

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH.

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In approaching the subject the teaching function of the church, three questions present themselves for answer: What do we mean by the church? Has she a teaching function? If so, how is it to be exercised? Upon the surface, that first question might seem ridiculous. The more so indeed, because of the intelligence of those to whom we speak. Nevertheless, it is a foundation question. It has to do with fundamentals. In order to a proper understanding of that which is to follow it is necessary that we have a common viewpoint at the beginning. The logic of the conclusion rests in the premise.

We very properly speak of the church as the church of Jesus Christ. It did not have its beginning with him but it had its origin in him. We are pleased to believe that he, in ascending on high, did not leave behind him any formal organization. However he did leave behind him conditions which made inevitable an organization that should bear his name. They who had the privilege of being assembled in the upper chamber on the great day of Pentecost, receiving thereby a measure of the divine outpouring, were "enriched in character

and empowered for service." These began immediately to proclaim the glad tidings of salvation through the death and resurrection of Jesus. The result was that thousands were converted to faith in him. The believers came together for prayer and conference and Christian fellowship, and almost at once a Christian society was formed. The ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper were observed and believers were instructed in the word. As the Gospel reached out in ever-widening circles new communities were formed. In time these communities came to be called churches. Together they formed the church of Jesus Christ. So the church of Jesus Christ originally meant a body of men and women who believed in Jesus as their Lord and Savior, and who therefore quite naturally banded together, first out of a unity of interests; second that they might enjoy the blessedness of worshipping together; third that they might facilitate the dispensing of charity and fourth that they might be the better equipped to dispense the glad tidings. We believe that this idea of the church has never been improved upon. Whenever an individual congregation has lived and labored for these ideals she has proven herself to be a worthy part of the church.

Returning to our original questions we ask, will the church be aided in the development of Christian character, in the performance of her social obligations and in the winning of men for Christ, by exercising the teaching function? Looking backward what is the answer? What does history have to say to us? As Jesus consistently and persistently taught that he came as the fulfillment of things religious which had gone before him, so his church is the child of the centuries that preceded her. She differs, as every child ought to differ, from the parent stock. Yet in many ways is she debtor to her ancestors. It is, therefore, a matter of interest to note the part played by the educational—the teaching function, in the religious life of the Hebrews. In Deut. 6: 7 we learn that the Israelites were commanded to teach their children diligently. In the same book, the 31st chapter, the 12th verse, it is said

that Moses was directed to gather the people together, men, women and children, to hear and learn in order that they might do God's will. The writer of 2 Chronicles informs us in the 7th, 8th and 9th verses of the 17th chapter that Jehoshaphat, the reformer king, sent princes, levites and priests to go throughout the land of Judah to teach the people from the book of the law of the Lord. In the days of Nehemiah, we are told in the book bearing his name, Ezra the Scribe conducted a bible school in Jerusalem, 13 levites assisting him in the reading of the scriptures and in explaining them to the people. Moreover, the historian tells us that Hebrew religious education assumed even greater importance at that critical time in Hebrew history when there was a movement of the people back to the home of their fathers. "In close proximity to this ancient home dwelt people of alien faiths. There was grave danger lest the distinctive qualities of the Hebrew religion should become obscured or lost." Therefore the synagogue school came into existence. Children from five to ten years of age were taught the scriptures. The material was provided in the form of parchment rolls and the method employed was largely the question and answer method. Unfortunately as time passed its main purpose was obscured in the effort to "perpetuate its processes" and when Jesus came it had lost the great throbbing impulse which first gave it life. However, he put the stamp of his approval upon the soundness of their theory by adopting the teaching method for the performance of his work. Men called him "Good Master" and he rebuked them for it. They called him "King" and he refused to rule over them as they wanted him to do. But when they called him rabbi or teacher he thanked them for it and strove to be worthy of the title. "And Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues." "For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes." Matt. 7: 29. "And it came to pass when Jesus had made an end of commanding his twelve disciples, he departed thence to teach and to preach in their cities." Matt. 11: 1. These

are but a few among the many, many references to him as the great teacher. Small wonder, therefore, that the supreme command, the great commission to the disciples was "go teach." Read the Acts of the Apostles, read the Epistles of St. Paul, having in mind the subject "The Teaching Function of the Church" and doubtless you will be surprised at the manifestations of fidelity to this command on the part of the really great ones among the early disciples. However, it was when the early church was confronted with a real crisis that she attempted consciously to meet that crisis through educational processes. "There was danger lest the recollections of Jesus should grow dim and his teachings become contaminated, through Jewish influence on the one hand and pagan on the other, until their distinctive qualities should be altogether lost." Consequently catechetical schools came into existence and continued throughout the period of the early church. The aim of these schools is stated by Clement of Alexandria to be: 'practical, not theoretical, aiming thus to improve the soul and to train it up to a virtuous, not intellectual life. The end of this education is moral loveliness, spiritual life and readiness for death.' As we come on down through the centuries we find that "the Medieval church had no system of religious instruction comparable in effectiveness to the catechumenate of the fourth and fifth centuries." This had prepared adults for baptism by careful doctrinal and ethical teaching, culminating in giving to the candidate the nominally secret formulas of the Apostles' Creed and the Lord's Prayer. Two factors aided in breaking down this catechumenate. One was that by the fifth and sixth centuries the Pagan multitudes were no longer pressing into the church, so that infant baptism became the rule. The other was the growing tendency to rely upon the mysterious or even magical potency of the sacraments, which were thought to be so powerful as to render almost superfluous any elaborate instruction of the intellect. After baptism the responsibility was placed upon parents and God-parents to indoctrinate the children. Synods held in England in the presence of Papal



delegates in the year 786 and capitularies of Charlemagne issued in or soon after 802, hold God-parents strictly to their accountability.

The Reformation was another epoch-making period. The right of the individual to live his own religious life and work out his own religious experiences involved the right to make his own study and interpretation of the bible. The method employed was largely the catechetical and emphasis was again on memorizing.

Thus we have seen briefly how, in centuries now remote, the church exercised the teaching function. Most important we have noted the motive which prompted her so to act. After all it is the motive and not the deed that counts the most. In relation to every act, thoughtful men will be asking the question why? Hence when we note that the church has in every age exercised the teaching function we may be assured that it was not an affair of chance but that it grew out of a well-fixed idea and the conviction that by teaching that idea could be furthered. It was the conviction that the Jewish religion could be preserved only by the educational method that firmly established that method. It was the conviction that the religion of Jesus Christ could most surely be established and most widely spread by the educational method that caused that method to be adopted by the early church.

We have previously expressed the conviction that the church of to-day can have no higher ideas or ideals than those which existed in some measure of perception for the early church, *i. e.*, the making of Godlike men and women, the helping of the needy (social service), and the leading of others to Christ (Evangelism). History tells us that the teaching function has been a strong arm of the church of the past. Reason tells us that the church of the present dare not ignore the place and the power of educational religion. In pursuing this conviction the church of to-day will profit as much by the errors of the past as by the wisdom of the past. She will be especially careful to avoid the error of Rome who has followed the theory

that to educate is to impose something upon men, rather than to lead out something that is already a part of them. Moreover, she will continue to avoid the error of Rome that all education must of necessity be under the control of the church for the reason that what the church does not do is worldly and therefore sinful. But, in avoiding the Roman error she will remember the times of the other extreme when, during two centuries of New England history, the state prescribed theological education for her youth, every one of the colonies with the bare exception of Rhode Island, conceiving religious education to be the duty of the state. During this period every child in New England received his instruction from the New England Primer and that instruction was all interwoven with Puritan doctrine. For a century and a half no child learned to read without being grounded at the same time in the elements of New England theology. Indeed it was not until 1833 that the New England schools surrendered the ideal of religious propaganda as their fundamental aim. However, now that it has been surrendered, there is no hope that the state will ever undertake the most important part of education—the development of the religious nature. “In the United States Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jew are united in believing that for the state to undertake any form of religious education is to do irreparable harm to religion itself.” “Here then is our national peril,” says President William H. P. Faunce, “that the supremely important task of our generation will fall between church and state, and be ignored by both. The church may say: ‘Education is no longer in our hands.’ The state may say: ‘On all religious matters we are silent.’ Thus millions may grow up—are actually growing up in America to-day—without any genuine religious training.” Indeed Dr. Faunce goes on to make the bold statement that “the state cannot, and the home usually does not undertake religious education and that therefore if the church shirks her responsibility, our people will be in 50 years a nation without a religion, i. e., a nation disintegrating and dying. For no

strong and enduring people ever yet existed without definite and continuous work in religious education." The power of the statement rests in the fact that it is prophecy based upon history. And even if it were not based upon history it is not such strange prophecy after all, for did not the Master himself say that happiness is dependent upon knowledge of the things of God? "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do." But the happiness that comes from doing rests upon the condition of knowing. But, how shall they know without a teacher?

It has been said that, "the nations have come to perceive that all industrial, military and intellectual achievement is based chiefly upon the persistent education of the people." It would seem that the church in its fundamental idea has anticipated precisely this attitude. For, in the days when in Europe she was officially in control of all human affairs, she planted Christian schools in every land. In America she founded nearly all of our earliest colleges. Here, then, is a challenge to all churches, and to the Reformed church in particular, to be true to her traditions and to profit by the experiences of the past, by supporting in unstinted measure her educational institutions. We call our colleges "Christian colleges" and we do well. They are colleges founded by our church. They are under the control of men chosen by her. Her aim has been to provide through them institutions where our young men and women might find that threefold development of body, mind and soul so essential to the fullest and most complete manhood and womanhood. We speak of our Seminary as the "school of the Prophets." It is fitting for us so to do. When, however, are we as church members going to appreciate the fact that to support liberally these institutions is not alone a matter of wise policy, but that it is in direct obedience to the great command: "Go teach"?

But, it has been contended that, great and important as it is, "the chief educational work of the church can never be done by reaching a few through formal schools and curricula, but

must be done in and through its regular services and functions." Doubtless, therefore, we are ready for the contention that she must, whatever else she does, exercise the teaching function. She must teach, and she must do it through her regular functions and services, we have said. And what does that mean? Does it mean that she is to see to it that her people, especially her young people, are taught the things that are in the bible? Yes, it means that and much more besides, for that much in itself may be but so much mental gymnastics. Teaching that reaches the head only is not sufficient for the church. We are reminded that the great teachers of Greece appealed to the intellect. They concluded their great orations with an appeal to reason. The great teachers of Rome made their appeal to the sensibilities. They concluded their great orations with an appeal to the feelings—a climax that "swayed the auditors as the summer winds move the ripening grain." But the greatest of all teachers, the Rabbi of Palestine, directed his appeal to the will. He was content neither with intellectual nor with emotional products. He knew that "the soul is cultured only when the will is moved to act." He closes his great appeals with "Go and Do." "Whoso heareth and doeth is wise." It is teaching such as this that must be done by the church—teaching that appeals to the will, teaching that ends in noble living. This means that the church must teach not only the words of Jesus, but the life and spirit of Jesus. That she must "traverse many realms in art and science and industry and politics where Jesus could not enter." She must solve problems that he was never called upon to face. She must battle with "diseases and vices and ingenuities of evil such as the first century could not know." Our age demands new knowledge but not a new attitude toward good and evil. It has been well said "the question: 'who is my neighbor?' must be answered in the twentieth century by a new definition of neighbor but not by a new kind of love for him. The 'woe unto you hypocrites' loses none of its pertinency and smiting power when the 'chief seats in the synagogues' are exchanged

for a rented pew in a Gothic church, and 'the devouring of widows' houses is accomplished by the manipulation of stocks.' In her teaching, therefore, the church will place emphasis not upon creeds and doctrines, good as these may be, but upon life. She will realize that she has to do with the souls of men and that that means more than intellect and sensibilities standing alone.

And how is she to organize to do this teaching? We do not fear contradiction when we say that the first responsibility must be placed upon the ministry. "When there is no vision the people perish." And when the minister does not stand upon the mountain top catching the vision, the church must be poor indeed. The minister is essentially the teacher of his generation. By this we are not arguing for a return to the old didactic and scholastic methods from which we have happily escaped. It does not mean the substitution of the essay for the sermon nor the exaltation of the doctrinal above the practical. The pulpit is not to become merely an "echo of the professor's chair" and the Gospel is not to become "mere diluted sociology or literary criticism." The great task of the minister is to give the people an abiding sense of moral and spiritual values—to make them realize what is worth while. It is to create and maintain Christian ideals and to apply them to the rapidly changing life of our generation. And this can be achieved "not through liturgy alone, nor by mere authority, nor by sermonic brilliance, but by the slow, silent, irrevocable processes of Christian education."

Believing this as we do, we would not make the sharp distinction made by so many, between the preaching function and the teaching function. Neither would we deny a place to the evangelistic in the work of the minister. We believe that preaching ought to afford him a most splendid opportunity for teaching and that the form of evangelism most worth while is that in which the teaching function is most wisely exercised. For some of us the most deplorable thing about the sporadic

evangelistic campaigns of the present day is that whatever attempt is made at teaching is not based upon sound doctrine. Men who are led to profess Christianity after subscribing to the kind of things that are preached from some evangelistic platforms of to-day, will live to see the time when they can no longer believe the things which have been falsely taught them and then there will be a reaction against all religion and all churches. Let it be noted that we believe in evangelism, that we understand that the office of the evangelist has New Testament warrant and an honored place in the history of the church. We are not unaware that from the work of men like Wesley and Moody there have come world influences that have not yet spent their force. The thing that we cannot do is be blind to the blight of unworthy evangelism—the kind that “rivals vaudeville with cap and bells and vulgar personalities, the kind that is commercial, transient, a spring flood that wastes and destroys as well as blesses, a forest fire that in many lives burns up the very soil of faith, a tornado that tears up the very roots of reverence and humility from which all true religion grows.” We believe most sincerely that the church of to-day is false to her name and untrue to her high calling if she is indifferent to the great command to evangelize men—win them for Christ. But we believe just as ardently that the best evangelism is that in which teaching is the largest element, is that in which the pastor is his own evangelist. And this means not only that in his pastoral work is he to set before men high ideals and lead them day by day into a larger measure of the abundant life, but that into his preaching he is to put so much of heart and so much of truth that the world may again be able to say: “We know that thou art a teacher come from God.” And this means, among other things, long pastorates. It means that the consecrated minister will not be asking: “Where will I be most comfortable”? but “Where can I be of most service”? It means on the part of the congregation that in a spirit of love for her shepherd, she will, by a sufficient support, through the manifestation of all proper



obedience and sympathetic helpfulness, endeavor to have him stay indefinitely, remembering that, "wherever a church has adopted a short pastorate, hothouse methods of culture and sensational results, it may have been stimulated but it has not been educated, and that the surest progress ever made by any church has been by the slow and irresistible processes of education, whereby, through the presentation of ideas and ideals, men have been led to take hold upon eternal life." And "this is life eternal, to know thee the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent." "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

Not alone in the pulpit does the minister have an opportunity to exercise the teaching function, but, in those churches which claim to be champions of educational religion, he is offered the advantages of a catechetical class. The conscientious pastor will not ask a finer opportunity for doing the real work of the church than that which is here presented. And the opportunity, let it be remarked, is one to exercise the teaching function. The catechetical idea is, as we have seen previously, an old one, being in "its simplest form as old as Christianity itself." The idea, as we interpret it to-day, rests upon the belief that God is Holy Love—our Father, and that he implants in every human being a positive religious nature. Therefore we seek, through the catechetical class, not to convert unto Christ, but to educate, to lead out the good that God has planted in the soul. And again we are called upon to make the assertion that the measure of good to be accomplished must be determined by the vision and the consecration of the individual pastor. We of this age, and we say it reverently and respectfully, do not feel that we have met the opportunities presented by the catechetical idea when we have simply used a prescribed catechism as a text-book, asking that the substance thereof be memorized. We believe that for the instruction of our youth our catechism, in much that it teaches, has been outgrown. And we believe further, that "the need of the child of the present generation must count for more than the

affection of the fathers for that which to them is perfectly satisfying." With profound reverence and gratitude for the work of our fathers, we nevertheless pray that the time may not be far distant when we shall have a catechism, breathing in all of its parts the spirit of our times and our beliefs and that therefore will not need as many interpretations as there are ministers who use it.

We have left for the last that which has been spoken of as "the unrivaled opportunity of the modern pastor for exercising the teaching function," *i. e.*, the Sunday School. President Faunce is so bold as to say that "the pastor who succeeds here, as the educational director of his young people, cannot fail otherwise, for his church has touched the ultimate springs of power. It is as a tree planted by rivers of waters, which each year adds new rings to its growth and new diameters to its shadow. Such a church is always anticipating its own future and training its own successors." Again we find the emphasis resting upon the work of the minister. Not that he must do all of the work, if indeed any of it in this case, but that he must be the inspiring and directing power in the church school of religion.

There are many minor matters pertaining to the work of the Sunday School of which we dare not take the time to speak. There are other things, vital and fundamental, to which we feel that we must make reference because they must be observed if the church through her Sunday School is to meet her God-given opportunity to exercise the teaching function. Doubtless there is some large measure of truth in the remark that "no other institution of our age shows such a chasm between possibility and performance." We would therefore presume to attempt to point out some of the things most essential to the nearly ideal school. It ought to be evident that, if it is to be a teaching institution, it needs more than 30 minutes of teaching each week. The public schools have thirty hours with half as many more hours of each week devoted to study in the home. Why the great disparity? Is it that we as par-

ents place a low estimate upon that knowledge which has for its primary purpose the nurture of the soul?

In the second place it needs to assemble in a building with class rooms. There is work to be done. Sunday School officers and teachers can no more do that work without a workshop than can the craftsman who deals with material structures do well his work without proper tools.

Third, it needs to be graded. This applies both to the pupils and the literature used for their instruction. Not in all things should the Sunday School copy after the secular school but assuredly in this one thing at least will she be wise in following. In many of our schools to-day we are persuaded there is no more imperative need than the grading of the scholars and the erection of rooms in which the grades may do effective work.

Last, but assuredly not least, is the need of trained officers and teachers. As some one has said: "The charming girl with blue eyes and golden hair is not necessarily able to undertake the religious education of our boys and girls. If she is not willing to join a training class, or study any of the methods of teaching, then she ought to go into some kind of work where kindliness and good intentions are a sufficient equipment."

Surely the church will strive to attain the ideal and to provide the equipment above mentioned, when she realizes that the purpose of the Sunday School is not merely to acquaint children with biblical facts, but it is to "set the currents of the soul in the channels of truth, that they may flow out into wider and wider reaches of power and steadier and steadier sweeps of influence."

The teaching function of the church! History tells us she has exercised it to the glory of God and the upbuilding of his kingdom. She turns to the future, desiring to be of service and to fulfill her mission in the world. She conceives her duty and her privilege to be summed up in social service, evangelization, and Christian nurture. She asks, How can I best do these things? and the spirit whispers: "Go teach, for in

relation to most of the crying evils, industrial and social, the good men, strong men, have been silent, because they have not been taught." Again she asks, How best evangelize? and the spirit whispers: "Go teach, for what shall it profit, if, in response to the call 'come to Jesus' men come forward by the score if they know not him to whom they come?" Moreover, says the spirit, "ye are not merely a life boat to save the few, but a lighthouse to guide the many. Would you therefore serve by nurturing unto strong Christian character? Then Go Teach."

BEDFORD, PA.

## II.

### CHURCH MUSIC.

W. S. KERSCHNER.

That there is a deplorable condition in modern church music will not be denied. All things being equal, the clergy is to blame when this condition is found in the church. The pastor usually holds the key to the musical situation in his own church. It is his privilege to appoint the music committee, he selects, or should select, the hymns for worship, and invariably the choice of a new songbook must have his approval. The minister has the power to make Christian song the vital force it should be in the service of God. This being so, it is essential that he possess a knowledge of music, but what are the facts in the case? The ministry is recruited from the stronger sex, 90 per cent. of whom either have not had, or have not embraced, the opportunity of a musical education. Entering the seminary, the candidate is taught to coördinate all the elements of the service. His prayers, the hymns, the sermon, all must be one grand harmonization of the truth he wishes to impress. He is taught the elements and structure of prayer; he is schooled in the choice of texts, the process of outline, and the method of treatment. Splendidly equipped, he goes forth with high hopes, only to have the early and rude awakening that the hymnal is to him a dark and unknown book. To say the least, he labors under a great handicap. The selection of three hymns for every service, without the ability to examine them for himself, soon becomes drudgery, and in his despair he too often shares this important part of the service arrangements with Philistines of worldly qualifications and praise.

It is not foreign to this subject to state that the theological

seminary curriculum should not be without something to supply this sore need. To see a minister turn to the many sensational songs with their freakish sentiment and clap-trap musical setting does not argue that he himself is entirely to blame. His practice is true to his training, or, better, to his lack of training. The crying fault of the seminaries in general is a perverted ideal of the thoroughly equipped minister. On an estimate, seven eighths of the curriculum is devoted to theoretics and dogmatics, and the poverty stricken remainder to practicalities. In these days of stern conditions, this ratio does not represent their relative importance.

We are within an ace of agreeing with a noted divine of the Anglican church when he was "almost tempted to say that the chair of music was vastly superior in practical importance to any chair in the seminary." In 1817, ten years after its founding, Andover Seminary wrote into its statutes the splendid idea that those who were to preside in the assemblies of God's people were to give serious attention to the culture of a true taste for genuine church music, and that the necessary instruction would be afforded in the theory and practice of the celestial art. Such seminaries as Yale and Union, with libraries containing the richest church music treasures in the country, afford little or nothing in the way of training for their students. Because of an endowment provided at Yale, a chair is maintained which at the beginning of the school year furnishes several very elementary lectures in church music, the attendance upon which is purely voluntary. At Oberlin, Hartford and Western Seminaries fair progress has been made in meeting the need, but the little the students receive brings to them such a rude awakening to the unattained possibilities that they realize with a new poignancy the truth of the poet's words,

"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing,  
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring."

The sacred music courses offered by the Moody Bible Institute,



Chicago, under the direction of Prof. D. B. Towner will serve as models for the curriculum of any seminary.

The church of Jesus Christ has yet to learn that music as an aid in worship and human uplift is largely an unexplored field. We need a new birth as to the character of church music. Music as an art *per se* has no place in divine worship. It is only music as an *applied* art that has any pragmatic value. Praise with the end of mere enjoyment or culture is a hideous monster. Songs that do not have for their object the uplifting of believers or the persuasion of unbelievers were better unsung. The effect of church music should not be intellectual, but rather emotional and psychological, or spiritual. This granted, the church should concern herself with the effects of the various styles and combinations of the words and music used in the sanctuary.

We draw an analogy from recent experiments in phonotherapy, or music healing, made at the Samaritan Hospital, Philadelphia, under the direction of its founder, the venerable Dr. Russell H. Conwell, and applied religiously at the Baptist Temple of which he is pastor. Healing by music is no new creed. The ancients believed in it so thoroughly and practised it so widely that our modern civilization must now place it among the lost arts. Hear the evidence from the ancient Hebrew life, in I Samuel 16: 14-23: "Now, the spirit of Jehovah departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from Jehovah troubled him. And Saul's servants said unto him, 'Let our lord now command thy servants that are before thee, to seek out a man who is a skilful player on the harp; and it shall come to pass when the evil spirit is upon thee, that he shall play with his hand, and thou shalt be well.' And Saul sent messengers unto Jesse and said, 'Send me David thy son, who is with the sheep.' And Saul said, 'Let David, I pray thee, stand before me, for he hath found favor in my sight.' And it came to pass, when the evil spirit from God was upon Saul, that David took the harp and played with his hands: so Saul was refreshed, and was well, and the evil spirit departed

from him." Ancient Babylonian and Assyrian writings show the doctors playing musical instruments for their patients. Egyptians used horns and cymbals to drive away disease. The Greeks studied the effects of music so closely that they passed laws limiting the stringed instruments to three strings, believing that playing on more strings weakened men, and had a tendency to make them ill. Roman conquests seem either to have buried this science entirely, or to have hidden it behind such clouds of pagan superstition that the only remnants we have are found degraded in the weird monotonous and incantations of the heathen medicine man.

To rescue this science from the ravings and orgies of heathenism Dr. Conwell and his helpers experimented with interesting results. Observing a score of patients suffering from various diseases, it was found that the rich melody of the hymn "I Know that my Redeemer Liveth" brought patients out of the anæsthetic trance without the usually attendant nausea and fever. They found, further, that restlessness was reduced by that old song "Flow Gently, Sweet Afton," that "Dixie" calmed a delirious patient, and that "Juanita," "The Last Rose of Summer," and like melodies, sent pain-racked invalids into soothing, healing slumber. One dyspeptic patient who was slowly starving, unable to take food, was so influenced by the music of "The Old Oaken Bucket" played in the next room that she was able to eat and enjoy what was set before her. "Old Black Joe" proved very injurious in fever cases, while "John Brown's Body" had a depressing effect upon brain fever patients. "Ben Bolt" sent the nervous patients into hysterics. Our national air, "The Star Spangled Banner," had a very injurious effect upon several children afflicted with brain fever, and the music had to be discontinued. Two little children, one afflicted with locomotor ataxia and the other with a form of St. Vitus's dance, were able to control themselves and even to walk, while the organ and violin played "Auld Lang Syne" and the tune that mothers use in singing "Hush My Dear, Lie Still and Slumber." Fever patients were greatly relieved and their temperature abated when the

sweet hymn was played, "Majestic Sweetness Sits Enthroned." The hymn "Savior, Breathe an Evening Blessing" was found to be one of the most beneficial. Patients suffering from sleeplessness were immediately sent into a sound, refreshing sleep when this hymn was played. After two or three renditions they were cured. The hymn was found to produce sleep in all cases. (Pastors will show discretion in deleting this hymn from further use.)

In an address before the House of Representatives years ago, Charles Proctor Knott said that the colored people of the South were almost entirely under the influence of musical sound; that any tune sung in a minor key would immediately win their attention, and that they could be kept law-abiding and moral, provided the government schools and the churches gave them the right kind of music.

We recall the instance of the babe who was torn from her mother's arms by the Indians during the frontier raid. At the end of sixteen years, during which time the captive grew into the fairest maiden of the tribe, a peace treaty was signed, and the white girl was returned to the pioneer home. The home and her parents seemed strange, and the perplexed mother in vain summoned all her power and skill to convince the girl that she was again with mother. Then, in desperation, she crooned one of the baby lullabys she had sung to her years before. Deep in the caverns of her soul the daughter had stored a childhood memory which needed only the lullaby to awaken, and she was soon back in the arms and love from which she had been torn.

Dare we spiritualize this evidence, and say that, if song will restore the lost to the arms of an earthly parent, it will, also, if rightly used, restore the prodigal to the love of a heavenly Parent? If music can check lawlessness and restore order in society, can it not, if wisely used, preserve that higher order which is heaven's first law, and bid chaos and soul darkness flee? And if it is a panacea for bodily ills, will we not find it, if used understandingly, a balm for the diseases of the soul?

Pastors unknowingly are driving away their people by giving them depressing music. A study of the effects of hymns should be made, and only such should be used as are refreshing and uplifting. Here is a great unworked field in church music.

Much has been said and written on the division of music into sacred and secular. Such designation is ungodly. Before God, all music is divine, and it is the fault of man if through usage it is so debased and so degraded as to be termed secular. He who qualified the singing bird as the first music master, who set the song in the sighing of the reed and the gushing of the rill, would never permit the music of the spheres to be employed except for His glory. Neither should His creatures be satisfied to see good music in the hands of the powers of sin and darkness. Whatever of taint may be in the world is so because of the unnatural use of the things to which the taint is ascribed. How can we speak of tainted money when the Lord of hosts says "The silver is mine and the gold is mine!" Haggai 2: 8. As well might we speak of a tainted soul! It was never intended that the money or the soul should belong to Satan, and the more money and souls we reclaim for the Kingdom, the more do we aid in the purposes of God. In like manner, there is a wealth of good music which, through association or by being set to worldly words and thoughts, has been degraded, and has had the divine stamp well nigh obliterated. If we believe with John Wesley that "the devil should not have all the good music," it should be counted our privilege and task to reclaim the best of the so-called secular music for the church.

Indeed, sacred music owes an everlasting debt to so-called secular music. Those ecclesiasts who place a ban on all music that has the least secular suggestion or association indulge a microscopic nicety which simply shows a woful ignorance. The average hymnbook is honeycombed with tunes originally set to sentimental, popular, and even drinking songs, and which were transferred in their entirety to our modern collections.

Dennis, Hursley, Seymour, Rhine, St. Hilda, Messiah, and many others, are adaptations from secular settings. At least three tunes in the Reformed hymnal are versions of Mendelssohn's "Songs Without Words." "My Jesus, as Thou Wilt," was arranged from von Weber's operatics. The splendid Passion Chorale was originally a love song. "Old Hundred" was adapted from a French folksong by Louis Bourgeois. When it is found that more than a score of our best hymns are excerpts from operas, we are prone to stand aghast at the thought of opera music in the church, but would it not be more proper to think of it as church music in the opera? On this point we long for a sane position which will not hold undue or unjust prejudice against much good music, and which at the same time will not offend ecclesiastical taste and the spirit of true worship. The recent encyclical of Pope Pius Tenth requiring all the congregations of the Roman communion to confine their music to the use of the ancient Gregorian chants could not be taken as a sane position. Neither is the idea held, except by a few Christians, that only the Psalms of King David should be used. The utter exclusion of music, as among the Quakers, is viewed as a meaningless eccentricity. While we would hedge about our declaration with numerous cautions, it is nevertheless true that in many selections taken from operas, etc., there is a most blessed interblend of words and music which weds them indissolubly with the highest aspirations of the human soul. Who does not love the tune "Mercy," taken from the fantastic setting of Gottschalk's "Last Hope"? Who is not edified with a worshipful rendition of the tender and most spiritual "Berceuse" from Godard's "Joelyn"? Wagner's "Tannhaeuser" furnishes two good examples of the unforced adaptability and serviceableness of opera music to church worship in the Prayer of Elizabeth and the Romance to the Evening Star sung by the baritone, Wolfram. I was once guilty of singing the words of the hymn, "More Love to Thee, O Christ," with the Welsh air set to the love serenade "All through the Night," a melody which the church could well

afford to adopt and adapt. At the close of the service the pastor and others commented very favorably upon the entirely pleasing and uplifting effect of the combination, but a retired Methodist minister in the audience, who was familiar with the original setting of the melody, was severe in his denunciation of my innovation, declaring that it smacked too much of bringing the world into the church. Yet this was the method employed by men who to-day are recognized as the mightiest of our hymnologists. Until recent years, Martin Luther was looked upon as an originator of the stirring Reformation hymns, but it is now generally accepted that he simply adapted and arranged them. It may be a shock to many to learn that the precious heritage "Ein Feste Burg ist Unser Gott," which Heine called the "Marseillaise of the Reformation," and which Frederick the Great called "God Almighty's Grenadier March," was originally a German folksong secular in character. Luther's other great contribution, known in classified hymnology as "Luther's Hymn," was arranged from a secular song and soon became wedded to Luther's own words "Nun Freut Euch, Lieben Christen Gemein." The situation was this: The Roman Catholic church had relegated music to the priesthood and to officially appointed choirs, and the people's part in the service was reduced to a minimum. The Reformation restored to the laity the privilege of joining in the music of the sanctuary, and to give it impetus the leaders naturally chose the familiar melodies taken from everyday life. Lowell Mason, who is regarded as the Father of American Hymnology, followed the same idea, though not so slavishly. However, this adaptation of secular airs by the church should be hedged about with cautions and exceptions. Tunes like Tipperary, etc., because of the lewd and vulgar parodies known to the average boy more than to the church, are used with positive loss.

Hymns can be classified from their character into inspirational and devotional. Inspirational hymns are such as please us, or as we think do us good. Devotional hymns concern



God, and are such as are used in raising our praise or in presenting our petitions. These latter are usually in the nature and structure of prayers. Both have their place in the church service, and both should have a distinctive place. Pastors will do well to observe this fact in preparing for any desired effect. Meetings are held where edification is the primary object, and to inspire a compelling dynamic all join in singing, for example, *Onward Christian Soldiers*, a hymn that is not primarily concerned with worship. In fact, it is usually sung with such gusto and utter abandon as to put real worship out of the question. Again, the meeting will have for its purpose worship pure and undefiled, when all the great realities of God as touching man are brought to heart, and the pastor will find that only the devotional hymns will give satisfaction. We must provide music for both situations, often in the same service. As pastors, upon whom devolves the important duty of selecting the hymns, we should see to this vital feature. Generally speaking, devotional music needs encouragement, because it is essentially unpopular. Edifying music needs little encouragement. Give each its proper place. Our Reformed hymnal is happily balanced in this respect. Of the 752 hymns, which is the total number, excluding the chants and several nondescripts, we find there are 323 devotional and 429 inspirational hymns, or a proportion of 43 per cent. devotional and 57 per cent. inspirational. With these resources at hand, any shortcoming in this respect makes the sin our own.

Answers to the following questionnaire might prove interesting: In selecting a hymn do you choose it for its tune or for its words? What is the character of the average tune you use? Do you seek properly to blend hymns that reach the heart of God with hymns that simply stir the heart of man? What thought is uppermost in your mind in selecting hymns? Which are the most popular songs in the hymnal? Does it not show a lamentable condition when minister and people are endlessly hitting upon the rollicking, sensational songs which serve to stir and inspire, but which do not bring God nearer?

The Moody and Sankey type of music primarily was never intended for worship, but for inspiration, and too often, alas! is its popularity mistaken for excellence. The average song-book of to-day contains a surfeit of selections which are but a slight improvement upon the old Negro Jubilee Songs, and which produce a species of religious hysteria rather than evoke a feeling of true worship. The law of fitness in worship should be brought against the rubbish heap of songs placed before the door of the church. The *Baltimore Sun* recently printed a list of objects that had been part of a trash-heap given to the Salvation Army after the City Clean-Up Campaign. The articles mentioned were one pussy-cat, six crutches, an ear trumpet, two bottles of patent medicine, a picture of John Alexander Dowie, a copy of "How to be Happy Though Married," and a Billy Sunday songbook!

Henry Ward Beecher has said: "Hymns are the jewels which the church has worn, the pearls, the diamonds, the precious stones formed into amulets more potent against sorrow and sadness than the most famous charm of the wizard or the magician. And he who knows the way that hymns flowed, knows where the blood of true piety ran, and can trace its veins and arteries to the very heart." Therefore, if we would present genuine jewels to God, and if we would preserve the power of these spiritual amulets, we must employ the best there is at hand. We can almost rejoice at the security of the Anglican church, which is saved from a deluge of inanities both in words and music by a wise provision of the church which permits nothing but duly authorized hymns to be sung.

What are the characteristics of a good hymn? We speak now of the ideal. The difficulty of writing a good hymn is acknowledged even by the masters of music. One of the foremost American composers when invited to contribute to a church hymnal declined with thanks, saying he would rather attempt a sonata than a hymn tune. The two features which go to make the difficulty are, first, a definite, complete and characteristic thought must be expressed within very circum-

scribed limits; and second, while the material to be used must necessarily be simple, the arrangement dare not be commonplace or shoddy. The great desideratum is the wedding of worthy music to worthy words. In too many hymns these are unequally yoked, and in only a select few is there a happy union which is of God. If we *must* choose between a good tune with unworthy words and a poor tune set to a worthy message, let us take the latter, for in the final analysis it is the words by which we mean to voice our praise. In the former instance it were better to release the good music from the millstone which burdens it, and secure nobler words. A Gospel songbook which recently left the press furnishes an amusing incident. In his compilation, the editor yielded to the strong universal criticism of the song "Somewhere the Sun is Shining," which possesses a splendid tune, but whose words are at once insipid and nauseating. The editor brings us into a coveted Canaan by using the tune with a metrical version of the 84th Psalm entitled "Longing Thy Courts to See," the effect of which is pleasing and satisfactory. But six pages farther on in the same book he again reduces us to bondage by presenting with all its weaknesses and aggravations, "Somewhere the Sun is Shining." How are the mighty fallen!

What standards shall be set for the tune? There is no arbitrary formula for its structural form. To reduce all tunes to a fundamental form would result in an intolerant monotony. Dr. David R. Breed would have all hymns in common, or four fourths time, but there are many hymns in other meters we would not care to surrender. The Reformed hymnal makes use of 45 various accepted meters. The hymnal of the Episcopal Church employs 105 meters. There has been, and is, a sentiment against three pulse time, on the ground that it has sensuous suggestions. The mediæval monks of the eleventh century held that triple time was perfect time, because the three pulses symbolized the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. There can be no set requirement for the tune, except that it

should aid by its rhythm in interpreting the message the words are to bring. A tune should be pleasing, and yet not to such an extent as to be called "pretty." Prettiness is indeed the last attribute of a good hymn tune. We speak of a pretty waltz, nocturne or serenade. A tune must be singable by the average worshipper. It must be of convenient range. In this respect *Lux Benigna*, with a range of six notes—two above and four below the tonic—is a model. The tune must not be angular, neither should it contain difficult or unusual intervals. The hymn arrangement of Handel's "I Know that My Redeemer Liveth," of which we have two settings in our hymnal, will never become a popular hymn for congregational use, because of its angularities. It is better as a solo. The tune Mozart to the words "Hail the Day that Sees Him Rise," should have no place among songs for the people, because of its florid style. Hymnals should contain comparatively few hymns in the minor mode. The sufferings of our Lord and possibly a funeral hymn should set the limit for the use of the somber minor in a religion which is one of joy unspeakable. The Reformed hymnal contains 15 selections in the minor key, 4 of which are chants.

As to the words of the hymn, someone has said that in the religion of Jesus Christ no hymn should be used which is not Christian in text. This is senseless drivel. The fact that the name of Christ is not mentioned does not render the hymn un-Christian. That model hymn, "O God Our Help in Ages Past," is purely Unitarian in content, written by the celebrated Isaac Watts, and yet the church at large delights in its use. Our Reformed hymnal editors saw fit to incorporate 12 hymns written by Unitarians. Hymns with fanciful, extravagant, highly poetical librettos, even though they may be beautiful, should be tabooed. The worshipper must understand what he sings. The inane, overdrawn verses of "Somewhere the Sun is Shining" mean little, and the singer completes them without the slightest notion of what he has sung. The words of Whittier,

"We may not climb the heavenly steep  
To bring the Christ-child down,  
In vain we search the lowest deeps  
For Him no depth can drown,"

are most beautiful of themselves and also in their musical setting, but the average worshipper will need an explanation of their meaning. The occasional reading of hymns in unison, with comments by the minister, will often enable the worshipper to grasp a hidden thought, and thus bring the hymn nearer and dearer.

The evolution of hymn singing has a distinct bearing upon the last thought of this lecture, namely, What will be the church music of the future? In large measure, the history of Christian song runs parallel with the music of the Anglican church. For nearly four centuries has that church supplied the best tunes, adopted as models by every branch of Christendom. Their superiority is attested by all the denominations in incorporating many of them in their hymnals. In our Reformed hymnal 32 per cent. of the hymns are from Anglican sources alone.

It must be remembered that no hymn music written prior to the tenth century has been preserved to us. The earliest notation of which we have any record is the ancient plainsong, or plain chant melodies. Their origin is uncertain. Some trace them back to the Jewish Temple service. Others say they are of Greek origin. There is one Jewish hymn preserved to us that has the characteristics of the plainsong. Plainsong was written before there was any harmonic conception, and ordinarily it was sung in unison, unaccompanied. Repetition of the text was not permitted, and often a single word was held and sung throughout the entire melody. These tunes, while quaint, were destined to survive, and several hundred are extant. Set to modern harmony, a number are found in use among Protestant churches.

Prior to the Reformation the hymnody of the church had not been influenced from without, but that great movement

changed the order. With the restoration to the layman of the privilege of song, thousands of hymns sprang up as over night, and the day of the German choral was ushered in. The chorals were invariably developments of themes taken from a plain-song or folksong. They are earnest and dignified, and many possess a solidity as though they had been hewn out of solid rock. They conform more nearly to the modern hymn notation, and are more readily learned than are the ancient plain-songs. With the aid of John Sebastian Bach, who must be looked upon as the father of our modern hymn harmony, Luther and his disciples far excelled the best efforts of the greatest hymn writers of all time. Nothing will ever efface their work, and we to-day enjoy the fruits of their labor. Our own hymnal is rich in the German chorals, most of which, unfortunately, suffer from weak arrangements. They also lose through translation. Compared with the Middle Ages, the German hymns show a greater variety. Sacred song once confined within the cloister walls now issued to the workshop, the harvest field and the home. There were hymns for family joys and sorrows, for toil and battle, for the sickbed and the wayside. In Germany the worship in the Reformed churches was closely linked with the hymn book, whereas in England the prayer book was the hand-maiden in worship. The Bible once restored, Luther energized until he had given Germany the hymn book. To Luther's compilation we are to-day indebted for the present independent character of our hymnals. Then, as to-day, the barriers found in the church on earth are broken down, and we see Luther sitting contentedly beside the Anabaptist, and the Reformed divine by the side of the Roman Catholic mystic. This has been a wonderful contribution to the praise of the church.

What Luther was to German music, Dr. Isaac Watts was to English music. His hymn book appearing in 1709 poured rich contributions into the musical coffers of the church. Several decades later the Wesleys appeared upon the scene, and out of lives filled with thrilling experiences and bitter perse-



cutions was distilled the Wesleyan hymn book. The early English hymns, while not so picturesque in outline, so extended in range or varied in character as the German chorals, possessed a certain characteristic simplicity which made them lasting contributions to the church.

The later English hymns, beginning with the year 1800, show a new departure. A freer spirit was manifest. Calvinistic influences, which fettered expression, were thrown off, and a period of original work followed. Missionary and evangelistic poems appeared with new rhythm combinations. We also find a lyric and emotional vein running through both tune and verses. The great outstanding figures in this development were Monk, Redhead, Smart, Barnby, Dykes and Sullivan.

Turning to America's contribution to hymnology, we find a situation that is without any positive principle. Preceding the work of Lowell Mason, who more than any other man set the type of church music in America, the Middle and Southern sections of the United States were developing the old "spirituals." Since the music of most of these was never written, very few are preserved to us. The "spirituals" grew out of the life of the people, and were just as characteristic as were the Negro Jubilee songs, which, by the way, were developments of the early "spirituals." To a people hidden among the inland retreats these spirituals were very satisfying, and, while they were crude from an artistic standpoint, they were good songs because they did the work, which after all is the true test for any hymn. The Gospel song of to-day, which is the predominating type of America's contribution to Christian music, grew out of the old-time "spirituals." Composers have known no bounds in their arrangements and adaptations. Their principle has been catholicity, and their creed practicality.

The church music of the future will not be any one of these alone. While the ancient plainsong would represent the purest, untainted type of worshipful music, yet a steady diet of

this would soon cloy. Neither would the sturdy, vigorous choral of the German or the Davidic Psalm tunes of the Calvinist and Puritan satisfy. The heavy polyphonic settings of a Bach would be found too mechanical. The early and later English tunes do not completely satisfy a life of shifting scenes, various emotions, and the freedom of American society. And above all, while we groan at many of the laments of æsthetical cranks over the Gospel-song, we should regret a divine selection that would preserve *it* to us as the surviving fittest. The church music of the future would seem to be a composite of many styles and influences. It will be as a great central station into which run wires from all sources, ancient and modern, religious and secular, sectarian and nonsectarian, Unitarian and Trinitarian, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, the splendid solidity of the ancient plainsong, the firmness of the German choral, the masterly polyphony of the Middle Ages, the classic dignity of the English cathedral style, plus the lyric and dramatic of later art, and even the emotional and sensational of modern fad and fancy, and from this conglomeration will evolve the message of Christian song which will be the survival of the fittest.

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### III.

#### THE PLACE OF THEOLOGY IN RELIGION.

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In these days one hears a multitude of voices, each crying out its eager longings or heart-felt complaints. On the one hand are the social idealists who tell us that the times are out of joint, and that they can be set right only upon the just principle of collectivism. On the other hand are they who would "let well enough alone," granting, however, as a concession to present-day discontent, the necessity of injecting more of the sense of personal obligation into our social consciousness. Here are the intellectuals who walk not by faith but by sight, and who would peer with a full measure of assurance into the "dim unknown," expecting to discover there the riddle of the universe solely by means of magnifying glass and telescope. There are the conservatives who conscientiously shudder at the latest conclusions of the scientific method as the sheerest kind of infidelity, as they hold tightly to a hoary-headed traditionalism which has, in truth, more of genuine speculation in it than vital personal experience. On all sides we hear either eager voices calling for something new, like the ancient Athenians, or disconsolate laments over the growing skepticism of the age.

In religious circles this confused clamor has created a great deal of uneasiness. It is true, some will have nothing whatever to do with religion, claiming that it is merely the relic of superstitious ages which is bound to be discarded eventually with the advance of science and more universal education. Others there are who hold with grim determination to the theology of the schoolmen, giving it precedence over every other interpretation of truth and religious experience. But

there are many to-day who impatiently break with all theological formulas, who in disdain wave away our dogmas and cry "Back to Christ," intending thereby to show both their loyalty to the historic Jesus and their interest in a faith which is simple yet energetic. Theology receives scant consideration from such as find their heart satisfied with the simple morality of the "Sermon on the Mount" and who quite agree with Matthew Arnold that religion is little more than "morality touched with emotion." Therefore in an age in which religion and theology are altogether discredited or misinterpreted or confused, it is necessary for us to define each clearly and to locate the position which theology ought rightly to hold in religion.

Religion has been variously defined, as "a simple feeling of self-surrender to the Godhead";<sup>1</sup> or as "the life of God in the soul of man";<sup>2</sup> or as "a matter of personal relationship between God and man";<sup>3</sup> or as a sense of dependence upon a power higher than oneself.<sup>4</sup> In these definitions we recognize two constant factors: God and man, a supreme Being and his creature, the former embracing the whole life of the latter and giving unity and direction to it;<sup>5</sup> while the latter consciously looks to the former for assistance in time of need and for light upon all life's perplexing problems. Should we define religion from the Christian point of view, we would doubtless agree with Harnack when he says that religion in its purity is what Jesus shows it to be: the consciousness of God's fatherhood and our sonship, and the filial and fraternal life which such consciousness entails.<sup>6</sup>

Theology is the science of religion,<sup>7</sup> an intelligent and systematic explanation of the facts and experiences which grow

<sup>1</sup> Bousset, *What is Religion?* 1907, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Abbott, *The Theology of an Evolutionist*, 1897, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Guthrie, etc., *The Personality of Christ*, 1907, p. vii.

<sup>4</sup> Schleiermacher's view: cf. Moore, *Christian Thought since Kant*, 1912, p. 76.

<sup>5</sup> Caird, *The Evolution of the Christian Religion*, Lect. I.

<sup>6</sup> Harnack, *What is Christianity?* p. 63.

<sup>7</sup> Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

out of our beliefs and hopes. It is religion conscious of itself and reflecting upon itself.<sup>8</sup> It is an interpretation of the why and wherefore of our "self-surrender to the Godhead"; it is a thoroughgoing description of the working of "God's life in the soul of man"; it is a concise treatise upon the "sense of dependence upon a power higher than oneself." Religion is a life—a life lived in God's presence and in the consciousness of God's interest in us; theology, in its restricted sense, is but an interpretation of that life, an attempt to clarify the religious atmosphere by giving a satisfactory answer to the questions which our personal experience and contemporary culture naturally raise.

But we should be careful to note that religion is *prior* to theology, as life is to an understanding of it, or as flowers were to botany. First comes the "sense of a power higher than oneself," and then follows the attempted description of that power and its relation to oneself. All the *vital* factors of theology have made themselves felt first in the religious life before theology tried to explain them. A conscience-stricken sinner experienced the blighting power of sin before the first theologian attempted to define its nature or to describe its origin.

In investigating the forms which religion has taken we discover three special types: Natural, Historical and Mystical.<sup>9</sup> The first finds God chiefly in nature and sings with the Psalmist: "the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork."<sup>10</sup> The second discovers God in connection with certain historical events and characters, and declares in Pauline language: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself."<sup>11</sup> The third fellowships with God in the inner spirit, and claims that he is "not so far away as even to be near." Each form has a measure of truth in it. But each, if unrelated to the others, faces a very real danger.

<sup>8</sup> Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 1904, p. 31, Vol. I.

<sup>9</sup> Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, 1909, p. 247.

<sup>10</sup> Psalm 19: 1.

<sup>11</sup> 2 Cor. 5: 19.

Natural religion is prone to degenerate into pantheism which undermines morality by destroying the sense of personal responsibility for sin; historical religion is liable to become a mere matter of proof-texts and evidences; mystical religion very easily becomes impractical and neurotic.

Christianity, however, combines these three forms into a well-rounded whole; and partially gives expression to its faith in the doctrine of the Trinity: nature speaks to us the language of God the Creator; the historic Jesus speaks of God's unchangeable and fatherly love; the Spirit symbolizes his eternal presence and sanctifying power. And a mature Christian will bow in worship before the God of the universe, in reverence before the Man of Gallilee, and will fellowship with God in spirit and in truth.

Now the place of theology in such a religious faith is determined by the part we let reason play in life. Should we believe that reason has a function to perform in every other aspect of life except the religious, then our theology would be of the most primitive and insignificant character. Were we to regard reason as an enemy of faith, tearing down what faith reverently attempts to construct, quite naturally we should be content merely to stand in wonder in the presence of the divine and mysterious, but with no thought of entering into their fellowship or mastering their secret. While theoretically this may be the attitude of many Christians, practically it is the attitude of none. Even the blackest savage in his fetish-worship, though he seems steeped in ignorance and superstition, has reasoned just enough about his fetish to conclude that it *ought* to be worshipped. So that while one may look askance at any attempt of reason to pierce the veil of the spiritual world, or to explain in a natural manner whatever seems to bear all the earmarks of the supernatural, still one cannot forbid reason to function.<sup>12</sup> It will do so, whether we wish it or not. For religion is concerned with the whole of life, with the mind as well as the heart, with thought to an equal degree with the emotions. The "first and great commandment" bids

<sup>12</sup> Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 12.



us love God with the heart and soul and *mind* and strength. It is indeed impossible for religious faith to reach its finest form without trying to analyze and reconstruct its content. If it fears the conclusions which reflection might reach and therefore shuts itself up against reflection, then its creed degenerates into a dead formula and its worship into superstition. But then it is no more faith. Reason, or theology, therefore, finds its logical place in religion as religion's *mirror*, in which it sees itself as it is.

The question next arises: Just what latitude ought we give to reason in religion? Shall we attempt to set a limit to its investigations and say: "Thus far you may go and no farther, for the ground whereon thou walkest is holy ground?" Or shall we set no boundary lines to it whatever, but give it free scope, permitting it to discover its very real limitations for itself and eventually to stand in reverence before that which it cannot explain? This latter, it seems to the writer, must be our consistent attitude; for reason cannot be legitimately forbidden entrance to any portion of life. It comprehends all of life in its activities. Though it is undoubtedly true that there is a realm of knowledge and life which is undiscoverable to pure reason, or to science, and which yields up its treasure only to the "open sesame" of faith, still we believe that it is the province of reason to refine that treasure, once it has become the possession of faith, and to interpret the religious experience to him who has passed through it. Theology, accordingly, though it creates neither God nor man, functions properly when it carefully investigates both and interprets the relationship of both. As long as we are intellectual beings we shall have a theology. The only question at issue is: just what kind of a theology shall we have?

Here we are confronted with two distinct theories concerning the nature of theology: (I) Static and (II) Developmental.

I. The first is held by all traditionalists. It asserts that our views of God, man, Jesus, redemption, etc., are substantially the same as those which were held by our fore-

fathers. There has been no change, and furthermore no need for change; for our theology is built upon God's revealed word, and revelation was completed nineteen centuries ago. It is our province merely to discover what God said then, in order to know what we ought to believe now. This is essentially the view of the Roman church and of certain portions of the Protestant—a view which is built upon the idea of divine transcendence. God is separated from his world, with which he occasionally comes into touch only through intermediaries or miracles. He has spoken to us once for all "unto the fathers by the prophets," and modern theology must exactly parallel biblical theology in order to receive Christian standing. "The faith once delivered unto the saints"<sup>13</sup> becomes the shibboleth of the traditionalist, and guarding "the deposit" is his most sacred concern.

There are two criticisms of this theory, however, which make it untenable for the modern age: (1) it is *unhistorical*. There never has existed an unchanging theology. The theology of to-day, even in its most conservative form, can scarcely be adjudged the theology of the apostolic age. "Verbal Inspiration of Scripture" and "The Virgin Birth," both of which occupy a prominent place in the conservative system, were of no consequence to Peter and to Paul. They were interested in the sublime facts of Jesus' public life, his death and resurrection, his teaching, and the underlying spirit of all his deeds. And beyond these the church of the first century did not go. Now, these may rightly (or wrongly) be postulated as the groundwork of our theology, but they are not the theology itself. In truth we have discovered far more theology in the Bible than is really there. And the fact that the conservative is always careful to state that the germs at least of his system are to be found in scripture, is sufficient warrant for our statement that there never has been an unchanging theology; for even a germ is not identical to the thing into it develops. Throughout the past nineteen centuries theology never stood

<sup>13</sup> Jude 3.

still, but repeatedly changed its content and form. We have but to recall the pre-Anselmic view of the Atonement to discover just how much theology has changed.

(2.) A static theology is *unscientific*. There is no room in the universe for the idea of the static. Science tells us that nothing stands still; all is movement and progression, or degeneration. A theory passes from one mind to another, and immediately it is not quite the same theory; it has been altered in the passing. For the mind is so constructed that no idea flits through it without having its form perceptibly changed. And it is quite unthinkable that the thought of God could have been transmitted from mind to mind through nineteen hundred years and remain precisely the same thought which flashed through the mind of the first Christian. New experiences and completer knowledge enable us think of God, sin, Jesus, and of all the other elements of our religion, in a different way from that of the twelve disciples. We cannot help ourselves in the matter; we are only fulfilling the law of our own being, which is not the law of inertia but of movement, of what someone has called "the glory of going on."<sup>14</sup>

II. This brings us to the second theory concerning the nature of theology: the Developmental. Probably the greatest scientific contribution of the nineteenth century to the world's thought was the theory of evolution; and Charles Darwin, though he was castigated on all sides as the enemy of religion, was, in fact, one of religion's, or rather theology's, greatest benefactors. Darwin, Wallace, *et al.*, described the operation of the law of development from lower to higher forms of life—a law which Henry Drummond said holds good in the mental and spiritual life of man as well as in the physical. We are constantly attaining to higher religious conceptions and fashioning more rational theories. The lapse of years throws more and more light upon our religious problems. Our views necessarily slowly change in harmony with our accrued knowledge. If the Christian religion is a life-giving and character-

<sup>14</sup> *The Outlook*, June 21, 1916, p. 407.

molding power, because of its inherent truth and life, then it must manifest a distinct developmental tendency; because it is of the very nature of life and truth to unfold through the passage of years. And if theology is the science of such an unfolding life it must perforce be a growing thing. There has consequently been almost as great a variety of theological concepts as biological species, and fixity is quite as impossible in the history of theology as it is in nature. For example, the angelology and eschatology of the apostolic age have been outgrown and are to-day viewed with as much curiosity as is the Ptolemaic picture of the world. We can trace a distinct religious and theological evolution in the Bible itself; for instance, witness the growth of the notion of God from judge, or king, to Father. The ethical value of the prophets is in part due to the fact that they were able and willing to break with the accepted ideas of their age and meet its needs by a theology of their own making.<sup>15</sup> Paul eliminated circumcision from the rising Christian system, because he believed the religious welfare of the gentile world demanded it. And Jesus himself did not hesitate to elaborate upon his contemporary theological conceptions and spiritualize them when the occasion suggested the need. We have but to recall how he always spoke of God as a Father who is to be loved, in distinction to the contemporary view of a harsh God who is to be feared and placated, in order to see just how freely Jesus departed from the theology of his age. As we take only a cursory glance at the history of theology we discover a genuine evolution. For, as we said before, religion is a life lived in the consciousness of God's fatherhood and our sonship. And it is a developing life. Theology, as an interpretation of that life, must likewise develop if it wishes to retain its scientific standing. It must prove itself "the product of actual persons working out their religious problems in immediate contact with their several worlds of reality, the process being renewed in the religious experience of each new generation."<sup>16</sup> It is a long step from

<sup>15</sup> Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, 1913, p. 191 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, 1914, p. 25.

the theology of the first century to that of the twentieth; but as we study it we are able to read the interesting history of earnest folks who tried to systematize their thoughts upon their peculiar experiences and to interpret those experiences in the light of their moral and spiritual capacities and needs.

Between the static and developmental theories there is a great gulf fixed, with no middle ground upon which one can take a safe stand. One must hold that our theology, or its germs, was given us *in toto* by the Lord to his apostles who transmitted it intact to the church of the twentieth century; or one must believe with the prophet Jeremiah that a new spiritual situation necessitates a new theological formula which is competent to meet its needs. We may, like the Colossus of Rhodes, try to straddle the current of theological thought, with a foot placed on either extreme; but then some new scientific theory may like an earthquake just as easily tumble us in ruins. We try to serve two masters when we hold with one hand to a thoroughgoing traditionalism, and yet, in a more liberal spirit, reach out with the other for the latest conclusions of the scientific method. Mediationalism really gets nowhere. It is an artful but highly unsatisfactory kind of exegesis which tries to harmonize the first chapter of Genesis with the evolutionary cosmology, for it cannot be done. It would be a far safer and truer method to recognize frankly the historical limitations of the biblical story and accept the evolutionary theory as, in the words of John Fiske, "God's way of doing things."

Developmental theology is not interested so much in a fixed conclusion, or in the content of doctrine, as it is in the method by which one may reach a conclusion. It is not concerned with the preservation of any special type of theological system, but with the great spiritual realities which lie back of all our systems; not with the particular garb in which truth may clothe itself in any generation, but with truth itself. We therefore recognize a clear need of the constant revision of our working theories in order more nearly to approximate the truth.

Granting, then, that theology must change to meet changing needs, shifting viewpoints, and rightly interpret new experiences, we must next determine the elements which should underlie it; and here we come to a very fruitful field of thought. Our theology, to be both Christian and philosophically sound, must reckon with three primary realities: (1) divine goodness, (2) divine immanence, (3) and Jesus. The elimination of any one of these will render our system inconsequential.

1. We have said that in religion the two constant factors are God and man, and that theology in brief is a systematic interpretation of their life and relationship. Now the existence of God is at best an assumption with which theology must begin.<sup>17</sup> But, as Christians, we need something more than the assumption of divine existence; we must reckon with a supreme *Personality*, in order to avoid the unwholesome conclusions of agnosticism. And our religious needs remain altogether unsatisfied with anything short of a supreme Personality who is also *good*, and with whom we may daily fellowship. It is this aspect of God, his goodness, which has survived all the vicissitudes of theological change. Sometimes it has been obscured by ideas borrowed from Greek philosophy or Jewish legalism; occasionally it seems to have been all but lost amid the rubbish of medieval dialecticism; frequently other divine attributes almost eclipsed it; yet underneath all the speculative accretions of nineteen centuries this idea of divine goodness has existed in more or less definite form.

But what do we mean by divine goodness, when we say that it must be considered a fundamental element of Christian theology? It has been defined for us as a "perfect knowledge and understanding of all the relations in which he (God) stands to other beings and other beings stand to him, in perfect choice and use of the highest considerations and seeking of the worthiest ends, and in complete unselfish devotion to the good of all."<sup>18</sup> We may summarize this definition in the words

<sup>17</sup> McGiffert, *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*, 1915, p. 226.

<sup>18</sup> Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, 1909, p. 81.



Wisdom, Holiness and Love, each of which is a constituent element in the idea of goodness; "but the greatest of these is Love." All our theological formulations must coincide with this conception of divine goodness in order to be regarded as trustworthy and Christian. In the sixteenth century justice was given preëminence in the divine Being; and, consequently, it was possible for doctrine which was very logically constructed, with justice as the premise, to be at the same time repugnant to the deep feelings of the heart. John Calvin, while he believed that his view of predestination satisfied all the canons of logic, was nevertheless impelled to call it a "horrible decree." But we are quite safe in assuming that any theory which offends our highest moral sense, though thoroughly logical, is theologically unsound. And once we postulate divine goodness as the fundamental element of God's character, we shall no longer be under the necessity of subscribing to some dialectical monstrosity which the heart terms a "horrible decree."

But divine goodness compels us not merely to ethicize our doctrines; it in fact requires the abandonment of some doctrines altogether, or at least such a transformation of their content that they become practically new. For example, the "substitutionary" theory of the atonement, which was constructed upon a strict medieval sense of justice, is completely undermined, for we cannot think of the good God permitting one person to suffer the punishment merited by another. And the theory of atonement is now in process of reconstruction. Predestination has become little more than a divine bequest in line with natural law, such as heredity, environment, will, etc. Revelation is no longer considered as completed with the closing of the canon, for divine goodness enables us to believe that God speaks to us to-day just as audibly as he did to the Jewish patriarchs and prophets. This leads us to alter our view of the Bible, so that it becomes what it was really intended to be: not a final court of appeals for every conceivable question, but a record of the changing experiences and developing religious

consciousness of the ancient world's most spiritually-minded people; a guide to life, therefore, and not the miraculous giver itself of life. Down through the Christian centuries men believed that God is good, even though at the time they were frightened into submission by a perverted idea of his justice and power. And we believe to-day that *divine goodness* is one of the tests of doctrinal validity.

2. *Divine immanence* is a necessary corollary of divine goodness, and is the second essential element of a Christian theology. This is a resultant conception from the two-fold contribution of science and philosophy to religious thought. Science speaks of a resident force in nature working according to a certain law for the production of a certain change. Philosophy recognizes the existence of such a resident force, imputes intelligence to it and calls it the Absolute, and thus philosophy discovers the unifying principle of nature. Religion accepts the idea of science thus amended by philosophy, adds moral character to it, and calls this intelligent resident force which is also good, *God*. This conception saves us from all crude anthropomorphisms, as well as from the wit of the French philosopher who said, "In the beginning God created man in his own image, and ever since man has been returning the compliment by creating God in his."

Divine immanence is what someone has called "the democratic view of God." It regards the universe as created and sustained by means of a purposive power or a living spirit dwelling within it, rather than working upon it from without. Thus creation is a process in perpetual operation, rather than a finished product. This logically precludes the necessity for miracles. All the natural is made supernatural. The conception of the miraculous is built upon divine transcendence, *i. e.*, a deity who exists apart from the universe and occasionally interferes with the cosmic machine which he ages ago set agoing. This idea was borrowed from the political theory of a monarchical period. The power of the king was absolute. His royal will was law for the people—a law imposed upon

them from without; only infrequently did he appear among his people like a good protector and distribute his favors gratuitously. It was but a step from an absolute monarch to a transcendent God who writes his law upon tables of stone amid the clouds of Sinai and shows his benevolent temper by bringing the dead back to life.

But science, philosophy, and democratic theory alike combine to render the quantitative view of transcendence untenable. God is not a "divine Hercules" who works upon his universe from without like the sculptor upon his clay; God is *in* his universe, whose forces may be described as the energies of his will, "working all things for good to them that love him."<sup>19</sup> He controls and shapes the universe as the spirit does the body. There is no question of occasional interferences in the form of miracle; God is always present, "closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet,"<sup>20</sup> always working out his supremely good purpose in his own good way. Transcendence loses its quantitative value and receives an ethical one: God is higher than his universe and greater than his creatures in that *he is perfectly good*, possessing all the qualities in fullest degree that we are able to attribute to moral perfection.

And an immanent deity is an incarnate deity, abiding in the human soul. Where, forsooth, could God more properly dwell than in beings who are life of his life and counterparts of his image? Thus the doctrine of the incarnation is lifted above the view of the metaphysician, who could see deity mechanically incarnate in only one historic personality, and is made descriptive of all human souls, who are, indeed, images of the divine. Jesus is illustrative in perfect measure of this ideal unity of the human and divine; his consciousness of it made him Lord of the human soul and the bearer of light into a world of darkness.

Revelation likewise is included in the changed interpretation which immanence brings about. Immanence makes fellowship with God both a possibility and a concrete reality, and

<sup>19</sup> Rom. 8: 28.

<sup>20</sup> Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism*.

it is this fellowship through which God communicates his thoughts to man. In the atmosphere of fellowship the intuitive faculty works most easily, and it is this which serves as the point of contact between the mind of God and the mind of man. Like a bubbling spring a divine truth wells up from the all-embracing Absolute through human consciousness and we say, "this is the will of God." We hear no voice, and yet we have the unswerving conviction that our intuition has served us aright. In some such way the prophets and apostles knew the heart and mind of God; and we feel their inspiration in our own quickened impulses and our yearning for "the things that are above,"<sup>21</sup> when we read the canonical writings.

Divine immanence furnishes theology the key to many a problem, such as how prayer can be squared with natural law; or how any good can possibly come out of life's evil circumstances; for immanence brings God very close to us—so close, that his eternal presence is a never-failing source of strength in time of temptation and of consolation in seasons of distress. While it is ever open to the danger of being converted into a bald pantheism, so that God is everything and everything is God, still our own personal experience will prevent any such deification of either ourselves or nature; but it will on the contrary send us down upon our knees in time of need and impel us to seek help from him alone "who rules over all, acts through all, and dwells in all."<sup>22</sup>

3. The third element in a Christian theology is *Jesus*. It is almost superfluous to speak of the Christocentric principle in this presence, for that has been our distinguishing characteristic for a generation and more. Yet we must not fail to recall Jesus' normative position. We are not here concerned with any theory of his preëxistence, nor with any speculative or biological conception of his birth, nor with his miraculous cures—all of which may have held an important place in the mind of the first three centuries after Christ as an explanation of his unique personality, but which have ceased to be re-

<sup>21</sup> Col. 3: 2.

<sup>22</sup> Eph. 4: 6, Modern Speech version.

garded as vital for our religious life. Theology must regard Jesus as the interpreter of God's purpose and the express image of God's character, and further than that we are not warranted by the gospels in proceeding. It is true that in several of his letters Paul reads a deeper meaning in Jesus' person, but we must remember that Paul's Christology is that of the first generation after Jesus lived and died; and a Christian theology must be built not upon Paul but upon Christ. It is what Jesus thought of himself and his work which must constitute a starting point in our thinking; and we secure that not from the great missionary but from a comparative study of the four gospels.

Here, as we have already said, we find that Jesus does two things: (1) he reveals God's eternal purpose, and (2) he illustrates God's unchangeable character.

1. God's purpose is to construct upon the earth a new social order which Jesus called the Kingdom of God—an order in which righteousness, brotherliness, and peace abide, in which men worship God as Father and serve one another as brothers. This idea lies at the very heart of Jesus' teaching, and it is to be regarded as his first great contribution to religious thought.

2. He shows that the character of God is one of perfect and holy love. God's purpose in respect to the founding of the Kingdom is an effect of which his love is the cause. And the essential truth of Jesus' gospel is that God is the eternally loving Father of all men and that he wants them to live on the closest and most intimate terms with himself and with each other. Jesus finds a normative position in Christian theology, therefore, not because of any unity of essence with God—for that is a metaphysical notion totally unverifiable in human experience—but chiefly because of his full consciousness of God's purpose and his entire personal consecration to that purpose; and, next, because of his perfect understanding of God's character and his own living embodiment of that character. Jesus became master of the world because his devotion to God's will and purpose enabled him to master all worldly

temptations and tendencies. And his value for the people of every age consists not in peculiarity of birth or essence of being, but in his mediation of God's purpose and character to each age. No one cometh unto a clear knowledge of God as his Father except by the way of Jesus Christ. Whatever theology may have to say about God must unalterably coincide with Jesus' view and representation. Furthermore, theology dare ascribe to Jesus no more than he claimed for himself, and that is ethical oneness with God. In everything else he considered himself as a man among men.<sup>23</sup> When we are able to see in Jesus a clear presentation of God's character and purpose, and also a perfect picture of what man shall some day become under God's gracious nurture, then surely we can reverently adore Jesus as Lord, and take up our cross daily and follow him. Altogether apart from what Jesus Christ did, were he no more than the ideal man—and there is power in all ideals which no one can gainsay—still he would draw all men unto himself and save unto the very uttermost. This is the clear testimony of nineteen hundred years.

And now we come to the point where we must find a norm for our theological system. How shall we know whether or not it ought to be accepted, whether it rightly interprets the inner truths of our religious life and faith? Here, again, we meet with three theories: (1) agnostic, (2) aristocratic or authoritative, (3) experimental.

1. Agnosticism declares that we cannot be certain of anything spiritual; that since the idea of God is a pure assumption, all speculation concerning his nature and activities is entirely fruitless. "The realm of supraphenomenal reality is wholly closed to us. We can deal with given facts and their relation to one another; but the inner nature of things, the first cause and the final purpose of all existence, we can know nothing about. . . . Absolute knowledge or knowledge of an absolute is quite unattainable."<sup>24</sup> In other words, spiritual realities do not really exist for the human mind; at least our

<sup>23</sup> Bousset, *Jesus*, p. 202, Crown Theol. Lib.

<sup>24</sup> McGiffert, *op. cit.*, p. 146.



knowledge of them is insufficient to serve as the basis of constructive thought. But the weakness of agnosticism is that it is never consistent. It presumes to know just enough about the spiritual world to assert dogmatically that we can actually know nothing about it, and thus in the act of denying the possibility of certain knowledge it really denies itself. Fortunately, however, for the good sense of the race, it will not be content with this theory of assurance; it simply must know beyond the peradventure of a doubt whether or not its dreams and visions are based on solid fact.

2. A step higher than the agnostic position is that of the so-called fiat-theology of "religions of authority." Here one's views must parallel those of one's religious organization. The average man has neither the mental equipment nor the spiritual insight to fashion his own theology. He must rest content with that which is handed down to him by his spiritual advisers and ask no questions. For a theological consensus is bound to be correct; and should the average man attempt to trespass upon his spiritual privileges and think for himself, he must be made to suffer for his presumption, and either be forced to bow in submission to that which has been decreed by his church, or to withdraw from his denominational body.

This theory practically assumes on the one hand the static character of theology, and on the other regards personal investigation as dangerous to the cause of truth and ecclesiastical sovereignty. Rather than run the risk of having any one of his flock go astray in search of green pastures, the shepherd will confine them all within the fold and forage for them. The average man is safest only when he holds as good that which authority dictates to him. But this view would establish a caste system in religious circles which is dangerous to the unity of the brotherhood and to its highest spiritual efficiency. For a theology which betrays esoteric tendencies is entirely devoid of virtue. In the long run religions of authority breed either intellectual stagnation or skepticism. Religion is common to all; and theology must interpret that common

religion in a way satisfactory to all. To each believer belongs the privilege of reaching his own conclusions concerning his religious life; but he must not forget that the cause of truth itself imposes upon him the necessity of laying tribute upon the common experience of the race as he formulates his opinion.

3. This leads us to the experimental theory of theological assurance. The first question which it asks of each formula is: "Does it work?" Is it true to the general experience of the race? For after all is said, the true test of a creed is *life*. The editor of the *Wall Street Journal* said some time ago that a man who believes in God is a better man to do business with than he who has no such belief. And there you have the crux of the whole matter. We may erect all the sayings of Jesus we please to the dignity of dogma, many of which were scarcely more than explicit directions for special occasions, like, "Go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and come follow me";<sup>25</sup> or to Nicodemus, "Ye must be born again."<sup>26</sup> But it is not our dogmatizing which makes the statement true; it is its agreement with life. Can it be tested in, the crucible of experience? Does our theology help to develop our moral consciousness, does it make us more efficient in the service of the race and more representative of the inner life and spirit of the Kingdom? In short, what relation does dogma have to the moral life of the believer, or is there no connection whatever? These questions determine the place of formulas in our system. Whatever has a direct bearing upon life must be considered fundamental; all else is secondary, interesting and highly suggestive, it is true, but still speculative and secondary. For religion is a living experience, and theology must interpret that experience in terms true to it. The one valid test of our theological system is its verifiability in life. And this test will probably relegate to the background some of our most cherished formulas. The doctrines of the "Virgin Birth" and "Plenary Inspiration of Scripture," the "sacramental" views of Baptism and the Lord's supper, etc., pass off the

<sup>25</sup> Mt. 19: 21.

<sup>26</sup> John 3: 7.

theological stage, and new characters which are truer to life begin to play the leading rôles.

The way is consequently left clear for recurring revisions by means of the most scientific methods. The last word has not yet been said upon any portion of our system. "Finality has never been reached, nor, in our conception of God, is it attainable."<sup>27</sup> But each generation must draw upon the experience of all previous ages in interpreting its own religious life and the objects of its faith, and must be wise enough to recognize both the limitations of its knowledge and the reality of continuous revelation. God is still speaking to man, but in a manner suitable to his twentieth century capacities and needs; and man must still attempt to construct a working interpretation of that revelation and of the life founded upon it. Throughout the ages religion, indeed, persists, but the science of that religion is changed by changing days. And religion persists, too, not by reason of its superior organization or the logic of its doctrines, but through the impression it makes upon the humble and contrite heart. If theology shall make any impression upon the mind of the age, it must also impress the heart, out of which are life's issues, and which in turn form the very warp and woof of all theological thought.

In closing let us recall to mind the pregnant admonition of the world's greatest evangelist to his Thessalonian converts: "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good,"<sup>28</sup> an attitude which theology will be compelled to face in every generation; for it can be no better—and no worse—than the moral sense and intellectual habits of its age. Each generation is judged not by the light which shall be, but which it already possesses; and while it cannot erect a theological system which by the greatest stretch of imagination could be called final, still it is never left in doubt as to the fundamental bases of such a system and of the general direction its thought should take. Theology must in the nature of the case ever be in a state of flux, always in process of becoming. But a periodically "new

<sup>27</sup> Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>28</sup> 1 Thes. 5: 21.

theology" does not undermine a *vital* Christian faith, nor does it take away our Lord. It but removes the metaphysical trappings in which our Lord has been too long confined and gives us a very human Jesus who really can be touched by the feeling of our infirmities; and at the same time it constructs a working system which will be a positive aid to the devout Christian in fashioning a faith which is truly dynamic. For each age changes its intellectual garments in order to conform more nearly with the current fashions. But despite all revisions of our theological concepts we retain definite convictions concerning the presence and goodness of God and of the work of Jesus which are reassuring; and we shall hold to them because they have proved themselves spiritually invigorating. We are not so unwise as to think that all old theories are devoid of value, and all new ones worthy; but we do believe sufficiently in divine immanence to warrant out conviction that revelation is continuous; and it is this conviction which justifies us in shifting the good theories from the bad and holding to those which satisfy.

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#### IV.

### THE MEANING OF RITSCHLIAN THEOLOGY.

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The writings of Albrecht Ritschl have been epoch-making in their influence on modern theology. His name is honored and the debt to him acknowledged wherever a critical and earnest study of Christianity is pursued. And though many, especially English authors, differ radically from him in their definition of the essentials of our religion, they notwithstanding frequently turn aside to do him reverence.

The works of a creative personality are seen not merely in the book which he writes or the picture which he paints, but particularly in the movement which he inaugurates. The pupils follow the gleam shown them by the master, go their separate ways, but still in one general direction; each making separate explorations and bringing individual contributions to the common fund of knowledge. Stählin, one of the severest critics of Ritschl, said: "No German theologian has a larger following than Albrecht Ritschl." Our own Dr. Schaff writes in a letter to Dr. Mann, just after Ritschl's death:<sup>1</sup> "So Ritschl is dead, but not his school. I do not have so unfavourable an opinion of it as you have. It is a reaction against the Hegelian much-knowledge and all-knowledge. It once more leads away from the realm of speculation and up to the sources of revelation, and from confessional ecclesiasticism to biblical Christianity. At any rate Ritschl has started a movement in theology." Among the leading theologians who are classed as Ritschlians we may name Herrmann, Kaftan, Harnack, J. Weiss, Wendt, Loofs, Lobstein, Drews and Troeltsch. Many of these differ widely from one another. Ritschlianism is not

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Swing in *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, p. 2.

a carefully articulated system of doctrine, but a general viewpoint and method of treatment of the facts of religion which are revolutionary when contrasted with the older systems of doctrine and which, we believe, contain truths of abiding worth, which are receiving emphasis in the modern interpretation of Christianity. Our present purpose is to indicate some of the important elements in the Ritschlian theology which have a particular significance to-day.

Among the first of these we may name the historical method. Schleiermacher had performed his monumental service of freeing Protestantism from the spell of barren dogmatism. Religion as life and experience, expressing itself in "the feeling of absolute dependence," brought a breath of new life to his time. Ritschl brings distinct contributions which enrich and deepen the conception of Schleiermacher. When feeling is made the foundation of a religious system, individualism, mysticism, lack of appreciation of the historical and the practical are likely to follow. Ritschl guards against this by his emphasis upon the historical character of Christianity. When he develops—what he considers to be the fundamental doctrine of Christianity about which all others revolve—Justification and Reconciliation, three large volumes are required to expound his thought. The first contains the history of the doctrine; the second, the biblical material; and the third, the positive development of the same. Coming to the study of doctrine from the study of history he avoided the dangers of the subjective and the individualistic that mark the system of Schleiermacher, notwithstanding his propositions to the contrary. Here Ritschlianism has a permanent meaning. It has given an impetus to the right valuation of the historical in Christianity. To Ritschl Christianity is not simply a matter of feelings and emotions, however exalted. "It exists apart from the individual as an objective reality in history, and the peculiar characteristic of the Christian experience, as distinct from that of the mystic, is that the former is called into being only through contact with this specific reality. The great



duty of the theologian, therefore, is to discover and to define, as accurately as he can, what is the particular fact in history which calls forth the Christian experience."<sup>2</sup> The healthier and more robust attitude of present day Christianity, which leads to the condemnation of mystic vagaries and fanatical perversions of the Gospel, is due in large part to the fact that Ritschl anchored his system in historic reality.

Another important element in the Ritschlian system which has served to turn the minds of theologians away from the fruitless speculative elements, which have been antagonistic to the spiritual and ethical, is his theory of religious knowledge. Judgments of value (*Werthurtheile*) alone are valid for religious knowledge, as over against the theoretical judgments of science and philosophy. In his introduction to the third volume on *Justification and Reconciliation* (English translation, p. 18 ff.) Ritschl reviews the different theories of knowledge which have played a part in theology and indicates the character of his own.

The first is Platonic and became the buttress of the scholastic system. "Wherever its influence extends, we find the idea that the thing works upon us, indeed, by means of its mutable qualities, arousing our sensations and ideas, but that it really *it at rest* behind the qualities, as a permanent self-equivalent unity of attributes." This idea of reality at rest behind its manifestations, of being unrevealed in its activity was the justification of the schoolmen in their empty speculations about the attributes of God and the inner relation of the persons of the Godhead. To them the revealed word manifesting itself in the renewed life was of little importance in understanding the nature of God.

The Kantian theory proves unsatisfactory to Ritschl because of what he considers to be irreconcilable differences between his Pure and Practical Reason. Placing himself among those who exaggerate this difference, he held that, according to Kant's conception of phenomena, there is no hint of reality, of the thing in itself, in them.

<sup>2</sup> Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*, p. 233.

A modified form of Kantianism, hints of which we may discern in *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Critique of Judgment*, was developed by Lotze, with whom Ritschl was thrown into intimate contact at Goettingen and was adopted by him as the philosophical background of his theology. According to Lotze, "in the phenomena which in a definite space exhibit changes to a limited extent and in a determined order, we cognize the thing as the cause of its qualities operating upon us, as the end which these serve as means, as the law of their constant changes."<sup>3</sup> Through the observation of the qualities of phenomena we have our only clue to reality, for in them reality manifests itself. It is this common-sense theory that gives validity to natural science. This theory adopted by Ritschl and applied to the sphere of religious knowledge raises the latter to the dignity of a science and delivers theology from the extravagant and puerile speculations which are an offense to God and man and serve no helpful purpose.

This theory of religious knowledge implies that our knowledge of God consists of a series of value judgments. To know the qualities of His person we must first know the worth of His work. "Our safest course therefore would be to infer the unknown qualities of His person from the known traits of His work."<sup>4</sup> This is a reversal of the traditional treatment of the topics of dogmatics. Formerly theologians began with the laying down of certain principles concerning the omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, infinity, etc., of God. But this means nothing to man; or, at best, the thoughts are overwhelming and depressing. They are not specifically Christian. They are not the primary qualities of the God whom Jesus revealed. They may be considered as secondary and derived qualities, if we are so disposed, but not as essential qualities of our religious knowledge of God, which as members of the Christian community, derived through communion with Christ, we experience as sovereign power that lifts us above the dominion of evil and furnishes the dynamic for moral progress.

<sup>3</sup> *Jus. and Rec.*, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Moore, *History of Christian Thought since Kant*, p. 93.

We limit, therefore, and rightly so, our knowledge of God to the worth elements of which we form "value judgments."

This method of treatment is strikingly illustrated in Ritschl's great dogmatic work, *Justification and Reconciliation*. Forsaking entirely the traditional order of treatment he begins with certain elements of the Christian consciousness, conviction of sin, experience of forgiveness and restoration, and the conferring of a new life. The experience of salvation is made fundamental and from it the attributes of God, the truths concerning man, sin, and the Christian life are deduced. Here Ritschl has done yeoman's service in the cause of scientific theology. His contribution to sober religious thinking cannot be overestimated. Religious knowledge based upon these value judgments is rooted in reality in like manner as the formula of the mathematician or the physicist. The worth of this knowledge is authenticated in the power that it brings into life. This life may be studied psychologically and historically and its claims sustained.

On the basis of these value judgments we can throw aside much theological baggage which formerly encumbered men and impeded their progress. We are delivered from the tyranny of metaphysics; but we do not cast it aside as useless. As Dr. Garvie in a recent review in the *Hibbert Journal*<sup>5</sup> has said: "Ritschl did not reject the reasoning function in toto as a mode of approaching reality, nor was he reduced to feeling and willing as his bases. What he taught was that reasoning is conditioned by feeling and willing." And thus on the substantial basis of life's experience, upon the judgment of the value God has for our lives do we conceive of the attributes of His personality. We know Him in His manifestations. We think of Him not as the First Cause but as the Creative Personality. Jesus is divine not by reason of any premundane relations which he may have sustained, or by reason of any miraculous manner by which he found entrance into this world, but because in His presence we experience salvation. The impression of His personality revealed in word and work

brings with it the assurance of forgiveness and reconciliation. In Him we find God's gracious purposes fulfilled. Jesus has for us the value of God. He is God revealed in terms of humanity whom we know through fellowship and whose saving work is experienced in renewed manhood. This is the only God whom the Christian can know.

The Ritschlian doctrine of value judgments has permanent significance in the altered viewpoint which it brings to bear upon dogmatics. From this standpoint certain doctrines in which great popular interest is manifested and to the defense of which many rush, as though to preserve the faith, are seen to be of no fundamental importance whatsoever. Because in Jesus Christ we know God as Father we understand that He is the creator and sustainer of all. But we refuse to identify the doctrine of creation with any particular method of creation. If science through the patient labor of geologist and biologist can demonstrate that it was by evolution, it is within its province to do so and the Christian will refuse to be alarmed concerning the consequences. Likewise concerning the doctrine of the virgin birth: the conviction of the divinity of Christ rests upon our experience of regeneration in Him. For us He is divine because of the valuation which we place upon His work and person; and this is a matter far distant from the manner of His birth. The doctrine of the virgin birth therefore in the light of the Ritschlian position is not a cornerstone of the faith. It assumes the lesser position which it holds in the New Testament scriptures.

The Ritschlian position as indicated naturally allies itself with the historico-critical method of the study of scriptures. The Christian faith is not guaranteed by a literally infallible book. The Bible does not become a fetish to which men bring a worship of the letter and lose the life-breath of the spirit. The "values" of the gospel authenticate themselves to us in our consciousness. The historical record which bears witness to them comes to us in the form of the sacred literature, which however is subject to the same laws of study and canons of

criticism which obtain in the study of all literatures. But appreciating the worth of the Kingdom, a balancing influence is brought to bear upon the scholar which saves him from the absurdities of criticism gone mad, or a method of study which loses the "values" in dedicating a life to the study of the minutia of dates and names.

Another very interesting and significant tendency of Ritschlian thought is that of churchliness. Ritschl himself has been frequently condemned for what has been considered by some as an exaggerated estimate of the place of the community of believers in mediating salvation, "the logical effect of whose teaching concerning the church would be the revival of an institutionalism and externalism such as Protestantism has hardly known."<sup>6</sup> At first glance some of Ritschl's statements in their bald form and when isolated from explanatory paragraphs seem to state the case too strongly. One might receive this impression from the statement: "The forgiveness of sins or reconciliation with God, as the common and permanent determination of the relation of men towards God, is not recognizable and operative outside of the community founded by Jesus Christ and dependent upon His specific action."<sup>7</sup> It may be objected that too much is made here of membership in the "community" as a condition of salvation. Is not the way opened for an external and mechanical idea of Christianity fraught with great errors and dangers such as moved the Reformers to abjure Roman Catholicism? It may be that Ritschl in his dislike for the individualism of pietism took pains to give great prominence to the idea of the corporate Christian life. But his idea of the place of the church in mediating salvation has nothing in common with the conception of the peculiar power of an ordained caste, or the magical effect of ceremonies and sacraments, the ideas popularly, but mistakenly, associated with the term churchliness.

The motive that led Ritschl to make the above statement and to quote approvingly the statement of Luther, "The

<sup>6</sup> Moore, p. 92.

<sup>7</sup> *Jus. and Rec.*, p. 607.

church, as a mother bears and nurtures every individual through the Word"<sup>8</sup> was not merely to accept the historical position of the Reformer, but because he was convinced that psychologically the church or community of believers occupies this high place. This idea is brought out by Ritschl in another place where he develops his idea of the church at greater length. "The statement that it is inside the community of believers that experience of reconciliation through Christ is to be had, corresponds to the general experimental truth that every spiritual acquisition is brought about by the incalculable interaction between the freedom of the individual and the stimulating and guiding impressions which he receives from fellowship with others."<sup>9</sup> To guard against misunderstanding he adds—"That statement does not however imply that the value which inheres in the personal work of Christ for our reconciliation is superseded by the existence of divine sonship in other members of the community and pushed so much into the background that we might disregard Christ as the Author of our reconciliation."

Herrmann in his well known volume "Communion with God" develops this view of the function of the church at greater length, "God cannot disclose Himself to all men without distinction; He holds indeed the guidance of every life in His hand, but He can open His inner self only to such as are in the church, *i. e.*, in the fellowship of believers. Our experience that the Gospel helps others gives us an ability to accept it for ourselves. Hence when Christians interest themselves in us, Christ comes near us" (p. 190).

We believe that this Ritschlian adaptation of the Reformation conception of the function of the church is the one which will prove most acceptable to modern theologians. It is far removed on the one hand from the idea of an institution which is the custodian of mysterious powers, practised as a secret science by an elect priesthood, and, on the other hand, from the

<sup>8</sup> *Jus. and Rec.*, p. 110.

<sup>9</sup> *Jus. and Rec.*, p. 590.



idea of the church as an association of the redeemed, having no inherent powers, and differing in no essential from a social organization. It is the instrument which supplies the environment for the development and enrichment of personality. It preserves the spiritual experiences of the race in its traditions and literature, and mediates, through the lives of the saintly, the person of the Master.

This conception of the functions of the church, which is in harmony with all that we know about the laws governing the growth of character, raises the church to a new dignity and importance and furnishes a new motive to magnify her claims and to labor for her advancement in the world. We can still say, although in a different sense than our fathers did, that "the church is necessary for salvation."

Another significant element in Ritschlian thought, which receives a warm welcome by the modern Christian, is its emphasis upon the ethical and social nature of the practical Christian life. Here Ritschl becomes the champion of the most excellent traits of Christian character—of the normal and healthful functions as over against the abnormal and diseased, which frequently masquerade in the borrowed robes of Christian piety. He exalts the rugged traits of the everyday religion which manifests itself in the world but is not of it—lordship over the world, patience, humility, and activity in one's vocation in life. And this practical application of his system is perfectly logical. Reconciliation with God endues us with new motives and latent spiritual gifts, which, if they are to be preserved, and raised to highest value, must find expression in our moral calling. Only in this way is character developed.

Es bildet ein Talent sich in der Stille  
Sich ein Character in dem Strom der Welt.

God reveals Himself to us in His activity, in the worth elements of which we form value judgments. This is the only valid knowledge of God which we have. What He has done is a true index of what He is. And so it is likewise with man.

The only clue which can guide us to form an estimate of the nature of our soul is its expression of itself in active loyalty to Christ ideals. The ethical life is the only proof to me of my salvation.

And how significant is Ritschl's interpretation of this ethical life which springs from reconciliation. The Kingdom is to penetrate and leaven every department of life. For the individual, life is a sacred whole. The dualistic view of the Christian life, characteristic of Roman Catholicism with its counsels of perfection, commanding that those who would attain to the highest order of the spiritual life shall forego all civil vocations and family bonds, and, on the other hand, the sentimental view adopted by many sects with its absolute separation of the so-called sacred and secular are completely swept aside. Man as a new spiritual personality in Christ Jesus shall dominate all life in the strength of his sovereignty. "He has a will that's whole, a single soul." Perfection, in its own order, lies within the reach of all, even as we are faithful in the life performance—perfect in its own order—of our vocation. Amid the changing experiences of life, the nature of our spirituality becomes apparent. "To sustain patience in the absence of success and humility in its abundance is quite a specific test of Christian piety." Here again Ritschl was the forerunner of the modern man who finds the sacred in the secular, who perceives the presence of the Lord Jesus in those who possess the homely everyday virtues of patience, humility, constancy in prayer, and activity in one's life work.

And this position has a social application. Ritschl, I am persuaded, holds front rank amid the modern prophets who have brought theology down from the clouds, and have given it a place in this work-a-day world where it can be understood and be of help to those who bear the heat and burden of the day. One is saved not in order to have assurance of celestial bliss by and by, but in order to make terrestrial conquests here and now, to establish the kingdom of righteousness and holy love among men. When Ritschl emphasized the social inter-rela-

tion of men in the church and its accompanying obligations and extended the sphere of religious duty so as to include every aspect of life, he foreshadowed the coming of the day in which we live, the day of the burning social passion, of emphasis upon economic justice, protection of women and children and the militant attitude of the church against great social evils.

READING, PA.

## V.

### EDMOND ROSTAND.

VICTOR W. DIPPELL.

Twelve years have elapsed since a Paris newspaper announced that M. Constant Coquelin had suddenly taken a train to the southwest of France as follows.

"Yesterday morning the greatest of our comedians received a telegram urging him to proceed without delay to Cambo, the tranquil, beautiful country seat, in the Pyrenees, of M. Edmond Rostand. No sooner had he read the message than M. Coquelin bade Gillett, his devoted valet, pack a valise, hail a fiacre, and accompany him to the Gare d'Orleans. Excitement and delight were depicted on the face of the distinguished traveller—whom we found smoking a cigarette in front of a first-class compartment. 'Yes,' he joyously admitted, 'Yes, I am off to the Pyrenees! but that is all I shall tell you.' Never, indeed, such indomitable discretion! In reply to our adroit, persuasive questions regarding the object of his visit, M. Coquelin made such irrelevant observations as these, 'The weather looks threatening,' and 'Gillett is the most admirable of valets,' and 'Ah, my friends, has it ever occurred to you what an extraordinary thing is a railroad station?' And then, as the train steamed slowly away, 'You may state in your article that the cushions of this carriage are exceedingly restful and sympathetic.' Still, in spite of M. Coquelin's reticence, we are in a position to acquaint our readers with the reason of this sudden, this sensational visit to Cambo. M. Edmond Rostand is engaged upon a new play, and the leading part in it will be sustained by M. Coquelin. Down there in the golden calm of the Pyrenees—yes, even as we pen these words, the most exquisite of our poets is reading to the most

brilliant of our actors . . . another Chef d'oeuvre. It will surpass the triumphant, the glorious Cyrano de Bergerac. Parisians will certainly rejoice, Parisians will assuredly be thrilled to hear of the superb artistic festival in store for them."

Such, ten years ago, was the first and extravagant announcement made of *Chantecler*. Paris "rejoiced," Paris was "thrilled," but it was maddening to wait. What was the theme, the setting, the title? Newspapers sent their yellowest reporters to Cambo, with instructions to secure by any means, fair or foul, some data, details, descriptions. They went armed with cameras. Everything and everybody was photographed—the gardener, the housemaid, a peacock, a mowing-machine, a dog and a hammock. Every movement of the distinguished host and guest was duly chronicled; every appearance at the window of any member of the household was carefully detailed. But the subject of the play remained a mystery. It was not until many months later that Paris learned that the hero was a cock, the heroine a hen pheasant and the chief scene a farm yard. And while Paris was marvelling at the audacity and novelty of the idea, the poet fell ill. A severe operation delayed him in his work for a whole year. "The successive deaths of a relative and of three close friends so shocked him that he had not the heart to return to his work. It was not until the autumn of 1908 that M. Coquelin made yet another visit to Cambo, and then the work was finally completed to be produced the following spring at the Porte St. Martin Theater.

But alas! Paris was not even yet to hear it. In January of 1909 M. Rostand came to the metropolis and took his abode in a hotel facing the Tuileries Gardens. Here, carefully guarded from the Knights of the Pencil, he remained and intended to remain until the play had been successfully staged. His visits were to be only to the theater and to Pont-aux-Dames, a home for aged and infirm actors, founded by Coquelin, who himself was spending some time there. Not that he was old or infirm

—"only a little fatigued and in need of calm and repose ere distinguishing myself as a proud, majestic cock" to quote his own words. The visits of the famous playwright, scene-painters, wig-makers, etc., restored to him all his former energy and enthusiasm. Everything was in readiness and the first rehearsal was scheduled for the following week. "When I have played *Chantecler*, I shall retire from the stage," said Coquelin. Unhappily one morning shortly after, Paris was astonished to learn that Coquelin was dead.

And this was not the end of delays. After four months spent in retirement at Cambo, M. Rostand returned to Paris. A few days later rehearsals began at the theater. Its first appearance was scheduled for November, "irrevocably in November" the newspapers said. But the month passed without a public performance. Innumerable delays prevented; innumerable newspaper stories made Paris still more eager. Finally on Sunday evening, February 6, 1910, *Chantecler*, "in the presence of the most brilliant audience yet assembled in a Paris theater," came, crowded and conquered.

A casual glance at the biography of the author reveals a life marked by no sudden upheavals. He was born at Marseilles, April 1, 1868, his father being a prominent journalist and economist. The family was moderately wealthy, cultured and refined. He received his education at the Marseilles Lycée and the College Stanislas, Paris. It was while a student at the latter institution that he first wrote and published verses. His favorite authors, he tells us, were always Shakespeare, Dickens and Victor Hugo. In 1891, he was admitted to the practice of law. Ten years later, March 30, 1901, he was elected to the French Academy, the youngest "Immortal" ever admitted. He married Rosemond Gerard, the poetess, and lives with his family in a charmingly situated villa at Cambo, in the south of France. Here, surrounded by all the elements of wealth and culture, he works, shunning garish and vulgar notoriety—modest, retiring, sensitive. His life has been singularly free from the hard, cruel experiences that



have characterized the lives of many of his compeers. He neither knows nor wants to know anything of gloom, bitterness or pessimism; his is a message of cheer, encouragement and joy. He himself says of his work: "I hope I shall always keep to the purpose that has so far guided me, of setting forth the fine and worthy in life, rather than the despicable; the clean and beautiful, rather than the ugly; the noble and inspiring, rather than the perverted."

This is his avowed purpose. Does he hold close to his ideal? *Cyrano de Bergerac* and *Chantecler* are the answer. He has written other plays and poems, but these two, one or both of them, are his surest claim to fame. Yet even in the less known of his works, the same note is struck. He has been consistently, from first to last, the prophet of modern romanticism. His first book *Les Musardises* (1890), a collection of verse, attracted scant notice. He suffered keen disappointment in his first attempt as a playwright with his one-act play—probably *Le Gant Rouge*—which was refused. He next wrote *Les Romanesques*, which appeared May 21, 1894. It at once placed him in the front rank of modern French authors, for it was accepted with special honor at the Comedie Française, awarded the Toirac Prize of four thousand francs for the best play given during the year, and crowned by the French Academy. Its theme is similar to that of *Romeo and Juliet* save that the ending is a happy one. One fails to find—and this is a relief—any morbidity, any of the "joyless pessimism and passional degeneracy so characteristic of modern French plays."

*La Princesse Lointaine* is a romantic tragedy that is to be read rather than played. It is semi-historical, dealing with the love of Rudel for a princess whom he has never seen, and her struggle between a dying lover and a living one, Bertrand. The following meager account from a Provençal manuscript of the thirteenth century forms the basis of the play: "Joffroy Rudel was a very noble gentleman and prince of Blaye. He fell in love with the countess of Tripoli without seeing her,

through the good which he had heard about her from pilgrims who came from Antioch; and about her he composed many poems of beautiful sound, but simple words. And from a desire to see her, he took the cross, and set out to sea. And on board the ship he was taken seriously ill, so that those who were with him thought that he would die in the ship; but on they sailed until they had taken him to Tripoli, [and conveyed him] almost dead to an hostelry. And they notified the countess, who came to his bedside, and took him in her arms. And he, knowing that it was the countess, recovered sight, hearing and smell, and praised God and thanked Him for preserving his life until he had seen her. And so he died in the arms of the lady. And she had him buried with honors in the Temple house; and on that selfsame day she became a nun, out of grief for him and for his death."

The introduction of Bertrand's love for the heroine is Rostand's invention. Of the story, Gaston Paris has said: "It is one of the sweetest and most touching symbols of the eternal aspiration of mankind toward the ideal; he loves it on the strength of what he imagines it to be, he risks all he possesses to attain it, but his strength fails as he nears the goal, and at the very moment he is about to reach it, death lays him low. Happy, nevertheless, he who, like Joffroy Rudel, sees his dreams realized for one instant, even though it be the last, and who dies carrying away on his lips the kiss for which he has given his life." This story has been treated poetically by Uhland, Heine, Browning, Swinburne, Mary Robinson and others.

Whether M. Rostand has been successful in his treatment of the subject is a matter of controversy. Bernard Shaw, the arch-skeptic, thus criticizes it: "The romance of chivalry has its good points, but it always dies of the Unwomanly Woman. And M. Rostand's Princess Far-Away will die of Melissinde. A first act in which the men do nothing but describe their hysterical vision of a wonderful goddess-princess whom they have never seen is bad enough; but it is pardonable, because

men do make fools of themselves about women, sometimes in an interesting and poetic fashion. But when the woman appears and plays up to the height of their folly, intoning her speeches to an accompaniment of pipes and horns, distributing lilies and languors to pilgrims, and roses and raptures to troubadours, always in the character which their ravings have ascribed to her, what can one feel except that an excellent opportunity for good comedy is being thrown away? If Melissinde would only eat something, or speak in prose, or swear in it, or do anything human—were it even smoking a cigarette—to bring these silly Argonauts to their senses for a moment, one could forgive her. But she remains an unredeemed humbug from one end of the play to the other; and when at the climax of one of her most deliberately piled-up theatrical entrances, a poor green mariner exclaims with open-mouthed awe, ‘The Blessed Virgin,’ it sends a twinge of frightful blasphemous irony down one’s spine. Having felt that, I now understand better than before why the Dulcinea episodes in *Don Quixote* are so coarse in comparison to the rest of the book. Cervantes had been driven into reactionary savagery by too much Melissinde.”

Yet, despite this criticism of Mr. Shaw’s, 45,000 copies of the play have been sold, which is certainly a powerful attestation of its popularity amongst a reading public. The real motif of the play Rostand puts into the mouth of the priest, Frère Trophime, who in answer to the question whether the whole quest is not a useless one, answers:

Most certainly it will benefit his soul.  
It was as dead while he was gay and light;  
But, now he suffers, loves and wills, it lives.  
Let each of us put forth what strength we have;  
The main thing is to have a heart that beats!  
The Prince has left behind him futile loves,  
All vice, and vain amusements of a court.  
How can we doubt his bettered sentiments?  
Great loves, indeed, are doing heaven’s work!

The real purpose of the play is to tell the story of the redemp-

tion of Joffroy Rudel; Melissinde and the green mariner are accessories.

The public and the press joined in loud acclaim on its presentation; but both *Les Romanesques* and *La Princesse Loiraine* were quite outdone by *Cyrano*. In the spring of the year that saw the first presentation of the latter, Rostand published *La Samaritaine*. It deals with the story of the woman of Samaria in a mystic and reverential manner and reminds one of Paul Heyse's *Mary of Magdala*, produced in this country by Mrs. Fiske with such artistic effect. It has never appeared in the United States owing to the introduction of Jesus of Nazareth as one of the actors, though there were three or four private performances given in New York, I believe; but Madame Bernhard is authority for the statement that it is the most exhausting rôle she has ever played, adding, "the play becomes a reality to me every time I go through it." To the Anglo-Saxon mind, however, the poet's virtuosity does not seem well adapted to such a theme; and it was quite forgotten when in December of that year (1897), *Cyrano de Bergerac* appeared. There is this to be said for it, however, that Rostand does not retreat one step from his definite purpose. He does not treat it realistically, but romantically. There is no ugly presentation of sin, no public vaunting of vice, no preaching. It is a dramatic endeavor pure and simple. Those, who lay stress on the character of the woman, forget the figure of the greatest idealist of all times. Rostand wished here simply to present one of the romantic episodes in the life of the Great Liberator. When one loses sight of Jesus, one has lost the purpose of the play. And it is refreshing, too, amidst the complexities and bickerings of theologians, great and near-great, professional and lay, to find here a man who is willing to take the story at its face value, and leave the problem of how Jesus converted, transformed, or illumined the Woman of Samaria to be solved by the great heart or mind of humanity.

But at best it is hard for the Anglo-Saxon mind to treat fairly this play, which in its very nature and appeal strikes

home to the peoples of southern Europe. To us there is more meaning and point in the play *Cyrano de Bergerac*.

Here for the first time Rostand fully found himself. There is no uncertainty, hesitation or weakening. He goes straight to the goal, displaying marvelous felicity in plot and diction. If some of his earlier efforts are best understood by a calm and judicious reading of the plays, here is one that can only make its strongest appeal in action. The dénouement demands flesh and blood. And, too, it requires a familiarity with French verse, rare even in our day when that language is the subject of zealous and intelligent study, to comprehend and appreciate the grace, suppleness, variety and wit of M. Rostand's alexandrines. That the whole is artificial militates little against it, for the age it portrays was artificial; that the language is full of boast and bombast is of small account, it was a period of braggadocio; that the action is blustering and impetuous matters not at all, it was an age of "panache." "Panache," the key word of *Cyrano*, is, as M. Rostand explains in his inaugural speech at the Academy, "the spirit of bravery. . . . To banter in the face of danger is the supreme politesse, a delicate refusal to take one's self too seriously. Panache is the modesty of heroism." Or, as another has put it: "The telling of daring deeds in resounding speech has always appealed to the dramatic side of the French character, which likes this form of the picturesque, as manifesting the boldness, foolhardiness or pluck, called *crânerie*. It is success in achieving a vigorous sweep of sounding words which gives value to the bombast of a drama by Hugo, it is the dramatic picturesqueness of deeds which pleases amid the artificialities of Rostand's *Cyrano*. M. Rostand wishes to be thought the poet of bravery in quest of an unattainable ideal, and made more noble by its heroic paradox: "*Frisez votre moustache, même si vous n'en avez pas*," as he told the pupils of his old school, the College Stanislas."

The criticism seems to be a just one. Rostand is an idealist. He believes that ideals redeem life.

For every ray from the ideal sent  
Into the soul destroys an evil there.  
All noble aims bring forth a nobler aim;  
No dream suggests a dream of lower flight.

The play, *Cyrano*, was hailed with delight by critics and theater-goers. Paris had long suffered in being compelled to see and hear much of the so-called naturalistic drama that this new voice came as a welcome relief. Faguet, himself, one of the sanest of critics, reviewed the play in extravagant terms. Here was Romanticism brought up to date and touched with a bit of symbolism at once striking and pleasing. Steeped as it was in the preciosity of that day, it afforded Rostand "as an incomparable virtuoso of language and rhyme" full scope to his genius. It is not to be wondered at, then, that he fairly revels in it.

And then withal, it was so life-like. Transplanting the auditor or reader into an earlier century—an age purely historical, stilted and flamboyant to most—it at once surrounded him with men and women so distinctly human, that the reality of the artificial age as well as of the play struck home. Here are individuals one knows for a common humanity is theirs and ours. The cut of their clothes and the swagger of their words and actions are perhaps a bit striking, reminding us of our own youth and the books we loved while young; but nevertheless the human appeal is there. We enter into their life at once and forget our own surroundings.

The habit of forming a salon, to which the literary élite lent luster, was common in the seventeenth century. At one of these, managed by Madame Sablé, in imitation of the Hotel de Rambouillet, *Cyrano* and Madeleine Robineau, or Roxane, were accustomed to meet. Here, with others, they tinged their pastimes with a literary hue, and here preciosity flourished. The tendencies of preciosity at this time in France were, on the one hand, a desire to avoid anything common, vulgar or even commonplace, which then became, on the other hand, an end in itself. "The true précieux wanted to scintillate and



to surprise by his cleverness at each unexpected turn." This bent is well illustrated in the balcony scene, where Christian offends Roxane by his inability to express his love in figures of speech at once compelling and surprising. And it is here that Cyrano rescues the unhappy lover and revives the romance.

Cyrano de Bergerac, the original (1619-1655), was a man of Gascon temperament, who served in a Gascon military company. He distinguished himself by his bravery as well as his wit, and soon made himself the talk of Paris by his numerous duels and brawls. He was charged with atheism, and his tragedy *Agripina* with the character of Sejanus seemed to the people of his day to justify the charge. His comedy *Le Pédant joué* was sufficiently important to influence both Racine and Molière, while his imaginary journeys to the sun and moon served as a model for Swift (*Gulliver's Travels*) and Voltaire (*Micromegas*).

With this figure and age as a stage setting, M. Rostand essays to portray a universal human sentiment idealized. "Hardly anyone can read the play without being captivated by its magnificent swagger, by the animation of its scenes, by the poetry of its lines, by its sentiment, by the suffering love of Cyrano for Roxane, by the vigorous or graceful climaxes, by the wonderful, even though occasionally strained, wit with which it is sprinkled" (Wright). From the moment Cyrano enters the theater to forbid the playing of Montfleury to the last scene with Roxane in the convent garden, our sympathy and interest are with him. The huge nose and the thoughtless impetuosity of the hero are readily forgotten, for below these outward trappings there is a heart, a great love, a heroic struggle and a sacrifice.

To have so adequately reconstructed the Paris of the seventeenth century is in itself a great achievement, and alone challenges attention. But to have created, or recreated, a character like Cyrano, so varied, so complex, so composite, is a triumph. If, as William Winter reminds us, "he would appear, like Acres, to keep a private graveyard, yet like Sydney

Carton, he is capable of magnanimous pathos." Loving Roxane, he mutely permits her to marry Christian, even promising to protect him. Insulted by the lover, he forgives him and woos the lady only to see another gain the kiss that rightly was his own. He gives Christian his genius, his soul and gains as his recompense only bitterness and despair. Yet blithely, he bids the lover secure his prize, saying, "we shall compose together a hero of romance." He gives bountifully to others; for himself he has nothing left. He saved others; himself he dared not spare. It is almost inconceivable that he could or would permit Roxane—the woman of his heart—to marry a "brainless dolt"—condemn her to a life of evident misery and heart-hunger. What, then, is his secret? He mentions it in the balcony scene and thus gives us the key to his renunciation: "Ah, for your happiness now readily would I give mine, though you should never know it, might I but, from a distance sometimes, hear the happy laughter bought by my sacrifice." Perhaps Roxane will be happy, very happy, with this "fine fellow," as he calls Christian. Cyrano will risk the venture.

This play "came like morning sunlight to dispel the mists of Ibsenism with which the atmosphere of dramatic art in France had been obscured. Here at last was a truly French play, excelling in theatrical brilliance, brimful of life and fire, bathed in a flood of poetry and song; untouched by the mysticism of Maeterlinck, untrammelled by the problems of Ibsen, untainted by the pruriency of D'Annunzio; a play light, clear and delicate; brilliant, sparkling, corruscating as a diamond with a thousand facets; dazzling in verbal luxury, in extravagant fancy, in scintillant flash of wit and epigram. Here, as Prof. Henderson has said, was poetry, not pathology; clarity, not obscurity; vitality, animate with romance, rather than the lifeless skeleton of the closet. Here too was history, not hysteria." "The closed book of the seventeenth century was opened, and Cyrano de Bergerac, D'Artagnan, the Precieuses, and the gay guardsmen came forth from the sepulcher of its

pages and lived again. The French bade glad farewell to Ibsen's greatness and hailed Rostand with an enthusiasm that almost taxes credulity." The reception given this play was unlike any other. Corneille's *Le Cid*, the most epochal play in all literature, was severely criticized and gained the enmity of Richelieu and the Academy, and gave rise to the "pamphlet-war." Racine's *Britannicus* was almost overwhelmed with destructive criticism. Vigny's *Chatterton* and Hugo's *Hernani* started literary battles that raged long and furiously. The reception given *Cyrano* can be likened only to that given to Ponsard's *Lucrece*, as was suggested by M. Edouard Rod some years ago in a lecture at Harvard. *Lucrece* "was hailed on all sides as a deliverance from romanticism, a return to classicism, and the beginning of a new era in French letters. Under a mere guise—the backward swing of the pendulum—we have recently seen history repeat itself." "Untainted by the passionate violence of Dumas, innocent of the pallid ratiocinations of Ibsen, the heroic comedy, *Cyrano*," was thought to mark the end of Ibsenism, the revival of romanticism, and the beginning of a new era.

Continuously and consistently, M. Rostand is the prophet of the romantic ideal. Every one of his plays has this fascinating theme at heart. In *Les Romanesques*, it is the obvious lovers, Percinet and Sylvette. Rostand here sports with romanticism. It is as though he would pillory the very thing he wishes to exploit. This is on the surface. But there is a deeper significance to the play. Men may jest at what they love most—only they jest not at the thing itself, but at the perversions of it. So it is with Rostand. The two lovers are silly enough, so are their querulous old fathers, but the real romance is not silly. "The mind that is sincere makes the reality; but people are too ready with the conventional commonplace as with the conventional romance," says Edward Everett Hale, Jr. "Romance itself may be real enough if it only be real romance and not the conventional, the make-belief, the fashionable. Percinet on the road, Sylvette in the garden learn that life is not made up of phrases and attitudes"

Now Paris had had quite enough of the conventional romance; and Balzac, Dumas (fils), Flaubert, Zola and a host of others had served the populace with tragic thrills for a generation. Surfeited with these melodramatic tremolo, on the one hand, and the impossible posings of their opponents on the other, *Les Romanesques* kindled anew the fires of romance. It was as though the race had returned to its childhood and stood again at the portals of the wonderful, brilliant, mystic, beginning of life. And yet there was a difference. The realists and the naturalists had made a genuine contribution to dramatic art. The audiences, it is true, had grown tired of the true-to-life, minute, detailed, X-ray presentation. These had been true, but they left life much as they found it; and men knew enough of misery and want and vice and crime, what they asked for was a cure; and in lieu of that, something to lighten, lift, illuminate, lure upwards. The realists had not discovered life's secret; they had only dissected life's phenomena. Romanticism was not to discover the hidden source either; much as it hoped to; but Romanticism had learned that it too must be human. The age of the conventional stage hero must pass away into the limbo of forgotten vagaries; and in his stead must come the hero who is real as well as romantic.

That is the appeal of Rudel in the *Princess Far-away*. He is not unreal, though his quest be quixotic. Smile or sneer as we may, men and women do throw their lives and all they hold precious into the balance and take the great chance—the gambler's chance. So when this hero goes in search of his ideal, his story touches any life that is at once impressionable and ambitious. He does not gain the prize, or he gains it only to lose it at once. And such is life to many. Their ideals are never realized; or if they are, they are but the portals that open to view new ones farther on ahead, leaving the life as unsatisfied as before. So Jesus affects the Woman of Samaria in *La Samaritaine*. He shatters her low motives and substitutes lofty ones, and creates a divine discontent, which we are led to believe eventually minister to her salvation. Life, real

life, is still before her, and to be attained. The Duc de Reichstadt in *L'Aiglon* is broken but not bent—the ideal still exists, stimulating, vibrating and throbbing as passionately as before. Cyrano never falters. He pursues to the end the secret idea; and the mystic love for Roxane supports him to the last. She does not love him, even though she does say so. Or if she does, what difference does it make? Somehow we feel that the play ends right.

Prof. Hale has put the philosophy of Cyrano to my liking. He says: "Cyrano is in fact a type—a type of the largest class of people in the world (for it includes every one), namely, those who do not get what they know they deserve, who find no chance to do what they know they could do, who are so much greater to themselves than to the cold world. He is also the type of a much smaller class who do not make a fuss about the matter, but carry it off so gaily and finely that no one has any consciousness of complaint, murmuring, repining; indeed perhaps there is at bottom hardly a suspicion of anything of the kind. From the girl who is not like other girls, from that strange commercial traveler some years ago who published poems that his friend might know his real self, to the philosopher with his 'To be great is to be misunderstood,' or to the professor who fretted and fumed and lamented, and tortured himself, 'because, as he acknowledged to himself, the Thou sweet gentleman was not sufficiently honoured,' to the great Queen exclaiming: 'If my people only knew me as I am,' we all nurse an ideal in our hearts and most of us know that it will never be realized, even that it cannot be realized. . . . And so Cyrano takes our sympathy. We are even as he. With him it is a nose, with us fortunately a something else, that prevents our standing forth to the world for all we are worth. This besides many minor matters, good each in its own way, is the thing that unconsciously touches all."

An interesting sidelight on the play is given us by Coquelin. Rostand had been sorely disappointed by the partial success gained by *La Princesse Lointaine* and refused for eighteen

months to put pen to paper. "As he slowly regained confidence and began taking pleasure once more in his work," writes M. Coquelin, "the boyish author took to dropping in on me at impossible morning hours to read some scene hot from his ardent brain. When seated at my bedside, he declaimed his lines, until, lit at his flame, I would jump out of bed, and wrapping my dressing gown hastily about me, seize the manuscript out of his hands, and, before I knew it, find myself addressing imaginary audiences, poker in hand in lieu of a sword, with any hat that came to hand doing duty for the plumed headgear of our hero."

Three years after *Cyrano's* glorious success, the author ventured to publish *L'Aiglon*. Critics had wondered whether the poet could maintain the high standard set. When it appeared, they were divided. The play tells the story of Napoleon's son trying to realize in his own life the father's strain. Within his soul the battle rages. Like the somber Dane, to which the play has often been compared, indecision kills him. He says:

Like a poor prisoner who falls a dreaming  
Of vast and murmuring forests, with a tree  
Fashioned of shavings, taken from a doll's house,  
I build my father's Epic with these soldiers.

And though these soldiers be but the little playthings ranged on the table, he hopes, aspires, longs. And all the while, striving to redeem his sire's blood, the Austrian strain of Maria Louisa comes to the fore.

The drama has been criticized as long and rambling; but it certainly reiterates the idealism that characterizes Rostand's entire work. He would have us believe "this world is no blot, no blur, it means intensely and means good." He is an optimist. For him the world is redeemed by loftiness of thought and nobility of action. He never wearies of reiterating this thought. But this does not mean that he is insensible to the sterner aspects of life. Men must pay to the uttermost farthing. Hear the soul of the Eaglet unbosom himself in these words:



I am the expiation.

All was not paid, and I complete the price.  
 'Twas fated I should seek his battlefield,  
 And here, above the multitudinous dead,  
 Be the white victim, growing daily whiter,  
 Renouncing, praying, asking but to suffer,  
 Yearning toward heaven, like sacrificial incense!  
 And while betwixt the heavens and this field  
 I am outstretched with all my soul and body,  
 Father, I feel the shuddering furrows rise,  
 I feel the hill upheave beneath my feet  
 To lift me gently to the stooping heavens!  
 'Tis meet and right the battlefield should offer  
 This sacrifice, that henceforth it may bear  
 Pure and unstained its name of Victory.  
 Wagram, behold me! Ransom of old days,  
 Son, offered for, alas! how many sons!  
 Above the dreadful haze wherein thou stirrest,  
 Uplift me, Wagram, in thy scarlet hands!  
 It must be so! I know it! Feel it! Will it!  
 The breath of death has rustled through my hair!  
 The shudder of death has passed athwart my soul!  
 I am all white: a sacramental Host!  
 What more reproaches can they hurl, O Father,  
 Against our hapless fate? Oh, hush! I add  
 In silence Schoenbrunn to Saint Helena!—  
 'Tis done!

Rostand, as an idealist, does not close his eyes to the stern facts of existence; but he does maintain with vehement reiteration that life is made more bearable and beautiful by aspiration. He would have men, while striving and sacrificing, keep ever clearly in view the "vision splendid." He is not so much a romanticist that he fails to be a man. The cruel and forbidding conditions of life are to be met with a smile and a song. The suffering is to be done in silence. Never complain! Fight on! The Duc de Reichstadt fails because he cannot steel himself against the calls and drains on his heart, because he cannot decide irrevocably and then act valiantly. Yet the drama emphasizes the fact that though he apparently fails, though he never really shows Napoleonic caliber, nevertheless in the last analysis he is redeemed by the very striving to realize his sire's strain.

"Certain passages of the play are in swelling and majestic verse, lines of genuine epic swing and burning rhetorical fervor. Reichstadt's apostrophe to his father's name, and Metternich's soliloquy over the hat of Napoleon are glowing flames of poetic fire. Certain scenes in the play are of high dramatic insensibility touched," as has been said, "with the psychological imaginativeness of modernity. The mirror scene, where Metternich extinguishes in the Eaglet the flicker of Napoleonic fire with the damp of Austrian impotence, and the scene on the battlefield of Wagram, reminiscent of Victor Hugo's celebrated description of the battlefield of Waterloo, are moments of terrible and tragic power."

*Chantecler* is not a study of poultry life but a frank gaze at the possibilities of human life when that life is touched by imagination. Chanticleer is a very real cock, but one with a poetic nature. The secret of the day lies in his song. The audience is informed in the prologue of the absence of the family on a Sunday fête. As the curtain rises one sees a barnyard, chickens, ducks, turkeys, a blackbird in a cage, a cat asleep on the wall, a watch-dog chained to his kennel—all engaged in animated conversation. Chanticleer appears and one is impressed with his poetic character.

I worship thee, O Sun! whose ample light,  
Blessing every forehead, ripening every fruit,  
Entering every flower and every hovel,  
Pours itself forth and yet is never less,  
Still spending and unspent—like mother's love.

As the act proceeds the tenets of his creed are announced in a spirited discussion between Ratou, the dog, and the blackbird. It is very clear that this discussion, though objective, intends to promulgate the theory of the influence of the poetic imagination. Night falls. A shot is heard. The Hen Pheasant flies in, imploring protection from a hunter. She looks at him, tenderly nestles under his wing, and straightway Chanticleer falls in love with the gorgeous black, red and golden pheasant, who typifies the seductive, flippant, exacting woman of the

world. She spends the night in Patou's kennel. As the darkness deepens, bats and owls appear, plotting death.

At five o'clock in the morning Chanticleer struts out upon the scene with a resounding "Cocorico." The Hen Pheasant asks him: "Tell me the secret of your power." Chanticleer refuses, hesitates, then reveals. The sun cannot rise until he has sung his song. He proceeds to exhibit his metier. At each "Cocorico" the day becomes more evident. But, asks the pheasant, if the sky is clouded and gray—"then it is because I sang badly," he answers. When the sun has risen and the world well started on its way, Chanticleer is overcome with the thought of his great responsibility. Can he repeat the miracle to-morrow? The pheasant is convinced—at least for the present. The allegory is evident. "It is a question of poetic imagination and of the extent to which a poet can create the world in which he lives. The point is made still clearer by the concluding scene, in which the blackbird is scored for his prosaic outlook." Chanticleer: "You have not seen the scarlet summits tremble?" Le Merle: "While you were crowing, I was looking at your feet."

The third act needs scarcely be mentioned, save to call it very clever. It is the guinea-fowl's five o'clock a. m. fashionable reception—a "lundi" held in the kitchen garden under the magpie's sanction—a keen satire on elegant Paris salons. Chanticleer appears, announced simply as Le Coq, and this causes trouble. He is compelled to fight and conquer the gamecock. The reception threatens to be a failure, but the irrepressible blackbird struggles valiantly to keep things moving and succeeds so well that the guinea-fowl can say to her young, after the others have gone: "It is the finest fête ever given." The act does not end, however, before Chanticleer has taunted the blackbird for his vain, shallow pretense at wit, saying that he lacks the gaiety and genius of a sparrow whom he would imitate. The latter is brave, merry, faithful with all his flippancy, the Gavroche of Paris. There follows the line that would have pleased Victor Hugo: "Il faut savoir mourir pour s' appeler Gavroche."

A month passes. Chanticleer and the Hen Pheasant are spending their honeymoon in the forest. The latter, jealous of his love for the dawn, urges him to crow but once a day for a month. Her design is to make him forget the dawn, absorbed and enthralled by the song of the nightingale. She succeeds. Chanticleer is ravished by the song and listens while the east grows gray; he is distracted by her sudden death from a hunter's shot. The sun rises and lights up the forest. Triumphantly the pheasant turns to him and says: "One may be all in all to another heart, you see, one can be nothing to the sky." At first he refuses to admit the truth. "It is the sun I summoned yesterday, I am the cock of the far-off sun." Gradually his vision enlarges, he returns to his farm-yard. He is "one of many, who together have power to illumine and recreate."

It would be a profitable study, were it within the limits of this paper, to consider in detail this drama of *Chantecler*. On it Rostand has obviously bestowed infinite love and patience. It is, all things considered, the best exposition of his philosophy of life, and, so far as I can learn, is meant to be. One can trace with little uncertainty or difficulty, the main outlines of his thought. However, in such an attempt, one must be careful not to present him as a preacher or a teacher; he is essentially a dramatist and wishes to be judged from this point of view. He has a purpose and a theory, but he contributes this by the way as any other great artist might, and it would be manifestly unfair to hold him strictly to any words of some particular character.

On the other hand, there are some questions which one naturally asks, relative to the advisability of presenting one's thought in the way he has done. Why was it, for instance, that he chose fowls and animals, and not men, if his purpose was really serious? It has been said that the play "proved on performance to be extremely tedious, both because of the lagging plot and the disguise of the characters as birds and beasts, by which their movements were constrained and their voices

made inaudible" (Wright). But how could the dramatist have better presented the very idea he had in mind than by the use of beasts and birds as the vehicle of his thought? Human beings are too complex to be dominated by one sole idea. No matter whom he had chosen, he would have been embarrassed by Cyrano's nose, Rudel's foibles, the Duke de Reichstadt's vacillation or Percinet's follies. He chose the world of the barnyard, for here each character could stand for but one thing, and the audience would agree to the characterization.

Take Chanticleer. He is a thoroughgoing idealist—the poet who lives in a world of his own creation, elated by his high calling, overwhelmed by his great responsibility. But he is thoroughly natural—one could almost say human. When he crows, he seeks out the proper spot, carefully pushes aside the litter that he may stand as close to mother Earth as possible. A delicate touch of art! For what poet dares hope for immortality, if his message ring not true to nature. It is as though the dramatist bade men sing of nature, but of nature in her better moods, in her own dignified environment, stripped of the accretions of civilization. He would tell of love, but not of the love of either the pastorels or the *Vers de Société*. These are partial, stilted, polished. In the great passion of love, there is much more reality and much more humanity—these are the elements that redeem it and life.

So Rostand believes that the idealist, the poetic nature, really portrays, lightens and illumines life. When the Hen Pheasant says to Chanticleer, "all these things about you are dreary and poor and flat," Chanticleer replies, "and I can never become used to the richness and wonder of these things." Life is not "weary, stale, flat and unprofitable" to the mind that has sensibilities quickened and alive to the flaming bush or the blooming lilies of the field. It is thinking makes it so, and Chanticleer chooses to see life so. "With power to see, capacity to suffer, one may come to understand all things," says he. Power to see—this has been the poet's prerogative in all ages. His name is synonymous for seer; his peculiar gift that he

can and does see what others with dull and low flying eyes fail to note. But Rostand adds "capacity to suffer." To enter fully into life he dare not simply be a pedant, looking at life from his study window; he must join with life, suffer and smile with his age, feel the high elation of victory and the bitter remorse of shame and low aim. He cannot be one of us, unless he has been tested, tried and touched by the feeling of our humanity.

His aim dare not be low. "I think of light, not of glory," says Chanticleer. It is not the plaudits of the multitude, but the realization of one's high calling in life that counts. Such a sentiment receives a peculiar impulse when coming from the lowly and the commonplace. We expect great men to act grandly; but Chanticleer is the representative of a very large class not great, and their lives are to be redeemed by light, not glory. When, therefore, this humble leader refuses to use the vulgar and sillier methods often employed to stir men to action, he is touching hands with the great souls and great hearts of humanity. There is the same impulse in his soul as in that of the great German calling for "more light."

Seeing, suffering, serving, struggling for light—these sum up Chanticleer's philosophy. They redeem the prosiness of life for him; and he would have the dwellers in his little, humble world redeemed by the same ideals. If he can but get them to see as he sees, to act as he acts, to endure as he endures, their lives will taste a fullness and a richness of living undreamed by any of them. That they may share in his vision and his joy, compels him to abandon the fair but frivolous Hen Pheasant and return to the life of the barnyard. Incidentally he knows that she will not be destroyed, for the proprietor is a vegetarian!

There is nothing maudlin, ugly or inartistic about Rostand's private life nor his dramas. He acts as though he were devoted to his family and his work. He abhors scandal. One fails to find any character, scene or plot that shocks the sensibilities of a cultured mind. Yet his is not a sweetness that



cloys. All critics are agreed as to his mastery of language, the virility of his men, the attractiveness of his women and the lofty idealism of his plays. While he portrays no cross-sections of life, he nevertheless is true to life. His gaze has been fixed on the beauty, the splendor and the nobility of the human soul. His dramas portray and turn about an inner struggle without baring to public view the weakness or the sensuality of humanity. He offers neither sermons, lessons nor a "slice of life."

He is both idealist, symbolist and romanticist. With marvelous felicity he unites the romanticism of *Cyrano de Bergerac* with the idealism of *Chantecler*. In the presentation of both aspects of life he excels. He would meet life gaily and gladly and endure all that it may be his lot to endure; but in the struggle he would never lose sight of the great mainspring of all action—a superb idealism.

Surely no just estimate of Edmond Rostand and his work can be made that neglects either his purpose or his audience. He is a Frenchman, who came upon the scene when realism held complete sway, and every ugly passion was rudely and artistically dissected. He was met by the criticism that the golden age of France had passed, and the literature of that nation, if not the nation itself, was rapidly becoming decadent. Some of her best critics mourned but admitted the fact. He had to make his appeal to a people fairly mad with frivolities and follies. Yet despite these hindrances he dared raise his voice—almost alone amongst the multitude—and promulgate a philosophy and view of life that had long been lost sight of. He claimed no special gifts nor graces. He set about his work as a careful, conscientious workman, and he caused a revolution. He refused to follow or be led by the popular models; instead he chose to follow his own inner light. When success smiled upon him, he refused to allow it to spoil him. He says, after his success with *Les Romanesques*: "The first thing I knew, Sarcey was proclaiming me the modern Regnard, and I was booked to write comedy all my life. But I had no intention of accepting any such narrow mission. What I wanted

to depict and study was life. So I wrote a play forthwith, *La Princesse Loïtaine*, that was delicate, sad and tender, and I let the critics reprove me as they pleased. Yes, I knew what I was doing. And I wrote *Cyrano*, which, I suppose, has a little of everything in it, like the world about us." Little wonder, then, that Mme. Bernhard in Gallic enthusiasm and impetuosity could say: "If Rostand were to die, it would be a calamity to mankind, for he is bringing in a new period in the drama—a clean, wholesome period. If Rostand were to die, I think—why I think I should want to die too." We may be unwilling to allow our passion for romanticism go as far as that of the "divine Sarah," but surely we will agree with Prof. Henderson, when he says: "The generation inspired by the message of Walter Scott welcomed with open arms the D'Artagnan of Alexander Dumas. To-day the generation inspired by the message of Robert Louis Stevenson bids hail to the *Cyrano de Bergerac* of Edmond Rostand. The Musketeer D'Artagnan congratulates the Musketeer De Bergerac, but are not these figures of still grander proportions? Is it not rather the spirit of the first half of the nineteenth century congratulating the spirit of the first half of the twentieth century upon Edmond Rostand and the return of Romance?"

LANCASTER, PA.

## VI.

### THE REFORMATION IN RELATION TO THE MODERN AGE.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

The Protestant world is planning to celebrate the four hundredth anniversary of the Reformation during this coming year. This means that during the next twelve months many and varied attempts will be made by the world's thinkers to interpret anew the abiding significance of the world-wide age-long series of events known in history as the Reformation of the sixteenth century. It is not likely that many new facts will be unearthed. For a hundred years or more men have been busy gathering every possible fact of historic interest in the lives of the Reformers, in their relation one to another, in the literature which they produced, and in the influence which they exerted upon their day and generation. We need not look then for any new and startling facts to be given to the world in the observance of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Protestant Reformation.

What we have a right to expect, however, is a new and better interpretation of the meaning of the Reformation than has been hitherto possible. Four hundred years ought to give us sufficient perspective to view events more or less in their totality and to look at them with a certain amount of calmness. It ought to enable us to see things steadily and to see them whole. This is not as easy a matter as we may imagine. It is next to impossible to view history in a wholly objective way even after centuries. So much depends on our point of view, on our personal philosophy of life, on our social, religious, or political opinions, on our ideas of what is really important in life, or of what really constitutes progress for the race, that

it is mere pretence to say that in the consideration of a question like the Reformation we are going to divest ourselves of all prepossession or of all subjective bias. So much depends on what we really consider valuable that in the consideration of any historic events we need to consider our philosophy of life and our theory of progress.

I can perhaps best illustrate how the interpretation of a great event like the Reformation is influenced by our conception of life and progress if I recall to you for a moment the fact that a keen student of history, an Oxford professor, recently treated the Reformation from three entirely different points of view in turn in order to show that the conclusion arrived at in each case was due to the presence of certain assumptions. First, he took the Protestant position, starting with the assumption that the supremely important thing in life was the soul's freedom of access to God. Then he took the Catholic position, starting with the assumption that the supremely important thing was the authority of the church and its law which was higher than that of the state or of the individual. His third argument started out with the assumption that the difference between religious freedom and religious authority was of really little consequence, but that the supreme good in life lay in economic advances. From this assumption he proved that the Reformation was essentially social and political, and that Protestantism was in fact a by-product, an attempt to readjust religious conceptions to a new political and social order. The real value of this Oxford professor's experiment lies in the fact that it shows us what a highly complex thing historical truth really is and how at best we can catch only a partial glimpse of so many-sided a movement as was the Reformation of the sixteenth century.

My personal conviction then that in the whole course of history, from the second century to the present time, the greatest movement and the one most pregnant with good was the Protestant Reformation, is based on the assumption that the principles of the Reformation are supremely important both for

individual human life and for the progress of the race. There is little difference of opinion as to what these principles actually are. Fundamentally it is a question of the liberation of the human soul. Primarily, Protestantism is an effectual assertion of human liberty. Strictly speaking Protestantism has but one great principle, namely, the right of direct access to God through Christ, his Son. This is its ultimate idea. At root the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism is found in the fact that Catholicism interposes a machinery of mediation between the soul and its God, while Protestantism is content to leave the spirit face to face with its Maker. Authority is the keynote of the one system, liberty of the other. To the one Christianity is an institutional affair, to the other it is a personal power within the soul which places it in direct relation to God. The one declares that the grace of God comes upon man only through certain fixed channels, of which a certain class of men have the control. The other asserts that the intercourse between God and man is absolutely free. The Reformation, then, is the assertion of freedom, it is a breaking of bonds. Throughout the Middle Ages many and ineffectual attempts were made on the part of the human soul to break the shackles that bound it. When the break did come it brought religion back to itself once more, freed it of accretions and reduced it to its essential factors. Harnack puts this idea in the following words: "In the history of religions every really important reformation is always first and foremost a reduction to principles; for in the course of its historical development, religion by adapting itself to circumstances, attracts to itself much alien material, and produces in conjunction with this a number of hybrid elements. If it is not to run wild from exuberance or be choked by its own dry leaves the reformer must come who purifies it and brings it back to itself. This critical reduction to principles the Reformers accomplished in the sixteenth century by victoriously declaring that the Christian religion was given only in the Word of God and in the inward experience which accords with this Word."

This new sense of religious freedom known as Protestantism arose out of a great experience. It was not the result of intellectual criticism. It grew out of a great practical need, namely, the question of the soul's salvation. Luther, for example, had tried his best to satisfy his religious needs in all the ways that the church of the Middle Ages had recommended, and he had experienced a sense of failure. "I was the most miserable man on earth," he says, so he began to examine and test the whole system in dead earnest, and guided by his study of the scriptures he threw himself directly upon God. This act he called faith. "There are two kinds of believing," he says, "first, a believing about God, which means that I believe that what is said about God is true. This faith is rather a form of knowledge than faith. There is secondly a believing about God which means that I put my trust in Him, giving myself up to thinking that I can have dealings with Him, and believe that without any doubt He will be to me and do to me according to the things said of Him. Such faith, which throws itself upon God, whether in life or in death alone makes a christian man."

The proclamation of this experience of the direct contact of man's personality with God's personality was the foundation of the Reformation. From this idea of faith everything else followed as a corollary. If the sum of religion consisted in trust of the heart in God who had given himself to us in Christ as our Father, then there was swept away the whole idea of the mediation of the priesthood as essential to salvation. It was this mediatorial priesthood that enslaved Europe, that made the liberty of the christian soul impossible, and that had stood for centuries as a barrier between the soul and its God. When the Reformers proclaimed the priesthood of all believers, they practically issued a religious Magna Charta. Luther's pamphlet on "Christian Liberty" is essentially a declaration of independence. Among other things he said that a christian man is the most free man of all, subject to none. This reformation doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers was



exceedingly far reaching in its effects, because it rejected once for all the artificial distinction between clergy and laity which had characterized the religious life of the Middle Ages. The Protestant principle is that laity and clergy alike have direct access to God through faith. As Luther puts it, "All men are worthy to appear before God, to pray for others, to teach each other the things that are of God." In the springtime of the Reformation, under the breath of this principle, everything that had a right freely to assert itself began to struggle forth into independent development. While the early Reformers had no other aim than to restore to the world a living faith in God, yet when they broke away from the shackles of Mediævalism, the spirit of freedom was felt and vindicated in every sphere of life and the christian man was made to feel that through his God he was an independent being who stood as a priest before God and as a king before the world.

Thus did the Reformation promote the spirit of liberty in the modern world, and emphasize the freedom of the individual. It is true it created divisions, but these very divisions prevented any one church from gaining the absolute control which the church of the Middle Ages had exercised for hundreds of years. In this way freedom had room to grow, private judgment was developed, and liberty of conscience and of life was everywhere proclaimed. Other influences than the Reformation had to do with the rise and spread of liberty in the modern world, but the right of private judgment in religious matters which was proclaimed in the early period of the Protestant Reformation forms the basis of that liberalism and that spirit of consequent progress which has characterized the superior elements of modern civilization.

We have spoken thus far of the spirit of liberty which is found in early Protestantism. Alas, however, the promise of freedom which the Reformation gave at the time of its birth before long began to wane. The early documents of the Reformation are full of declarations of the rights of conscience and of religious liberty, but it was soon seen that it was one

thing to claim liberty for oneself and another to accord it to others. Liberty soon led to license. Before long all sorts of heresies and excesses sprang up from every side. Sects began to abound, and the Reformers were confronted with the question as to what length toleration ought to go and just to what limit protest ought to be confined. Many of these sects emphasized truths which the Reformers had neglected. The fact is that as much of the modern spirit has come from the sects of the Reformation as from the churches of the Reformers. An example of this may be found in the Anabaptist conception of the separation of church and state, and their idea of the freedom of conscience, as well as their condemnation of religious persecutions of every kind. The world likewise gained a great deal from the Socinian emphasis on the moral ability of man and their contention against natural depravity, their appeal to social ideals, and their humanistic way of looking at things.

As soon as the Reformers were confronted with the question as to what extent toleration ought to go, or difference of opinion ought to be permitted, they began to forsake the real Reformation discovery that faith was not an intellectual thing but a dynamic spiritual force, that Christianity was not an assent to certain propositions, but was a personal power within the soul placing it in direct relation to God. This change of attitude on the part of Protestantism began early, even in Luther's life. As the Saxon Reformer advanced in life his idea of faith became more intellectual, until at last it comprised little more than the acceptance of certain articles of an orthodox creed. The early Luther up to 1523 stands for freedom, individuality, democracy, supreme spirituality. From that time on he comes into contact with the sects and by way of reaction becomes more dogmatic, harder in his judgment of men, less purely spiritual, less liberal. Harnack says: "The very man who freed the Gospel of Jesus Christ from the forms of the old Catholic theology gave to those forms once again a value and a meaning. He retained the old Mediæval formulæ and re-

stored many of the old Catholic doctrines which had lain dormant for centuries."

The same thing can in part be said of Zwingli. The Swiss Reformer had early learned from his humanistic studies the futility of trying to save the soul by the elaborate external system of the Middle Ages. Like Luther he came to his conclusions independently. When Luther's teachings came to his notice he was prepared for them. Both men at first grasped the spiritual and vital elements of the Gospel. Both taught the Gospel of God's forgiving love in Christ, of salvation through God's free grace, of the liberty of Christian men, of the universal priesthood of believers, and of the church as the communion of saints. But both in addition to these spiritual elements of the Gospel maintained the formulæ and the framework of Mediæval thought.

The Reformation, then, though it introduced a new order of things, was by no means a consistent and harmonious manifestation. It cannot be judged only by the first generation of its existence. Before long the Protestants were busy doing the very thing which they had condemned at the birth of the Reformation, namely, systematizing and crystallizing their religious experiences into hard and fast systems of theology. When they began doing this, the creative period of the Reformation was past and the scholastic period was born. Philip Melancthon laid the foundation of Protestant scholasticism in the Lutheran church. John Calvin did the same for the Reformed church. Though Luther had declared that reason was more poisonous than a beast with many dragon heads and that speculative theology belonged to the devil in Hell, the application of reason to religion in the building up of hard and fast dogmatic systems was the chief occupation of Protestant thinkers in the latter part of the sixteenth century and in the major part of the seventeenth century. In this period Protestant scholasticism weighed as heavily upon the mind of Europe, was animated by the same spirit, and followed the same method that had characterized Catholic scholasticism in

pre-Reformation days. The result was what is known in our day as the old Protestantism, with its narrowness, its rigidity, and its intolerance. Professor Beard in his Hibbert lectures sums up the period by saying: "I know no epoch of Christianity to which I could more comfortably point in illustration of the fact that where there is most theology there is often least religion." Troeltsch in his volume on "Protestantism and Progress" shows very clearly the great change which came over Protestantism. He shows that the Protestant churches, in spite of their anti-Catholic doctrines of salvation, developed into an ecclesiastical system akin to that of the Middle Ages, and claimed the right to regulate state and society, science and education, law, commerce and industry, according to their own point of view. He shows that Protestantism, in spite of its doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers, and its principle of inwardness, soon came to be conceived as resting on an authority distinct and separate from the world and its interests. "Indeed," says Troeltsch, "it actually endeavored to carry through by its own methods this tendency of Mediæval civilization more strictly than it had been possible for the hierarchically constituted church of the Middle Ages to do."

Meanwhile, however, certain historic movements were proceeding alongside of the old Protestantism, and frequently in spite of it, which had an independent influence on the world. For a time Protestantism with short-sighted bitterness and narrow sympathy kept itself apart from and in opposition to these modern historical movements. Gradually and surely, however, these independent influences transformed the old Protestantism of scholastic days into the new Protestantism of more modern times. What are some of these influences in modern life which have brought about this transformation? The first is pietism. There was a depression of moral and religious life in seventeenth century Europe. The prevalence of scholasticism and the demoralizing effects of the Thirty Years War had caused a demand for practical religious work, had brought about the revival of personal religious interests. Then it was

that Spener and his followers, like the early Luther, issued anew their protests of individualism against institutionalism, and demanded once more the right of direct independent communion with God, asserted once more the universal priesthood of believers, the rights of the laity, the recognition of religious experience, and the emphasis of religion on the will rather than on the intellect. The pietistic movement had a decided influence. It helped to turn men's attention from the unessential to the essential, and made prominent not doctrine, but life. What Spener did in Germany, Wesley did in England. He too transferred emphasis from the institutional to the personal element in religion. He returned to the spirit of the early Reformation. He gave new meaning and independent value to religion. He promoted individualism and helped to rescue religion from the bondage of scholasticism and ecclesiasticism.

The enlightenment of the eighteenth century was perhaps the most influential factor in the transformation of the whole world of thought and culture in modern times. Its fruits are seen in every sphere of life, political, social, economic, scientific, philosophical, and religious. In the world of politics, it brought about the French Revolution, and laid the foundations of modern democracy, by undermining belief in the divine right of kings, by destroying feudalism, and by emphasizing the theory of natural rights. The enlightenment shared with the renaissance the task of reconstructing the modern world. Protestantism at first opposed the enlightenment and then in course of time was transformed by it.

One influence which has helped to change the modern world was the growth of the critical spirit. It was brought about largely by three epoch-making books, Richard Bentley's "Dissertation on the Epistle of Phalaris," Frederick August Wolf's "Prolegomena to Homer," and Niebuhr's "History of Rome." Lessing and Herder, too, had a great influence in their insistence on criticizing all records and on paying undivided allegiance to all truth. Here again Protestantism at first resisted the critical spirit, and then afterwards was transformed by it.

Another influential movement of modern times was found in the new awakening which came to scientific investigation. The whole framework of systematic theology was built up before natural science was born. The scientific results from the day when Newton laid his "Principia" before the Royal Society to the day when Darwin published his "Origin of Species," matured themselves largely in entire independence of both Protestant and Catholic ideas. There was a wide divergence between the formulated doctrines of the Reformation and the modern scientific views of the world, and in the conflict between two diverse sciences, unfortunately the church too often supported the older. If the Protestant church in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the earlier part of the nineteenth century had frankly recognized that it was teaching an antiquated world view and had openly put itself on the side of the new scientific investigation, it would have been far better.

Another influential movement of modern times was the critical philosophy of the eighteenth century. When Kant first insisted on the supreme value of the moral elements in life, Protestantism stood aghast. It could not for a moment imagine what the Koenigsberg philosopher meant to imply by the astonishing assertion of the supremacy of moral over theological issues, or by shifting the emphasis of thought from a hypothetical demonstration of a transcendent natural order to the critical investigation of the human soul itself. It looked askance at the shifting of a religious interest from a transcendent to an experimental basis. How shy the systems of Christian dogmatics were of the systems of ethics. But here Protestantism again asserted itself in its better spirit. Before long the center of gravity in Protestant thought began to change from metaphysics to ethics, and to-day the church stands face to face with the great modern problems of ethical reform. Modern Protestantism has little use for a man who is morally crooked, however orthodox he may be. Modern Protestantism does not believe in moral opportunism. It is



not as much concerned about traditional theology as about true manliness.

So when the great social questions came sweeping over the world, under the influence of new political and industrial conditions, old Protestantism was reluctant to shift its emphasis from the future world to the everlasting now. And yet the transition is being made. The church is no longer looked upon as a mere depository of doctrine, or a school of ideal philosophy. Genetic study has made it plain to the modern religious thinker that Christianity is partly the product of a given society at a given point in the world's history, and that what one society has produced another society may improve upon. So the new Protestantism frankly faces social problems and comes into close touch with the workaday life of humanity.

Under the influence of these movements a transition has come into the life of the Protestant church. Just because the Protestant church did not have the unity and the element of authority of the Catholic church, she could not resist the influences of the movements that have just been mentioned. She could not maintain in the face of overwhelming opposition the fast and fixed systems of doctrine which she had wrought out for herself in the seventeenth century. The result was a general breaking up of Protestantism. One part of it tried to maintain itself in its old shell, and attempted to be immune to all the influences of the new civilization. Another part, true to the spirit of Protestantism, sincerely tried to emancipate itself from the enslavement of a hard and fast scholastic system, and to enter upon a new career of freedom and independence. This was accomplished under the leadership of Kant and Schleiermacher. These men broke up the barrenness of old Protestantism, and opened up a new springtime of religious history. Under the touch of their hand and the inspiration of their thought, the laborious systems spun out by previous generations broke like the winter's ice floe under the warm touch of spring. Due largely to their efforts, Protestantism is once more asserting its sense of freedom. It is

really returning to the earlier spirit of the Reformation, while it is renouncing the scholastic period of its own history. If you wish to put it otherwise you might say that Protestantism is proclaiming a new Reformation, is rejoicing in the possession of a new freedom, is heralding once more the Evangel of a new and direct access to the spirit of God in Christ.

Lessing in his work on the "Education of the Human Race," laid down the principle that an idea once sown in the world must sooner or later come to its fruition. This holds true of the idea of spiritual freedom. It was the favorite teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. It was proclaimed by St. Paul. It was rediscovered by Luther and Zwingli. It is the one element in Protestantism to-day that ought most be cherished. The last thing on earth that the Protestant Church historically has a right to do is to indulge in anathemas of authority against freedom of thought or against the spirit of honest research. When Semler, not much more than a century ago, applied the critical spirit to the study of the Bible, he was reviled and spit upon. But the real spirit of Protestantism has since then made itself felt in the world. We realize to-day that we might as well ignore the spectroscope in astronomy or bacilli in medicine as to check spiritual freedom in its sincere and devout attempt to make a literary study of the Bible, or an historical study of the church, or to apply the principles of genetic evolution to institutions, creeds, doctrines, or even to the religious consciousness itself.

Up to this point we have dealt with the question of the fundamental principles of the Reformation, of the conflicting elements in Protestantism, and of the inherent power in the Protestant churches because of the Reformation principle of freedom to amalgamate themselves with the elements of a new civilization. We have seen that as Protestantism was confronted with the modern world of ideas it accepted them with more or less reluctance, partly because it chose to do so, but largely because lacking unity and authority it had little power of resistance and was overwhelmed in the struggle.

This brings us to the important question as to whether the

culture and civilization of the modern world actually did spring up outside of Protestantism, and actually did force itself upon Protestantism from without. This leads us to a still greater question, namely, to what extent is Protestantism with its Reformation principles responsible for the modern age, what tendencies does it have which draw it to the culture and civilization of the modern world. It is this question which Troeltsch, of Heidelberg University, has taken up in his numerous publications and historical studies. His conclusion is two-fold, namely, that Protestantism is a potent influence in the establishment of modern culture, one of the most powerful forces of modern civilization, and yet Protestantism in its actual state fails to work the miracle of directing the spirit of the modern world. These two things are not inconsistent. It is quite possible for the very civilization which Protestantism has produced to crush its own parent, unless there be greater stamina and more self-assertiveness and a fortifying of its basic principles on the part of modern Protestantism itself. Unless this be done, modern culture and modern civilization may prove to be the Frankenstein of Protestantism, a monster slaying its own maker. Troeltsch declares that Protestantism is now engaged in a titanic struggle with the very elements of civilization it has helped to create, and on its ability to express itself in vigorous and unmistakable terms regarding the family, the law, the state, commerce, society, science, and art, will depend not only its own future but the future of modern society itself. The danger is that in her willingness to accept positive sciences in order to play a great rôle in the world's social economy, the Protestant church may sacrifice her own spiritual supremacy, and that instead of making science subserve her teaching she may rush over to the other extreme of simply existing to serve the interest of science. Her real glory lies in the fact that she still has the inherent power born of the freedom of the Reformation to reconcile the rationalism of modern science with a desire of being a spiritual life guide.

Let us look a little more closely at the problem we have set for ourselves, namely, what has been the influence of the church of the Reformation on modern culture. That there was such an influence is undoubted. How much of the modern spirit actually owes its impetus to the principles of Protestantism is hard to determine. It is difficult to arrive at any causal connection. "Propter hoc, ergo hoc" will not do. One must do more than simply contrast the elements of modern civilization with those of the immediately preceding periods. It is true one might take the principles of the Reformation and show how they would work themselves out naturally under favoring circumstances. The better method, probably, is to take up the several institutions of modern life and ascertain historically, so far as possible, what part if any Protestantism played in the development of the modern world. This is practically what Troeltsch tried to do. His conclusion was that while Protestantism greatly influenced the modern world, it did so indirectly and unconsciously.

Take the Protestant influence on the family as an example. The Reformation did away with the monastic view of marriage. It substituted for the celibate priesthood the Protestant citizen pastor. It created in its pastorate a new social order, and furnished a pattern of family life that has been more of an influence to the remotest community than we often suspect. Protestantism put marriage on a more ethical and personal basis. It is true it retained many of the family ideals in common with Catholicism, such as the complete subordination of wife and children. It is also true that it made possible the freedom of divorce, characteristic of modern times, in an attempt to prepare the way for a freer movement of the individual. Now comes the question, can Protestantism in its actual state direct the spirit of the modern world in questions of family life? I shall not attempt to answer the question. But Protestantism may well squarely face the issue as to what extent organized religion in the twentieth century is a success in the treatment of the marriage relation, and as to whether the facility for divorce in which Protestant churches have too

frequently acquiesced has not had a great deal to do with lowering the whole tone of modern society.

Or take the idea of the state. It would doubtless be too much to say that the modern state is the creation of Protestantism. It is true, however, that the churches of the Reformation freed the state from every kind of subordination to the hierarchy. It gave the final note of independence to the state when it declared that civil office was direct service to God and was not dependent upon the church. Yet one would hardly dare to say that the modern state directly owed its birth to Protestantism, for after all Protestantism regarded the state as a religious institution whose business it was to advance civilization in the interest of the Christian commonwealth. While it would be hard to prove that the modern democratic state directly owes its origin to Protestantism, Troeltsch certainly overstates the case when he declared that the Lutheran type of Protestantism was politically favorable to absolutism, and that enlightened absolutism after the Prussian style was inherently the result of Protestantism. He likewise gives a rather twisted interpretation to Calvinism, when he declares that it prefers a modified aristocracy, but that in its great struggles in France, Holland, and Scotland, it successfully established the principle of the right of resistance on the part of the individual, and therefore is frequently given the credit for the rise of democracy in modern life. Troeltsch declares that democracy in the strictest sense is foreign to the Calvinistic spirit and could only develop out of it where as in the New England states the old class system of Europe was absent. Even there Calvinism developed into a theocracy in which church membership was a condition for holding office. Therefore, he concludes that the democratizing of the modern world ought not to be referred to Calvin, but rather to Rousseau. While all this is true, it can be proved with little difficulty, we believe, that the spirit of the Reformation with its ideas of civil liberty was developed by men like Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. With its insistence on the strength of simple manhood and individual worth, it played an important part in prepar-

ing the way for the growth of the democratic spirit of modern times.

So with the idea of the rights of man, freedom of conscience, and the inviolability of life and property. While these are bound up with the idea of democracy, they are not necessarily identical with it. It is possible for the rights of individuals to exist apart from democracy. The English Revolution of 1688 recognized the rights of the individual, and liberty of conscience without democracy. It is possible, too, to have a form of democracy without liberty of conscience. This was the case in the Calvinistic New England states. Jellinek has developed the idea that the rights of the individual were derived from the constitutions of the states of North America, and that these states derived them from their Puritan religious principles, and that from the American states they entered the French constitution and most modern constitutions. An opponent of Jellinek shrewdly observes, however, that liberty of conscience was found in those two colonial states which were not Calvinistic, in Rhode Island, under the influence of Roger Williams, the Baptist, and in Pennsylvania, under the Quaker influence of William Penn. Not the church Protestantism, then, is responsible for the doctrine of the rights of man, but rather the sects which church Protestantism hated and drove out of the old world. As one writer intimates, the step-children of the Reformation have the honor of continuing the spirit of religious freedom in the new world and of bringing to an end the Mediæval idea of civilization.

It would be an interesting question in discussing Protestantism's relation to the modern state to ascertain just what relation the modern principle of nationality bears to the question of the system of national churches developed by Protestantism since the days of the Reformation. It certainly would not be fair to give either the credit or the blame of the modern spirit of nationality to any of the essential principles of Protestantism. Nationality is born of two irreconcilable forces in modern life, the awakening of the masses, and the romantic idea of national spirit.



Another question that opens here is to what extent is the modern system of industrial and economic life and organization the product of Protestant ideas? This phase of the question has been discussed by Laveleye. Sometimes it is thought that Luther's doctrine of the value of the secular calling as over against the monastic life had a great influence on the development of industrial organization. But this thought is rather far-fetched. The fact is that the Protestant theory of secular calling is so bound up with a conservation theory of society as based on a class system that its tendency was to keep each individual in his own class. It rather crushed industrial ambition and prescribed patient endurance of the injustices and hardships of the world. Early Protestantism especially helped to create and educate a humble, patient working class, but it apparently did not contain an impulse toward vigorous economic development. While it may be true that Lutheranism exercised the patience of the working-man by picturing the world as a hard pilgrimage, the Reformed church under the influence of Calvin was not content with passivity or acquiescence. It counselled the heroic and urged the rôle of relentless discipline. Wherever the spirit of Calvin went, it was accompanied by a spirit of industrialism. Max Weber in a very interesting study on the presuppositions of our present economic system distinguishes between what he calls the capitalistic system and the capitalistic spirit. By the capitalistic spirit he means the display of untiring activity and of a boundlessness of grasp which is contrary to the natural impulses of enjoyment and ease. Now, says Weber, it was Calvinism that created the psychological conditions that made possible the vast economic development in modern times. A clever writer has shrewdly observed that this may be due to the close spiritual affinity between Jewish and Calvinistic attitudes toward life. It is perhaps a more rational view which concludes that if there be any truth whatever in the fact that the spirit of Calvinism has anything to do with the rise of the industrial life of modern times, it is due to the fact that Calvinism emphasizes

the doctrine of the will of God, which urges man to the full development of his God-given powers.

The very industrial economic system however which indirectly owes its origin in part to Protestant ideas has developed its darker side, has torn loose from its former ethical foundation and has in many cases become a power directly opposed to the principles of freedom involved in Protestantism. Rauschenbush in his book on "Christianity and the Social Crisis" shows very clearly the problems of the present position of Protestant economic ethics in America. It is a very fair question to ask what message has Protestantism to give to the solution of the problems of industrialism and capitalism of modern times. Shall the whole economic system be changed as the Christian socialists demand or shall we continue to do what Protestantism is attempting to do now, simply insist on higher ethical standards.

We know that the Reformation in essence and origin was not primarily a social but a religious movement. We know too that the social struggles and aspirations of the times contributed to its success. While the Protestantism of the great confessions was essentially conservative and in large part failed to recognize the existence of a social problem, the smaller groups of Protestants constantly insisted that the Kingdom of God was a realizable ideal of human society. Too often alas has Protestantism been content to leave things take care of themselves, but in every generation since the days of Zwingli there have been men who have been as the salt of the earth, there have been men who have recognized and labored for the new social world which was coming into being.

Protestantism has ever been largely individualistic. One can easily account for this. The demolition of the authority of the Roman church destroyed the conception of life as dominated by authority. And yet if you will think just a little more deeply you will see that Protestantism has really been surprisingly conservative. It has insisted that respect for the law, maintenance of order and subordination to organized authority are the conditions of liberty. The idea of the re-

construction of society in the interest of the individual except as it is occasionally found among the Anabaptists is not a product of Protestantism. Modern social theories have not come from religious ideas primarily but really are the creatures of the enlightenment, which has insisted upon the equality of men in virtue of their possession of reason and on the possibility of the reconstruction of society on the basis of scientific knowledge.

Is Protestantism, as we are often told, really the pioneer of science in the modern world? In what sense can it be said that Protestantism opened up the way for the modern idea of the freedom of science? It might be too much to say that it guided science to new and original discoveries. It did several very important things. It made it possible for the state to foster science for its own interest and to proceed independently in its investigations even though its results ceased to coincide with those of the church. Further, Protestantism encouraged the spirit of individual criticism. It encouraged the application of psychological methods. It took over the tools of humanism. It encouraged exact thinking and scholarly methods. While its scholarship for a long time was a type of scholasticism, it was aided by humanism. Yet we must not claim too much. We must not lose sight of the fact that the great scientific discoveries of modern mathematics and physics came from the Renaissance, that Kepler came into conflict with church authorities, and that the foundation of modern philosophy was laid by the Catholic Descartes, and that the modern political and social sciences were recast largely by men who stood aloof from the Confessions of orthodox Protestantism. Where Protestantism however gained the advantage was in the fact that it gradually appropriated this mass of scientific knowledge and secured for its people a distinct scientific superiority. We would hardly say that modern science was born out of Protestantism but we can say that it was welded into it. This only came to pass after terrific struggle. But when the scientific spirit was merged with the Protestant religious spirit Christianity received a fuller development and man-

kind penetrated more deeply into the wonder and the glory of God. The fine thing was that the possibility of the change was inherent in Protestantism.

When it comes to the question of the relation of Protestantism to *art* one often hears unfavorable comments. We are told that Catholicism because of its emphasis on the sensible and on the imaginative as over against the intellectual and the practical spirit is decidedly more favorable to the artistic development of men and nations. Yet it is well to remember that Protestantism has had real creative importance for art and literature. In any case it entirely changed the range of subjects from which art has drawn its material and it has inspired art with a new spirit. It has given a more realistic expression to life. Neither has it been wanting in the sense of the inner life. Protestantism need not be ashamed of its religious lyrics and as to music it has had no small share in the education of Sebastian Bach, while in literature the spirit of Protestantism is found in a dozen plays of Shakespeare, in the Epics of Milton, and in the genius of Goethe.

In Protestantism's influence on education we see an important characteristic of modern life. From the very beginning Protestantism made an alliance with humanism and displayed a remarkable ability in the founding of schools. Its educational zeal has given to the nations great individual alertness of mind. All the Reformers gave much of their time to the education of the masses. Luther not only translated the entire Bible for the masses to read and reflect upon, but he preached sermons on the duty of sending children to school in order to make of them good citizens. He advised compulsory attendance. He enlarged the curriculum. He commended rational methods of teaching. Zwingli likewise made the extension of educational facilities a part of his reform. He founded a number of educational institutions and introduced elementary schools into Switzerland. Calvin established colleges at Geneva and elsewhere. It was the zeal for education on the part of the Reformers that brought into existence as a counteractive the wonderful educational system of the Jesuits. In the

American colonies founded by Reformed and Lutheran people early provision was made for elementary education. Universities sprang up in all the Protestant states of Europe with marvelous rapidity and in America all the early colleges were closely connected with the various Protestant church communions. While the democratic ideal in education came in large part from Rousseau and the period of enlightenment that served to elevate mankind by means of knowledge to a share in the general benefits of civilization, yet that spirit in modern education which believes in the freedom to teach all the people all truth on all subjects is a distinctly Protestant spirit. Modern education owes more to the Reformation than we are apt to think. In answer to the question we raised then as to the influence of the Reformation and the principles of Protestantism on the modern world, I think a close study of the facts and tendencies of the history of the past four hundred years will show that the principles of Protestantism have expressed themselves in vigorous and unmistakable terms and have had much to do with our modern conceptions of the family, the state, society, science, art, and education.

But the other question that we set for ourselves is even more difficult of solution; namely, to what extent does Protestantism in its actual state to-day succeed in directing the spirit of the modern world? Protestantism certainly has given to the modern world much of its spirit of individualism, of its interest in the life of the present world, of its self-confident spirit of progress. But parallel with these things there has sprung up in the modern world a new type of life which, while it emphasizes individualism, present worldliness, and progress, departs widely from Protestant, even from Christian ideals, in that it seeks to make increase of power the highest and all sufficient goal of life. The very self-sufficiency and sense of infallibility in modern civilization makes us feel that if these things are the result of Protestant ideals, then Protestantism is a failure. If the struggle for progress, the spirit of individualism and the emphasis on the things of present life which have brought the leading Protestant nations of the earth in

our day to grapple with one another to the very death for the increase of power were the only fruits of the Reformation principles we might well despair; for modern life does present so much that is dark and evil and the desire for the increase of power has yielded such a strong sense of inner emptiness that it is well for us to bear in mind that Protestantism is primarily not a civilizing force in the narrower sense but a religious force. It was a mistake in the seventeenth century to make Protestantism primarily a scholastic doctrine. It would be equally a mistake in the nineteenth or the twentieth century to judge it primarily by its ability to direct the civilizing forces of the world. The really revolutionary effects of the Reformation were in the main only to be found in the religious sphere and wherever the principles of Protestantism are found their effects are to be judged by their power to transform men under the influence of the ideas of freedom and grace into self-directing personalities and into spiritual fellowships.

Protestantism may well subject itself to a rigid self-examination and ask itself clearly what there is in it which is destined to encompass all ages and what part of it belongs only to a particular time and place. While the Reformation has been the animating soul of the modern world, and while Protestantism has attained its position in the modern world in large part by forming an alliance with modern civilization, the real value of Protestantism in present-day life consists in its power to direct the movements of civilization toward a spiritual goal under the leadership of free sovereign personalities in whom the sweep and current of the age has become flesh and blood, personalities that feel free to exercise the same rights which the Reformation exercised, personalities that still long passionately for immediate access to God and that under the inspiration of such access honestly and sincerely face the new problems of the new age and throw a whole-souled energy into their solution, personalities, free, independent, courageous that have a masterful grasp of things and that help to fill the whole of modern life with the glow and the irresistible attraction that has characterized genuine Protestantism at all times.



Genuine Protestantism does not look upon the Reformation of the sixteenth century as a finality. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was in itself a revolt against finality. It would be a strange thing if finality were to be its result. If the Reformers were living to-day they would breathe the common air of the intellectual life of the twentieth century and answer to its inspiration as they did to that of their own time. The glory of Protestantism lies in its spirit of fresh receptiveness, in its capacity by virtue of its doctrines of freedom and grace to adapt itself to the best thought of every age, to ally itself with the finest type of civilization in every land. Herein lies the promise of its future. It is in America that the great opportunity of Protestantism lies in the twentieth century. If we can link the self-directing power of free personalities to our material resources, to our Anglo-Saxon endowment of character, to our traditions of political and religious autonomy, to our democratic institutions we can meet heroically the scientific, ethical and social problems of the age. As we do this will we help the world to become purer and stronger in spirit and ever more loving and brotherly in action. Then will Protestantism not only have had a great past but it will also have a great future.

There is a two-fold danger in Protestantism. On the one hand there is the danger of stagnation which is sure to come if it looks upon sixteenth or seventeenth century life as the norm and authority for twentieth century conditions. The other danger lies in so trying to play a rôle in the world's social economy by allying itself with anti-Christian elements in civilization as to sacrifice spiritual supremacy. The great work of Protestantism lies in continued emphasis on simple faith in and direct access to the God and Father of Jesus Christ, who is the power whence come to us freedom and self-direction and spiritual personality. The Reformation was an enormous stride towards the Apostolic ideal, "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." As I see it the hope of religion in the twentieth century with its giant states, its vast military power, its development of modern capitalistic

business organization, its growth of applied science, its struggle of the nations in the world politics without, its struggles of social classes within, its mental and spiritual revolutions, its various tendencies that give it a certain characteristic stamp different from every other century—the hope of it all I believe, sincerely, lies in that liberal and progressive element in Protestantism which is free enough to look squarely at the facts of modern life and strong enough in the face of all facts, new and old, to maintain its spiritual supremacy. Here lies the task of the present and the hope of the future.

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## VII.

### PRAYER AND NATURAL LAW.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

A striking contrast may be observed to-day in the religious life of mankind, especially within organized Christianity. There is, on the one hand, a firm grip, firmer I am persuaded, than ever before, on the great religious certainties; while on the other hand, there is a tremendous disintegration of doctrine. Take, for example, the person of Jesus Christ. Did ever an age resemble ours in its devotion to Him, in its wistful yearning for Him as the Saviour of mankind? And yet, as a theological figure, was there ever a time when men, competent to speak, were less ready to define and label Him? This observed contrast between the life of religion and its logic, between confident vital assurances and stammering explanations thereof, is alarming only to those who have failed to apprehend that the very essence of religion is life. To all others it is one of most hopeful signs of the present, prophetic of a greater future. For it means that in these latter days men have walked with God—directly they will learn to talk about Him in worthier accents. It means that the Living God Whom men are coming to know in their experience is vaster far than all the formulas about Him. And we are beginning to realize that instead of essaying anew the futile task of confining within theological mill-races and philosophical ponds the vast ocean of divine life in which we live and move and have our being, it were far better to plunge into its quickening currents, that lave the shores of the universe; far better, to *realize* its wonders than to theologize or philosophize about its mysteries.

And this applies with special force to prayer. Viewed as a

phase of life how vast and wonderful it seems, and how simple and satisfactory withal:

"Speak to Him, thou, for He hears.  
Spirit with spirit can meet.  
Closer is He than breathing  
And nearer than hands and feet."

It remained for Tennyson to express, in these words, the philosophy upon which men have acted unconsciously always and everywhere. One may marshal the testimonies of countless myriads who have called to the Unseen and have kept calling all the days of their life, bearing glad witness by word and deed, that response comes when men really pray to God. One may point to the example of Jesus Himself Who prayed often and taught His disciples to pray. Prayer is as universal as mankind and as elemental as breathing. Here and there you may find a man saying, with Heine, "No one but a fool really expects an answer to prayer." But that bitter voice is lost in the chorus of universal prayer that rises to the Unseen through the ages. Henry W. Beecher expressed the truth, whimsically, when he said, "I pray on the principle that wine knocks the cork out of the bottle. There is an inward fermentation and there must be a vent." Thus, viewed as a phase of life, the act of prayer is one of the elemental functions of human nature. It is coeval with our race, and coterminous with human life. Skepticism may inhibit its practice and worldliness may impair or atrophy its power. Yet, even in the skeptic and worldling prayer is latent, and will surge up from the depths in crises.

But the moment we turn from the life of prayer to its logic, from its practice to its justification before the tribunal of reason, we experience tremendous difficulties. Viewed from anything else than the point of view of Christian experience, prayer soon seems to be superfluous, presumptuous, and futile. Superfluous, if God is conceived as being perfectly good; presumptuous, if the absolute wisdom of God has created and constantly controls the universe; and futile, if law reigns, instead

of God. Thus both our intellectual advance and our spiritual growth seem to be hostile to prayer. The Christian conception of God, no less than the scientific conception of the universe, tends to make a consistent doctrine of prayer difficult, and the religious difficulty is even greater than the scientific one. We may meet and refute all the scientific arguments against prayer, but how can we harmonize our faith in the absolute goodness of God and in His perfect wisdom with petitionary and intercessory prayer? And in view of the difficulties that beset the theory of prayer on many sides, as contrasted with the simplicity and supreme satisfaction that attend its practice, the best justification of its validity is not to reason about the experience, but to enter into it. Life is the best school of prayer. There only men learn its validity and utility. And Jesus is its greatest teacher. Christ-taught men pray to their Father without asking science for its sanction or philosophy for its permission.

And yet there must be possible a rational explanation, or at least justification, of every vital function. Ultimately only that function will survive that corresponds with some reality. And if prayer is an elemental function of human nature, then it must be possible to harmonize it with our rational knowledge of the universe and with our deepest spiritual convictions concerning the God who made it and controls it. It is my object in this paper to confirm the Christian conviction that prayer is not an alien in God's world, or a hyphenated intruder into the rational order of life, but a native of the universe—much maligned by those who misunderstand it, often maltreated even by its friends, but capable of ministering to the highest life of mankind and full of potential energies, unsuspected, perhaps, by most and unrealized by all.

My topic, *Prayer and Natural Law*, suggests at once the apparently insuperable obstacle to prayer in the modern mind. *Law*, men reason, denotes order, regularity, and fixity—and *Natural Law* denotes the inviolate and inviolable order and fixity of the realm of Nature, which is coëxtensive with the

realm of reality. Prayer, on the other hand, denotes petitions born of human need and addressed to the Divine Omnipotence. It implies the power of God to bend the laws of Nature, or to break them, as He wills. Hence the dilemma—either Nature is unbending, and then prayer is unavailing; or prayer is efficacious, and in that case natural law is a figment of the human brain. But that dilemma, so popular once both among the pious and the philosophical, has been superseded. Only ignorant piety and dogmatic science continue its use. Calm reflection and critical analysis will easily convince us that natural law, properly understood, offers no impediment to prayer, and issues no injunction against faith in its efficacy.

What is Natural Law? It is a name given by science to the fixed sequences in all the occurrences in the realm of nature. Instead of being a heterogeneous scheme of things, full of unrelated and disconnected events, as a child might easily suppose, our universe is thoroughly coherent. No event in nature is independent of others; each of them is inextricably interlocked with others; and all of them stand in a causal connection. It is true, of course, that science has not yet explored the whole of our vast universe, and demonstrated the fixed sequence of cause and effect in its every precinct. But it is equally true that wherever science has advanced, whether in the realm of matter or mind, it has found fixity controlled by uniform laws, instead of chance or caprice. From being the mere "working hypothesis" of a handful of experimenting scientists, the belief that the natural world is a world of law and order has become a universal principle whose validity is not so much a matter for speculation as of information.

If now we ask, in view of this universal sequential causation, What about prayer? we seem to be driven relentlessly to the inevitable conclusion that in such an ordered universe of cause and effect, of fixed antecedents and necessary consequents, there is no room for prayer. It may survive, as a bit of stranded seaweed, long after the wave has receded that cast it ashore, but it is doomed to ultimate extinction. And that,



in fact, has been the attitude toward prayer of many scientists. But reserving *our* decision, let us now note that there is another attitude, one wholly different from that pure science, in which we can approach the facts of the physical world. We may ask two quite distinct questions respecting the natural order, namely, the very pertinent questions: How and Why! And the answer to both is necessary to a full satisfaction of mind or to a complete comprehension of things. Things exist and events happen in certain ways—now we may ask, “How do they happen?” To discover, describe, and classify these ways of being and happening in the universe is the function of science. All it does or can do, by the use of its proper methods, is to point out the mechanical or physical causes of an event (that which in modern speech is somewhat loosely called efficient causes), the antecedent conditions which lie immediately behind an event and of which it is the outcome. But when this is done, the second question, the Why, still presses for an answer. We further need to form some conception of the ultimate causality at work in this uniformity of existence and sequence which constitutes the natural order, and of the end or purpose which may underlie the whole, and which the event is intended to serve. Such an inquiry, however, leading to *final causes*, not merely to efficient causes, takes us into the field of philosophy. These, then, are the two distinct aspects under which the whole field of human experience may be regarded. It may be regarded as the resultant of efficient causes, that is, of fixed antecedents. That is the attitude of science. Or it may be regarded as the expression of final causes. That is the attitude of philosophy. And if this final cause is found in the Divine Intelligence and Will, it is the attitude of religion as well.

This distinction between efficient and final causes is of the utmost importance. Here, if anywhere, the haunting dilemma must be dissolved between natural law that denies the validity of prayer and a conception of prayer that defies and denies natural law. Again, this distinction is simply one aspect of

the larger traditional antithesis between the natural and the supernatural. Hence I shall dwell on it a moment longer. Time was when this distinction was either overlooked or denied by science and by theology. Each neglected one aspect of the order of nature, and each made dogmatic overclaims for its own interpretation of human experience. There were scientific observers whose study of efficient causes led them to a denial of finalism in any form whatsoever. And there were speculative theologians whose belief in the Final Cause led them into unreasonable opposition to the conclusions of science. Both, we say, manifested a zeal untempered by knowledge. Yet there are many mitigating circumstances which may help us to appreciate, if not to justify, their positions.

Consider, for a moment, the case of the scientist. The advance of science in the last century has been unparalleled. And that advance has been steadily in the discovery of the uniformity of the laws of nature. The reign of rigid law was the postulate as it became the ever renewed discovery of the scientific method. And it was this discovery of the fixity of the universe in the order and regularity of sequential causation, that made our modern civilization possible. What wonder, then, that good physics became bad metaphysics! Nature was spelled with a capital "N," and matter was endowed with inherent forces that initiated and maintained the cosmic processes, and produced their manifold and marvellous results. Law thus became all-embracing, nature self-sufficient, and God wholly superfluous. As Comte said: "Science conducted God to the frontier of His universe and bowed Him out with thanks for His provisional services in past ages." How general this way of thinking has been is familiar to all who are acquainted with the naturalistic literature of the last generation. As expounded by its ablest authorities, naturalism professed to explain the universe and all its phenomena in terms of matter and motion alone. It deified the uniformities and causal sequences of nature by making them adequate to the production and maintenance of all the wonders, material, mental and spiritual, that surround us.

Arrayed against this crude naturalism, with its atheistic conclusions, we see an equally crude supernaturalism, championed by theology. Apparently the two were diametrically opposed systems of thought. The one was naturalistic, and the other supra-naturalistic; the one believed in matter, the other in spirit; the one was atheistic, the other theistic. And in the literature of the time their deadly antagonism finds abundant illustration. From the day of Galileo and Copernicus theology has been afraid of science. First it hushed and crushed its exponents by external authority; and then it decried their conclusions as "science falsely so-called." In the past generation this ancient warfare between theology and science became particularly acrimonious. Science flaunted the reign of law in the face of indignant theologians, who, from time immemorial, had regarded miracles (*i. e.*, breaks in the order of nature caused by the direct interposition of God, for punitive, protective, or redemptive purposes) as the surest proofs of God's existence, as the most convincing manifestation of His omnipotence, and as the strongest props of their faith. Hence theology became openly suspicious, contemptuous even, of the much vaunted reign of law, and insisted that, at most, the laws of nature were secondary causes, instituted and imposed upon the natural universe by its divine Creator; and that the omnipotent Being who had made these laws could also break, or at least supersede, them at will. Now, historically, there is much to excuse, if not to justify, this attitude of uncompromising opposition of theology to natural science. For, as we have seen, the latter had become openly atheistic. It substituted mechanical force for spiritual power, as the ground and goal of the universe. It put natural law in place of supernatural love. And, after all, let us never forget that even the false supernaturalism of the last generation did fight for God. However false in method, it was sound in principle and purpose. And we are born of the spirit of these men. We belong to their company, rather than to the cohorts led by Vogt and Buechner, by Lamettrie and Holbach, by Tyndall and

Huxley. Salvation was their slogan, not mechanical causation; and their "plan of salvation" represented a system of final causes, the purposive, creative and providential activity of an Omnipotent God of Love.

But though historically intelligible, the attitude of theology in this controversy about the reign of law was just as untenable as that of science. In reality, and in spite of their apparent antagonism, these two controversialists were of kindred spirit. The one believed in a self-running system of nature, the other in an absentee God. But what becomes of the natural universe if its Author and Controller is conceived as existing outside of its frame? It is reduced to a self-running machine. Its Creator is the *Deus ex machina*. Hence the self-running mechanism of natural science, whose sustaining energy is found in law, was matched by the self-running machine of theology, whose constructor and conductor is an absentee God. In both systems of thought God was regarded as a rival of nature. Naturalism claimed to have given this rival his passport to the limbo of exploded superstitions, while supernaturalism endowed Him with plenipotentary powers, superseding the laws of nature, and breaking one, now and then, in order to achieve His purposes or to demonstrate His power. Again, underlying both systems, we find one and the same crude sense realism. The one assumed that the scientific fact of the reign of law reduced the universe to a mechanism. It asserted boldly that the rigid sequence of efficient material causes destroyed the religious belief in a Final Cause. The other assumed that religious faith in an omnipotent God was incompatible with scientific faith in the rigid reign of law. It asserted blindly that the bulk of the world's work, all its "natural" activities, were, indeed, performed by a machine-like mechanism, through the constant operation of secondary causes, but that in the midst of this natural order God manifested and achieved His "supernatural" aims and ends, His redemptive plan and His providential purposes, by means of occasional interpositions and interferences, as directed by His will or as moved by the prayers of His chosen

children. Science said that the universe existed wholly independent of God. Theology declared that it was absolutely dependent upon an absent God. Thus, in either case, God was not in the world. He had no vital connection with its orderly movements. And with such mixed and muddled conceptions of reality, naturalism could not fail to be hostile to religion, nor could religion fail to antagonize and repudiate naturalism.

However, a new day has dawned. The former antithesis, between nature as a self-running mechanism and as the inert machine of an absentee God, has been overcome by a higher synthesis in which the truths of both attitudes are conserved and their manifest errors avoided. In this modern attitude towards the universe the naturalism of atheistic thought and the supernaturalism of an absentee God are both seen as illusions. To-day the naturalist is not afraid of supernaturalism, nor the supernaturalist of naturalism. For the cosmic order, with its uniformities and sequences, is regarded not as the rival of God, nor even as His mask, but as the continuous manifestation and product of the divine activities. Thus the naturalistic and deistic banishment of God from the real world is recalled and the doctrine of the Divine Immanence is put in its place; yet not an immanence of caprice and disorder, but an immanence of goodness, wisdom, and law. And the difference between the natural and the supernatural is simply a difference in the attitude in which the whole field of human experience is surveyed. All the realms of life form the domain of science,—nature and history, matter and mind. And in all of these vast realms, by means of observation, investigation and classification, science seeks to answer the great question: How do things exist, and how do events happen? It is exclusively occupied with the study of efficient causes, that is of regular uniformity, of natural law. Again, the whole field of human experience, likewise, constitutes the realm of philosophy and theology. Everywhere, they ask the question: Why do things exist and why do events happen? Their exclusive function is interpretation and explanation of the facts of the material and

mental order of the universe. Their sole quest is for final causes. Where the scientist sees the working of sequential causation, the philosopher may search for the Absolute Will or the Supreme Intelligence, and the theologian may see the working of God. To trace *the method* of God's work is the business of science, but to explain its *ultimate meaning* is the task of theology and philosophy. And supernaturalism means just this: Not a capricious arbitrary Deity behind and above nature, but a supreme rational intelligence, achieving its purposes and consummating its plans in and through the natural order. Not a God, outside of the universe, who manifests his existence and power in exceptional acts and in sporadic instances, but a Christlike Spirit who suffuses the whole universe and yet transcends it in the perfection of His divine personality; who manifests His presence, power, and purpose, not in miraculous signs and arbitrary wonders, but in the progressive establishment of the kingdom of God in the form of higher and holier living.

There can be no doubt, I think, that this modern attitude towards the universe, this valid distinction between efficient and final causes, and their reconciliation, is fast gaining ground in science and in theology. Certainly, the extreme atheistic position of the past generation of scientists, with their mechanical theory of nature, has been generally abandoned. The main fact in the intellectual advance of the last decades has been the restoration of spirituality to our scientific thought of the universe. The late Prof. Bowne said: "The atheistic gust of recent years has about blown over; atheism is dead as philosophy and remains chiefly as a disposition. The critic must allow that the theistic outlook was never more encouraging." And this concise verdict is correct. Scientific literature itself amply confirms it. Modern science is no longer atheistic. Even its hesitant agnosticism is, in the main, a disavowal only of an untenable theism. And though it be far, as yet, from accepting our Christian faith as offering the only rational explanation of the phenomena which it observes and



investigates, it confesses freely, in the writings of some of its ablest authorities, that the more thoroughly and critically we study nature, the more surely we are driven at last to questions which science, as such, cannot answer. Here lies one of the great opportunities of the Christian theologian. He may show the baffled scientist the solution of the riddle of his marvellous universe, provided he abandons his false supranaturalism and makes the conception of the Divine Immanence the constructive principle of his interpretation of the creative, redemptive and providential activities of the universe.

And that, too, is being done more and more, though, as in the domain of science, the transition is a slow and difficult process. Only imperfectly, as yet, has the general conception of the Divine Immanence passed from philosophical thought into our theological and religious thinking. The great majority, indeed, of the leading theologians of all lands have discarded the false deism of the past, with many of its untenable implications. But there are still those who attempt to reconcile science and religion by a division of the field between them. Certain classes of facts are assigned to science and certain others to religion. But such a division is as uncritical as it is unsatisfactory, and can never lead to a true reconciliation. It is certain, sooner or later, to lead to collision through confusion. At best, it can only produce an armed truce between science and religion. Even Bushnell, whose *Nature and the Supernatural* pointed the way to a permanent reconciliation of the claims of science and religion, did not succeed fully in overcoming the idea of an inherent opposition between the natural and the supernatural. His great merit was that he helped men to see that the supernatural element or factor in the universe is the personal God, manifesting himself and achieving his purposes in and through the natural. But he failed to apply this great insight consistently to the whole realm of reality. In spite of his noble conception of the supernatural, he maintained that we can find unmistakable evidence of the supernatural only in phenomena which are more than natural, *i. e.*,

which cannot be explained by the action of ordinary processes and must, therefore, be ascribed to extraordinary causation and regarded as absolutely new beginnings in the order of the natural universe, due to the direct creative activity of God. Many modern writers are guilty of a similar inconsistency, with far less excuse than Bushnell, who wrote his great book before Darwin published the *Origin of Species*. They accept evolution as the method by which God has achieved the wonders of His universe, but they restrict its application arbitrarily. And they find specific evidence for the supernatural in the spheres which they thus bar to scientific investigation, fearful, apparently, lest the divine causality or teleology be endangered by a too rigid application of the divine method of evolution to the processes of the entire universe.

But such an inconsistent attitude is disastrous. In principle, it denotes a repudiation of the Divine Immanence, and a relapse into Deistic misconceptions of God; and in practise, it is bound to lead to an absolute antagonism with science, which, very properly, will not allow such an arbitrary restriction of its field of investigation. Evolution, as a name for the method of God's activity in the universe, is either true or false. If false, then let us say so and prove our contention. If true, then let there be no fear nor hesitancy to apply it to the entire realm of reality. Not by an arbitrary division of the field, but by a consistent application of the diverse methods of science and religion to the whole field can conflict and confusion be avoided. Banish science from certain spheres of human experience, and you open the way anew to the old heresies concerning the natural and the supernatural. Then the "natural" is the material and physical part of the universe, and the "supernatural" is the magical divine Being that manifests his presence, power, and purpose, in creation, redemption, and providence, mainly if not wholly, through isolated, arbitrary irruptions into the realm of nature. Assign the whole field of human experience to scientific observation and to religious interpretation and you will get the two aspects of the full-orbed

reality which are properly named the natural and the supernatural. Then you learn to apprehend the divineness of the natural and the naturalness of the divine. Then the natural will be regarded as forms, events and experiences, rigid uniformities and causal sequences, through which the supernatural, the personal ground of the universe, is manifesting His Presence and power and consummating His gracious purpose.

We have gone far afield, seemingly, in our discussion of the topic, Prayer and Natural Law. And yet, it will be seen that only against this background can a Christian doctrine of prayer be constructed. If efficient causes hold us in their relentless grip, prayer is an inveterate delusion. But if back of the causal sequences of the natural universe there is a final cause, purposive and directive, then, to say the least, prayer is still an open question. And that is the point at which we have arrived in our consideration of the theme. We have established the right of a religious interpretation of the universe, as being the outcome of *some sort* of final causality, which carries with it the provisional possibility of prayer. You cannot pray to efficient physical causes, but if there be a final cause prayer may be possible. And if that final cause be personal, then prayer must be profitable. Hence our next step must be to inquire what sort of finalism there is that expresses its will and achieves its purpose through the universal reign of law.

What do the facts say? What is the evidence in the case? The evidence which must decide the question whether the cosmic process of development under the reign of law is purposive and has been designed by a directing intelligence, is of a twofold character. There is, first, the physical universe, and, secondly, there is the phenomenon of life. So far as the former is concerned, we have there a piece of work which might fitly be ascribed to a final cause which is the embodiment of intelligent omnipotence. It is worthy, in every way, of a limitless mind and of absolute power. It is such a product as infinite skill and power might well bring forth. Scientific

evidence only strengthens that conviction, for it proves that at every point in space and period in time forces are at work whose action is absolutely perfect. On this evidence alone no man can ascribe the origin or maintenance of the universe to a reign of law, which is impersonal and non-purposive, without abandoning his own rationality. Efficient causes are not sufficient to explain the physical universe. And how is it when we examine the second class of facts, those found in the province of life? There, apart from subhuman realms of existence, we find man, human personality, as the most astonishing fact in a universe of strict uniformity and unbroken causal sequence. We see, in the most primitive man, the emergence of rational and moral capacities that separate him, by an immeasurable gulf, from the highest brute. We observe the gradual and progressive development of these human capacities in the history of the intellectual and moral growth of mankind. We stand, finally, in the presence of the matchless Jesus Christ, who realized all the latent potentialities of the spirit of man, while sharing all the limitations of his flesh. These are the facts in the realm of life which call for an explanation. All of them are the outcome of the laws of nature. Yet, how is it that uniform law produced such marvellous development of life from the simple cell to human personality as seen in Jesus Christ. Evidently, under the rigid reign of law, there has been progress: from the inorganic to the organic; from the physical to the mental and moral; from the ethical to the spiritual! And progress implies purpose. But purpose is a supremely personal word; it inheres only in personality. And if the facts of life under the reign of law exhibit a clear purposive tendency running through the ages and finding its consummation in the matchless character of Jesus Christ, and in the creation of a Christlike social order, then, again, we are compelled to assume a Person standing back of the cosmic process, originating and ordering it. Is it rational or possible to regard man, the highest product of the universe, as the effect of something itself destitute of mind and consciousness? Can the effect in any case be greater than

the originating cause? No amount of intellectual legerdemain or dogmatic assumption can shut off the inexorable demand that in every instance the cause shall be equal or superior to the effect. The sufficient cause of a universe like ours, whatever its efficient causes may be, cannot be less than the personal God of the Christian revelation.

Hence the facts, mechanical and vital, not simply warrant but fairly compel the candid searcher of truth to assume that the final cause of the universe is a Person adequate to achieve the astonishing results which have been produced by means of the efficient causes known to us as natural laws—One Whose ultimate purpose must be measured by His highest achievement, which is manhood as manifested by Jesus Christ. It is wholly unimportant to inquire what natural science has to say to this form of finalism, for as we have seen, final causes lie beyond the proper sphere of science. Yet it is interesting to observe that great scientists have not only abandoned the irrational materialism of the past generation, but are no longer afraid or ashamed of a rational finalism. Long ago, Prof. Agassiz said: "I never make preparation for penetrating into some province of nature hitherto undiscovered without breathing a prayer to the Being Who hides His secrets from me only to allure me cautiously on to the unfolding of them." And more recently, in a presidential address before the British Association, Lord Salisbury said: "Overpoweringly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent design lie around us; and if ever perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific, turn us away from them for a time, they come back upon us with irresistible force, showing us through nature the influence of a free will, and teaching us that all living things depend on the One Everlasting Creator and Ruler." Such significant testimonies might be multiplied indefinitely.

It appears, then, that we live in an ordered universe which, under one aspect, is under the reign of uniform law, while, under another aspect, it is the instrument through which a Supreme Intelligence is achieving its purpose. And it appears further that, so far, the highest expression of this Divine Will

is our human personality. Man, so far as we know, is the choicest product of the great cosmic process conducted by God. Yet man, AS WE KNOW HIM, cannot be the end of this process. He is an unfinished product. There has appeared in the field of time only one man to whom we ascribe perfection. And him we regard as the creative head of a new race. He is the redeemer of mankind. Let us revert for a moment to the two classes of evidence which point to a final personal cause, namely, the larger mechanism of the universe and the sphere of human life. And let us note, now, this startling contrast between the two: The mechanism is perfect but the organism is imperfect! When we contemplate the universe, we can only gaze in mute wonder upon the triumphs of the creative mind. But what is man? A feeble and fumbling creature at best. As Hamlet said of certain men, one might say of all mankind, "Nature's journeymen have made them and not made them well." And yet it is one and the same God has made man and the mechanism. Only, there is this far-reaching difference between the two: The mechanism is *creature*, while man, though a creature of God, is yet also *His child*. The one is bound and therefore displays the power, skill and wisdom of God, its Maker, so far as we can judge, without limit. The other is free, and the evil and sorrow of his career are the price which he is paying for the divinest of gifts. The mechanism, one may say, is God's instrumentality for the production and maintenance of life, but the evolution of personal beings has not been merely a mechanical process. Man was not cast in a mould of rigid circumstance, by a power extraneous to himself. To some extent, mankind has created itself. An overruling Providence has worked with it in such a wise as to prevent utter failure on its part; yet, it has trusted it to the utmost verge of safety to make its own way. It has displayed endless patience with it for the sake of developing its gift of self-determination. And is it not reasonable to affirm that the creation of such beings as we believe ourselves to be could have been brought to pass in no other way? Mechanical toys, human puppets doubtless could have been created some other way.



But goodness must be achieved. Its achievement implies freedom of will. And the price which man must pay for his freedom is the possibility of failure. Personality, as we know it, could only come, as it has come, out of long ages of free endeavor, with all its attendant risks. And the failures and imperfections that have attended the divine process of evolving personal beings, give us no ground on which to impeach God's goodness or to deny His power. Rather, they emphasize the fact that, so far as man is concerned, God's creation is as yet an unfinished product. The Divine Father is still at work. His creative activity is continuous, and its one great aim is to aid His human child in the consummation of his destiny and save him from the evil and sorrow of his life. In the day of naturalism the cry was "in harmony with nature." That was the gospel shouted from the housetops of science and philosophy. Get into harmony with nature! And there was much truth and reason in that cry, especially when it was aimed at the false supernaturalism which banished God from the material universe and fixed his abode somewhere beyond the stars. But nature is so much more than naturalism knew. And getting into harmony with it means vastly more than a knowledge of its physical laws and the adjustment of our life to their inexorable demands. With deep spiritual insight Matthew Arnold says:

"Know, man hath all which nature hath, but more,  
And in that more lie all his hopes of good,  
Man must begin, know this, where nature ends,  
Nature and man can never be fast friends.  
Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!"

That "more" is man's divine sonship. He is not kindred to the stars but to God. God is his Father and Friend. And if he would realize and fulfil his destiny he must pass nature and rise into friendship and communion with God. Nature is merely God's mechanism through which He conveys spiritual impulses to men and ministers to their developing life. He only understands nature who sees in it the instrument and

revelation of the creative love of God. And he alone gets the full benefit of nature who in the natural sees and appropriates the supernatural. Not "in harmony with nature," but into harmony with the God of our Christian religion, through conscious choice and voluntary self-determination, that must be the exalted aim of the human soul that would "pass nature, and not rest her slave."

And now, at last, we come definitely to the place of prayer. Instead of giving, *a priori*, a dogmatic statement of the doctrine of prayer, I have sought to construct, strictly *a posteriori*, by the inductive method, a *Weltanschauung* in which prayer has a vital significance and an indispensable function. I have attempted to give an interpretation of the observed facts of our existence and experience which is in accord, I believe, with human reason and with Christian revelation. It remains now to show the place of prayer in this universe of law, where God is continuously at work, creatively and redemptively. And it is precisely this thought that must grip us if prayer is to become a reality in our lives: God's presence in His world, His *present* redemptive activity, His constant and unremitting purpose to save men from sin by making them His sons and friends. For that conviction not only allows prayer; nay, it necessitates it. Then prayer will be the most effective means of coming into perfect communion with God—not the *only* means, for through thought and work men may also commune with God, but the most effective means. If God is the Christ-like Spirit who has created the universe, and who controls and conducts it for the spiritual development of men as the sons of the Divine Father, then prayer is personal communion between the Infinite Spirit and finite spirit, an intimate fellowship, having its parallel in human relations, through which man seeks to relate his life to God and subordinate his will to that of his Father; through which, moreover, he fits himself for coöperation with God in the consummation of his divine purpose.

In the development of the human race prayer has proved infinitely adaptable to all stages of spiritual culture. The his-

tory of prayer, as Sabatier puts it, would be a history of religion. In its lowest forms, prayer and magic were indistinguishable. To pray, then, was to use charms that compelled the assent of reluctant or hostile gods to human desires. From such pagan beginnings prayer has proved capable of unlimited development. The intellectual and spiritual growth of our race has not hushed prayer but has lifted it into ever finer and nobler forms. Nowhere is this more plain than in the Bible. Compare the dying prayer of Samson with the dying prayer of Stephen. "O Lord, Jehovah, remember me, I pray Thee, and strengthen me, I pray Thee, only this once, O God, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistines for my two eyes"—thus prayed Samson. "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge"—thus prayed Stephen. Or compare Jacob's prayer at Bethel with Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane. The one is a shrewd bargain with God, the other filial submission to the Father's Will. Both are prayers, but they come from two ages between which the revelation of God and the meaning of prayer had infinitely widened. Now, psychologically, these lower forms of prayer had their justification in the education of our race. Through them, after all, men communed with their gods. And thus they still perform a pedagogical function in the progressive development of our own spiritual life. But as men come into spiritual maturity, through the revelation of Jesus Christ, they must discard childish forms of prayer and pagan prayer formulas. To men with Christ's spirit, prayer can no longer be a talisman or a species of magic to coerce God, not persuasion of a reluctant God nor an ultimatum to high Heaven. Its primary aim must be through intimate communion with God, in the sacred sphere of personal relationship, to grow in love, trust and obedience. Its constant refrain and its inmost spirit must be: Not my will but Thine be done!

Thus, through prayer, man realizes and, at the same time, cultivates the divine companionship, which is the real meaning of the doctrine of Providence. Huxley, somewhere, speaks derisively of the 'peddling providence,' which, like a huckster,

offers its benefits in the open market to the highest bidder. That childish and unreflecting conception of Providence is, indeed, undermined by experience and refuted by science. The deeper truth of Providence is the constant spiritual presence of God, and the guidance of the individual by the supreme personality as unseen Friend and Companion. The great question of Providence is: Is there one that cares for me? Has God an interest in man that is personal, and has man full and free access to God? The confident answer of Christian faith is: Yes, God cares! His care extends over the whole of his creation, but it is centered upon man, his child. And this divine interest in every individual soul is manifested not only in occasional providential interventions, as the result of spasmodic cries in bitter experiences, but in his constant spiritual and personal companionship, which men may realize and actualize in prayer. The man who lives in such a communion of prayer with God may never experience an interference with the laws of nature on his behalf. Disease, disaster and death may not be averted by his petitions. But, better than all that, God will uphold him with the joy of his presence and console him with the glory of his promises. He will realize that his Father is with him in this world, and that through prayer he may enter and dwell in His companionship. With Paul, he will be able to say, "All things work together for good to them that love God."

And when a man has learned that prayer is not sorcery, beggary, or soliloquy, but communion with God when he has tasted and enjoyed the transforming experience of the divine friendship, he leaves far behind all the theoretical perplexities that beset prayer. Then he knows that prayer is the search of the soul for God rather than for His gifts, for spiritual life rather than for material good. Then the standard objections to prayer, viz., the reign of natural law making answers impossible, the goodness and wisdom of God making changes in His plans undesirable, will not trouble him.

But let us face the one great theoretical perplexity that besets prayer. Psychologically, petition forms an inevitable ele-

ment of our prayers. We are children, helpless and needy, and if God is our Father, the vicissitudes of life will compel us frequently to go to Him with prayers of petition and intercession. But as soon as petition enters into our prayer we encounter the formidable obstacle of the reign of law. Must we then forego petition? Is our prayer to God simply the means of learning resignation and submission to the Divine Will? No one, indeed, has completely mastered the difficult art of Christian prayer until he has learned to say, "Thy will be done"; until that supreme petition is not merely a plaintive sob wrung from reluctant lips, but a triumphant cry, not merely helpless resignation but voluntary submission to God and glad coöperation with Him. And when, with our Lord, we stand on that high level of Christian experience, we shall know that prayer never fails, even though our petitions remain unanswered. Our Father answers us though He denies our petitions. His answer will be life—the triumph of His love in us and the achievement of His divine purpose in our lives. But our question now is whether the sole efficacy of prayer is reflexive and subjective, or whether we may reasonably believe that the immanent God whose wisdom and purpose the laws of nature constantly express, will permit any variation whatever in natural events under the influence of our prayers? In this modern difficulty, the Bible affords us no direct help. It does not even raise this problem, let alone solve it, for the unity of nature and the uniformity of her laws was wholly unknown in the ages when our Bible was written. But we have already seen that natural law, so far from being a chain that binds God or a barrier that excludes Him from nature, is an expression of His Will, the constant manner in which the Divine Person pursues his creative and redemptive purpose. H. E. Fosdick, in his recent book, *The Meaning of Prayer*, which is the most commendable treatise on that topic known to the writer, says beautifully, "Dealing with the reign of natural law is like going through the Simplon Tunnel. Go a little way and one has darkness and imprisonment. Go to the end, and one has

light, liberty, and the far stretches of the Italian hills." When you realize that natural law is our name for the way in which our omnipotent Father conducts His universe, then the answer to the question whether we may expect any changes in the realm of nature in response to our petitions must be a confident and jubilant affirmative—*provided it be understood that such objective changes will further the beneficent Divine Purpose.* This is the insight which takes from the heart of religion all fear of the reign of law. Even in ourselves, personality is the master and not the slave of natural laws. We cannot violate them, but we can make them do what without our intelligent coöperation they could never do. Personal causes are making natural causes the pliant tools of intelligent will. If this be true of human personality, how much truer must it be of God, the Creator of the natural laws, that they are subject absolutely to His Divine Will. Our limited control of universal forces is simply the counterpart of God's unlimited control. And the question whether God can work objective changes in nature in response to our petitions, is not a matter for speculation but for observation. It can be decided only by the actual experience of mankind. And if the power of prayer to affect the objective processes of nature is incapable of scientific demonstration, we may conclude that the mechanism of the universe is so wisely planned and so lovingly adapted to the realization of the Divine Purpose, which is not our "happiness" but our blessedness, that any change in it would be disastrous to our supreme good; but we may not conclude that the mechanism of the universe interposes an effective barrier between our needs and God's ability or willingness to satisfy them. Hence we may indeed pray about everything. But we shall *pray in faith*, which is by no means the same thing as having faith in prayer. Faith in prayer may lead us to do things that are foolish and futile. It may present ultimatums to the Almighty demanding his acquiescence; or it may try to make a prayer a talisman that shall work magical changes in nature. But prayer in faith asks everything in entire submission to the will



of God. It remembers that thought and work, as well as prayer, are active means of communion with God. Hence it will not be a prayer that stultifies the Christian intelligence, our rational insight into the method and means of God's work, nor one that parades as a cheap substitute for earnest effort. It will not, for example, ask God to swing a storm out of its regular path in order to water the cornfield of a pious farmer, because that would introduce confusion in place of the order that reigns in the universe. Nor will it expect Him to abate a typhoid fever epidemic in answer to our petitions, since He has showed us that the demon of typhoid must be exorcised by work, and not by prayer.

But can our petitions be truly said to have been heard and answered unless objective changes result through them? Our answer to this question will depend wholly on our conception of the true meaning of prayer. If, primarily, prayer is "asking God for things," then its efficacy is determined by getting what we ask for. But if prayer is our highest act of devotion, "in which we become conscious of God as he discloses himself in our inmost being, in which, too, we realize that elevation of spirit above the world, wherein the unrest that springs from the imperfect forms of particular desires gives place to the sweet and blessed peace of the life of God—if this is the true meaning of prayer, then men will pray as long as they have need of communion with the Father of spirits and he has some better things for them than any earthly gifts" ("Realities of Christian Theology" by Beckwith). But the best reply to our question is the prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane. Was his prayer answered? In that great moral crisis of His life He brought the confused and crushing weight on His heart to His Heavenly Father, and, shrinking from its burden and bitterness, He begged earnestly and vehemently that it be removed. And then, gradually, in the communion of prayer, the tumult subsided, and its place was taken by a profound consciousness of submission, of happy trust, of resting in God, and of divine strength mightier than temptation, pain, or the fear of death.

If objective changes are the sole proof of the efficacy of prayer, then Jesus' great prayer remained unanswered. But if strength, peace, and vision count for aught in our spiritual life, then His prayer was fully answered. And it is mere juggling with words to describe such an answer to prayer as "reflex influence," or as "*merely*" subjective. It is neither. For it is not brought about simply by the soul itself, engaged in pious soliloquy. Nay, it is brought about by God in the soul of man through prayer. It is a result wrought in the realm of his spiritual life, by actual spiritual communion and fellowship with God. It is a realization of that for which prayer stands and of which it is the great means, namely, a conscious union of the soul with God, glad submission to His Will, and joyous coöperation with it, and thus vital fellowship with the Father. And as Jesus teaches us how to pray, our will, too, shall move gradually and progressively from the lower—the physical, the individual, the human—to the higher—the spiritual, the universal, the divine aspect and aim. And we shall find within the inner realm of our personal relationship to God, the sphere in which our prayers are answered. Through communion with God in prayer, we shall find in Him our supreme good, the unfailing source of strength and wisdom, of inspiration and comfort, of peace and joy. Through our prayer-life God will be enabled to finish in us His great creation, to save us to the uttermost by making us partakers of His divine life.

"Lord, teach us to pray," the disciples said to Jesus. It was a remarkable request. They did not ask for instruction in teaching, preaching, or healing, but for instruction in prayer. Preaching and teaching is thinking with God; ministering to human needs is working with God; but prayer is living with God. And it is our life with God that makes our thought true and our work efficient. Without exception, those who have thought and wrought greatly in God's kingdom, have been great pray-ers. And Jesus, who imaged the Father's thought without a shadow and who did His will perfectly, this crystal

Christ, matchless in thought and work, was matchless also in prayer. Men are still speculating about the mystery of his personality. We know that God dwelt in him, full of grace and truth, and that he was given unto us for our salvation. We believe that he was the perfect Son of God. But when we seek to solve the mystery of God's incarnation in Christ our partial knowledge shades off into ignorance. No metaphysical key in our possession fits the lock or opens the door that guards the secret of Christ's divine-human personality. Perhaps we should know him better and understand him more if our experience enabled us to follow him into the Holy of Holies of his life, his closet of prayer, where his soul dwelt in unbroken fellowship and in unclouded communion with God.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN TRUTH. By John A. W. Haas, President of Muhlenberg College, Professor of Religion and Philosophy. Boston: Richard G. Badger. Pages 329. Prices \$1.50 net.

The author assumes that in every age the truth of Christianity and the thought-trends are closely related. "Christianity must influence thought and thought must condition the intellectual expression of Christianity." In his consideration of trends of thought he confines himself to those which appear in scientific and philosophic thinking—excluding artistic and literary ideals. There are four centers around which the discussion of the leading trends cluster: (1) The mathematical or quantitative; (2) The inductive, based on comparison and analogy; (3) The mechanical, biological, and psychological; (4) The social or sociological. These are ways of approach to truth or reality, for thought is carefully distinguished from truth. "The aim of thought is to attain truth." "The intellect may not be all that truth needs but it cannot be absent. In fact it remains, after all, the dominant factor, if not in actuality, at any rate in the demonstration of truth."

The question at once arises, what is truth? how is it obtained? shall it be discovered or unveiled? Truth has been defined as the Absolute and as Reality. It may be comprehended by a process of logic or by immediate intuition. At any rate it is static and final; and when once perceived, the expression of it is fixed and immutable. Again, truth is conceived as relative, dependent on life and experience. Such is the conception of the pragmatist, the vitalist, the realist. What sympathy has Christianity with these different conceptions of truth? Is it essentially mystic, logical, or vitalistic? To what extent do these different conceptions of truth enable us to understand and interpret Christianity? It cannot ignore these ways of thought and forms of truth; but "in all its various forms it must come into relation with the problem of thought and truth."

After defining the thought-trends and truth forms, he proceeds to define Christianity. "Among all the varieties of the conception of Christianity there are several leading types." The first is the dogmatic which regards Christianity as consisting of "a number of truths. These are formulated into some kind of a Christian philosophy and form a system." The second is the

mystic, apprehending the truth of Christianity in the immediacy of feeling. "By intuition and imagination a religious world of thought is constructed." A third type is the voluntaristic, which interprets religion from the point of view of the will.

"All the types of interpreting Christianity which have been discussed may be finally reduced to another fundamental distinction, that between the permanent and the changing, the eternal and the temporal." Those who hold the former view claim that Christianity is "a spiritual unchanging reality and truth." They make no allowance "for its historic origin nor its development." This is the view of the conservatives and the dogmatists, who "leave no real place for progress, for even the progress of the assimilation of the eternal truth is in fact only the absorption into the unchanging reality." The other conception of Christianity regards it as a "merely human religious historical movement to be determined by and compared with, other religions." It consists only of "humanly created values but not of existent and actual eternal realities."

The author holds that "the same attitude appears to be in the combination, and not in the separation, of the two elements of eternity and temporality." An eternal Christianity without true development, or an historical Christianity without unchanging principle is a misconception. "When we have combined both elements it is evident that from this point of view particularly we must from time to time inquire how the historical interpretation of eternal truth is related to the thinking of an age."

After having defined his terms, as briefly outlined above, the author, to use his own language, goes on "to inquire, weigh, balance, compare, criticise, and then to attempt without violence to what we conceive to be the eternal elements in Christianity, to reaffirm its (Christianity's) truths and to indicate how they agree or can agree, and how they disagree and must disagree, with modern conception of thought and truth."

The discussion is divided into two parts. Part One—Leading Trends of Thought—has eight chapters headed as follows: (1) The Mathematical Method; (2) The Inductive Claim; (3) The Comparative Idea; (4) The Conjectural Scheme; (5) The Mechanical Demand; (6) The Biological Supposition; (7) The Psychological Solution; (8) The Social Trend. Part Two—Thought and Truth—has seven chapters with the following headings: (1) The Finding of Truth; (2) The Absolutist Aim; (3) The Mystic Absorption; (4) The Pragmatic Program; (5) The Results of Pragmatism; (6) The Vitalist View; (7) The Realist Realm.

In each chapter of Part One the author gives a brief historical statement of the method of thought under discussion, states its fundamental principles, shows its merits and its defects, and how it may be an aid or a hindrance to Christian truth. He himself

occupies mediating ground, being neither a narrow conservative nor a liberal. In his own words he "mediates between wholesale adoption and complete rejection."

His attitude comes to view in the chapter on the Biological Supposition in which he discusses the relation of evolution to Christianity. He shows how the forces and factors in the evolutionary process may be safely appropriated by Christian thinkers. He allows room for environment and heredity in the development of life and character. But he objects vigorously to materialistic, fatalistic, and atheistic evolution. On page 120 he says: "If evolution as a biological theory remains within its limits and knows its sphere, it will not contradict the claims of Christianity. If we avoid a materialistic philosophy in biology, and if we do not make nature all-controlling, we can accept evolution as not in disagreement with Christianity. A conflict can be avoided, if biological science remains sober in its own sphere, and does not antagonize Christianity within its sphere. The only difficulty occurs when evolution demands a control over all existence. If it begins with an originally assumed matter and energy, and passes upward mechanically, claiming the mechanical ultimates as sufficient, it will, of course, contradict a spiritual religion."

While he defines with great care the limitations of the evolutionary hypothesis, he makes some striking concessions to the liberal interpretation of Christianity in the following passage: "But, on the other hand, Christianity must be careful not to demand as biblical facts old hypotheses of species. It must differentiate between biblical statement in popular, religious language and the interpretation which tradition has put upon biblical statement. In this tradition there are elements of past science, which have unconsciously colored the biblical account. Christianity must also treat its documents historically and not be disturbed if the temporal vessels of its religious truths are not shaped scientifically. Were they thus shaped they would fail in their very purpose. It is general, popular, descriptive, child-like language which is universal and lasting. But Christianity must make certain great reservations over against any theory of evolution. It must demand that the doctrines of a personal God, of the final spiritual character of life and its origin, and of the divine nature of man's spirit, be not violated." Statements like these are especially significant when they come from a representative scholar and theologian of the Lutheran Church.

In Part Two the reader will find a most interesting and illuminating discussion of the different philosophical interpretations of truth and life and their relation to Christianity. Each chapter is worthy of careful study. The author is master of the best authorities on the subject. He has read widely and thought deeply. Whether one agrees with all his conclusions or not, he must admire his power of analysis, comparison, and differentia-



tion. He remains a conservative, though he makes concessions to the liberals. He cannot, as yet, cross the dividing line. After all is said, his conception of Christianity is static and dogmatic. "Christianity," he says, "has a system of truth to which it must cling." One wonders whether the author identifies that "system of truth to which it must cling" with the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord. Aye, there's the rub. Here we are inclined to differ from him. Truth, in our view, is dynamic and vital, not static and dogmatic. It consists primarily, not in a series of revealed doctrines, however simple they may be, but in vital relations, physical, social, religious. Jesus did more than reveal doctrines; he established vital relations between God and man, between man and man, between man and the world. Doctrinal statements will follow vital relations and describe them. They do not beget them. All such statements, however, fail to express the fulness of reality in the vital relations. Therefore while the relations remain constant or vary only in degree, the doctrinal statements are subject to change from age to age.

While reading chapter after chapter we feel the need of a definition of essential Christianity. The definition of Christianity on pages 18 to 25 is not sufficient; it does not touch the vital point. One constantly asks, what is the Christianity of Jesus? What are its essential and immutable elements? What its transient and mutable forms? In the last sentence of the Introduction the author says: "The Christian truth which will be compared with the trends of thought, embraces the fundamental and essential features of what constitutes the general, prevalent, and common Christianity." The last clause, "the general, prevalent, and common Christianity," is too vague a term when one is about to make a philosophic comparison between Trends of Thought and Christian Truth. We need a definition of Christianity in the light of the revelation of Jesus in the New Testament, which we believe to be far simpler than "the fundamental and essential features of what constitutes the general, prevalent, and common Christianity." Such a definition, it seems to us, would have enabled the reader to understand more readily the relation of Christianity to modern thought-trends.

We recommend this book to all thoughtful readers. It must not merely be read through; it must be thought through. It is a privilege for a college student to sit in the class-room of one who can write such a book; it consists of lectures which were delivered before college men. It is the kind of work that is indispensable in a college curriculum if we would reconcile the difficulties which arise in the minds of the present-day college student when he studies science and philosophy and compares the conclusions of these disciplines with the religion and theology which he has received as a sacred heritage from his fathers.

G. W. RICHARDS.

THE NEW PERSONALITY AND OTHER SERMONS. By Frederick F. Shannon. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company.

The author of this volume is pastor of the Reformed Church-on-the-Heights, Brooklyn, New York. The dozen sermons in this book show that he is a preacher of more than ordinary ability. He has a real living message expressed with unusual felicity and force. His themes circle around the heart of the Gospel. Every text, with a single exception, is taken from the New Testament. The introductory sermon based on John III:3 referring to the New Birth has furnished for him the title of the book.

We commend this volume to the readers of the REVIEW for two distinct reasons. First of all these sermons are vigorous and robust in thought, and then they are fashioned by a man possessed of rare gift of expression. As far as the content of his sermons is concerned the author evidently believes that Christianity is for the strong man. He makes his appeal to the robust element in human nature. He finds all his subjects in the Bible and shows very plainly that the true work of the preacher is to declare to men the message of the Gospel. We can easily see how themes such as the author treats in this volume would have a compelling attraction and influence on people who amid the whirl of city life find time to listen to a preacher who really touches their life.

Furthermore we congratulate the author upon the fact that he has given fit and worthy expression to his ideas. If literature is the art of saying what one wants to say in the most effective fashion then these sermons are literature. There are those who are constantly telling us that a sermon is not literature and has nothing to do with literature, that the business of the preacher is the saving and the upbuilding of souls and therefore Cockney slang is as acceptable in the pulpit as highly wrought English. With this opinion we do not agree. Of course any passage which has a mere æsthetic effect, which makes people say "How beautiful that is!" has no business to be in any sermon. Any preacher who gives way to the temptation of using such passages is like Atalanta who lost her race because the beautiful apple drew her from the path. A preacher who is in dead earnest has no time for picking flowers unless they are of the utmost service to him. While we grant all that, we maintain too that sermons ought to be literature, that preachers ought to pay sufficient attention to the form of their deliverances. We do not mean that they are to deliver neatly written essays which may be fine English but which will certainly leave their hearers unmoved. We do not mean polish, for that means loss of heat. But we mean care for the instrument that is used in heralding the Gospel. We do not mean English tricked out in literary flummery but we do mean direct, vigorous, savory English as you find in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*. Any man who has ever read Robertson's sermons knows what we mean. The reason why so

many sermons in modern days prove to be a bore is because preachers fall into the habit of having a limited conventional vocabulary. They are slovenly in their pulpit style and then they fulminate against their hearers and accuse them of listlessness and indifference.

The Bible was not written in slovenly fashion. Do you imagine that Isaiah when he wrote those wonderful chapters said to himself: "It does not matter how I write this; any Hebrew, no matter how slovenly, will do"? If anyone would realize what fit and worthy expression of sacred thought ought to be, let him study the method in which the Bible message is delivered. The simplicity, directness, dignity and vigor of the language of the Bible has made it the standard of style for the ages. Into whatever language the Bible is translated it at once becomes the standard of style. How carefully the psalmist chose his words; what a balance and a rhythm in his sentences, what an earnestness and vigor of expression, what a vividness which seems to carry us into the very realities of life. Likewise with the New Testament passages when we cherish them in our memory we unconsciously pay tribute to their style. They are fit and worthy expressions of great thoughts.

The volume of sermons before us not only contains a message of spiritual import but it is at the same time an excellent example of nervous, direct and vigorous English. These are not essays but real sermons for strong men. They are pungent, gripping, effective and full of spiritual vitality.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

**THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE PRIMITIVE SEMITES.** By Henry Schaeffer, Ph.D., Member of the American School for Oriental Study and Research, Syria, 1908-09. Yale University Press, 1915. Price \$2.35 net, postpaid. Pages i-xiv, 1-245.

This book, according to its preface, is an outgrowth of a thesis presented in 1912 to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctorate.

The book treats of the social customs and legislation of the primitive Semites or more particularly of three groups of ancient Semites: the ancient Israelites; the ancient Arabs; and the ancient Semites in Babylonia. The subject is treated in fourteen chapters as follows: I. Matriarchy; II. Patriarchy; III. Agnation; IV. The Goël, or Next of Kin; V. Slavery; VI. Interest; VII. Pledges and Security; VIII. The Social Problem as viewed by the Prophets; IX. Poor Laws; X. Sabbatical Year; XI. The Year of Jubilee; XII. Ezekiel's Plan of Allotment; XIII. Taxation and Tribute; and XIV. The Development of Individual Landownership in Israel. The naming of the chapter titles suffices to indicate the scope of the treatment or what social cus-

toms and legislation of the ancient Israelites, Arabs and Babylonians are considered in this volume.

The volume also abounds in footnotes of a more or less technical character; these footnotes appear on every page throughout the entire volume. They are of course printed in smaller type. In not a few instances these notes fill one third of the page and in some instances even one half of the page, while in the great majority of instances they are very brief, some of these latter frequently consist of only a single word or of a Biblical reference or of a name of an author, etc. The number of these footnotes in the entire volume is 1242.

Apart from the treatment of the theme under the above-mentioned fourteen chapters and in the footnotes, the volume has a brief preface in which the author informs the reader concerning the origin of his book and the system of transliteration of Semitic terms followed by him, and also calls the reader's attention to the list of principal abbreviations, to the index of Biblical references, and to the index of subjects. Thereupon follows a list of about ten or more names of professors in different schools of higher learning in our country and of some other individuals, to some of whom the author acknowledges himself as grateful for valuable suggestions and criticisms, to others of whom for courtesies and helpful suggestions, and to still others for assistance in proofreading.

Other formal characteristics of the volume are: a good table of contents, covering four full pages; a list of the principal abbreviations employed in the volume in referring to other scientific works, most of which are in German, the rest in English, covering two full pages; a convenient index of six pages of Biblical references, presented in an orderly way in three main divisions, as follows: Old Testament, New Testament, and Apocrypha, with subdivisions under the names of the several canonical and non-canonical books; and last of all, but not the feature least helpful to the user of the volume, an index of subjects, of about four and one half pages.

The treatment of the subjects of the various chapters is clear and strictly methodical. The author discusses in each chapter separately the data furnished by the Old Testament, then in a similar way those furnished by the ancient Arabs, and then likewise those by the ancient Babylonians. In this way the reader is made acquainted with the social customs and the legislation of these three groups of ancient Semites on the subject under discussion in the given chapter. The treatment therefore amounts to a comparative study of the social customs and legislation of these Semites on the subjects of the several chapters of the volume.

Throughout the entire volume, which, as the titles of the several chapters indicate, covers a large field, the author gives ample

evidence of being well acquainted not only with the works and views of other scholars but also with the sources in their original languages, more especially with Hebrew and with the languages written in cuneiform, as also with Arabic.

Of course, in the discussion of a subject like the one of the present volume, one man will make his way through the numerous conflicting views and the difficulties of the many problems by one path, while another comes out by another path. This is not necessarily due to incompetence on the part of the one or on the part of both, or in other words, to subjective insufficiency, but it may also be due to objective insufficiency. Any one who is measurably well acquainted with the sources in the original languages, available for the study of the subject of the present volume, knows that such an actual difference in the results is in a large measure due rather to the character of the existing data themselves, which are sometimes on a given point meagre, sometimes imperfect, and sometimes complicated and even ambiguous and consequently difficult of interpretation. Here then is where the subjective element comes into the discussion. Our author has honestly striven to adhere to the data themselves and consequently the subjective element is not more pronounced in his volume than in that of any one else who has honestly striven to present an objective account. He does not lay claim to great originality, and says that he "was frequently obliged to choose his way between conflicting theories and arguments, and to collect the scattered rays of light from various sources. An endeavor has been made to present as clearly as possible the leading facts of a most interesting subject." (Preface.) There are a number of minor points in the sphere of transliteration, phraseology, interpretation, and proofreading, which I have corrected on the margin in the copy read by me. The number of these points is however not very large. Nor do they seriously mar the volume or the presentation. In general, the author performed his difficult task very well, and the readers of our Reformed Church Review, who are interested in a historical and comparative study of Israel's social customs and legislation, will find this volume not only interesting but also instructive.

IRWIN H. DELONG.